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What could be more important, in these times of turbulence, than the 
investigation into the phenomenon of whistleblowing? We focus on 
one particular story—that of Peer Jacob Svenkerud (hereafter, PJS) in 
the hopes and beliefs that greater understanding will lead to increased 
effectiveness in responding to, seeing the warning signs, and establishing 
cultures that respond to whistleblowing. In this book, our aim is to inves­
tigate, through various theoretical approaches, one narrative, one data 
set, from the actual experiences of a whistleblower.
This book grew out of an ethnographic chapter that Peer Jacob Sven­
kerud (PJS) contributed to an earlier book, edited by Soelberg, Brown­
ing, and Sørnes, titled  High North Stories in a Time of Transition. Based 
on his experience with articulating his story in ethnographic form, PJS 
invited the second and third editors to participate in developing a book 
with a multi-dimensional focus on his experience as a whistleblower. His 
goal, rather than simply sensationalizing his story, was to use it to show­
case theoretical development. Our question, in inviting writers for chap­
ters, was this: How does your theoretical stance as a scholar inform the 
data that PJS developed from his experience? 
One of our goals was to enjoy the experience while we did the work.
In service of that goal, work sessions occurred in delightful places: Crest-
one, Colorado; San Pancho, Mexico; Bodo, Norway; and at PJS’s farm 
northeast of Oslo. These work sessions allowed us to complete 26 hours 
of interviews and to translate documents central to the whistleblowing 
event, including news articles, annual reports, governmental reports, and 
official investigative formal reports contracted by Norsk Tipping. These 
are the data provided to the chapter writers as a basis for their analysis.
As we elaborate in Chapter 2 , the total data set was posted on a web­
site; the chapter writers used the website to access these documents as the 
data for their analysis. Our goal was to generate independent interpreta­
tions of the data.
Several grants enabled us to complete this book. We thank Inland 
Norway University of Applied Sciences and Nord University for their 
generous support through research grants for traveling, transcription,



























We also thank Åse Storhaug Hole and Anne Oline Haugen, as they 
were pivotal in initiating the project and securing funding at Inland Uni­
versity; John Trimble, distinguished teaching professor of English, emeri­
tus, University of Texas at Austin for editing the final copy; François 
Cooren, for supporting our efforts in securing a contract with Routledge; 
and Victoria Hoch for taking a final sweep through the galley proofs. As 
always, we thank Wencke and Victoria for keeping the home fires burn­
ing. Following is the rationale and outline for this book.
A Rationale and Outline 
This book, Whistleblowing, Communication and Consequences: Lessons 
from The Norwegian National Lottery, offers the first in-depth analysis 
of a highly publicized, and morally complex, case of whistleblowing—the 
take-down of Norsk Tipping (hereafter, NT), Norway’s national lottery,
by one of the firm’s senior officials, Peer Jacob Svenkerud, (hereafter, PJS) 
the Senior Vice President Information and External Relations. It took
29 months for NTʼs wrongdoings to be resolved. Meanwhile, PJS was
asked to stay in place as a confidential informant and, ironically, also to 
help create the firm’s communication strategy for responding to the very 
illegalities he had privately revealed. He agreed to become a double agent 
and to live a life of secrecy for the 29 months it took for PJSʼs identity to 
become public knowledge.
PJS himself gets the opening chapter here to tell us his story from his
own viewpoint. The second chapter, which PJS co-writes with his editing
partners, turns to a theoretical interpretation of voice and heroism to set
expectations for the chapter contributors. Then, in the succeeding chapters,
13 scholars take turns viewing the same incident, but each through his or
her own theoretical lens, the better to reveal the case’s multi-dimensional
complexity.The book is synthesized with Rita L. Rahoi-Gilchrest’s epilogue.
What can we learn from their dissecting of this example of institutional 
failure? It turns out, plenty.
Whistleblowing, Communication and Consequences: Lessons from 
The Norwegian National Lottery lays out a single case, that of PJS blow­
ing the whistle while the Senior Vice President Information and External 
Relations . Our inspiration for this strategy comes from several places: 
James G. March and his colleagues urge us to learn from samples of one 
or fewer by trading the analysis of multiple cases to the depth of multiple 
analyses of a single case.1 Franç ois Cooren follows this model by asking 
contributors to analyze a single board meeting from multiple perspec­
tives.2 The body of the book follows March’s insistence and Cooren’s 
example by submitting PJS’s outlier case to 13 different theoretical lenses 
to show its complex and multi-faceted nature. Our aim is to offer fresh 
takes on what might be learned about wrongdoing in organizations.
What follows is an outline of the chapters and the contributing authors.
 
   
 











   
 
   
 
 








Part I: Introduction 
1. Alone Against the Organization: Peerʼs Whistleblower Story. Peer J.
Svenkerud, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences.
2. Whistleblowing, Voice, and Monomythology: The Prospect for Anal-
ysis . Larry Browning, Nord University and University of Texas at 
Austin; Jan-Oddvar Sørnes, Nord University; and Peer J. Svenkerud,
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences 
Part II: What Goes Wrong? 
What triggers a sense that something has gone desperately wrong? How
does communication change when wrongdoing happens? Greene, Horvath,
and Browningʼs opening chapter on the rhetoric of wrongdoing introduces
this three-chapter grouping by locating whistleblowing as a persuasive act
articulated in a local culture, with blame and gain activated within a micro-
political context.Anne Oline Haugen then addresses Norway’s legal system,
especially as to whether its laws support and defend whistleblowers. Corey
Bruno and Charles Conrad cap the section by showing how the story dem-
onstrates the autonomous choice of the whistleblower—especially how
PJS’s corporate knowledge and communication style distinguish his story.
3. Truth-Telling and Organizational Democracy: The Rhetoric of Whis-
tleblowing as an Act of Parrhesia. Ronald Walter Greene, University 
of Minnesota; Daniel Horvath, California State University, Stan-
islaus; and Larry Browning, Nord University and the University of 
Texas at Austin.
4. Smothered by Paradoxes and Swamped by Procedures: The Legal 
Context of the Case. Anne Oline Haugen, Inland Norway University 
of Applied Sciences.
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tion, Corey Bruno and Charles Conrad, Texas A&M University.
Part III: How Does It Happen? 
Why do some organization members fail to see wrongdoing, let alone 
report it? It is hardly uncommon: “Employees, perhaps sensing that man-
agers will not welcome complaints, often do not speak up.” 3 It’s much 
easier to look past the misconduct; blowing the whistle requires a lot 
of energy and effort, and people are often punished for it. 4 But how,
exactly, does an organization’s culture repress or express what to con-
sider wrongdoing? How do people decide what to look past and what to 
report? Karl E. Weick’s lead-off chapter of this four-set grouping shows 
us that sensemaking occurs when something is set apart from the routine 























a way to question this situation, to ask, “What’s happening here?” Next,
Einar Øverenget and Åse Storhaug Hole argue that ethical blindness con-
sists of closing one’s eyes to avoid seeing what is clearly wrongdoing—in 
effect, it is blindness by choice. For the authors, moral neutralization 
occurs not when looking past the behavior but instead when seeing and 
interpreting what is directly visible and common enough to be explicable 
and acceptable—in short, rationalized and normalized. De la Garza con-
tributes to this section by applying the concept of the chronotope to trace 
the time-space relations of PJS’s story and how then spatio-temporal 
sequences relate to De la Garza’s own experience with whistleblowing.
Finally, Bjørn T. Bakken and Thorvald Hærem apply the concept of weak 
signals to this whistleblowing case and suggest how a person and organi-
zation might move from weak to strong signals.
6. Sensemaking and Whistleblowing. Karl E. Weick, University of 
Michigan.
7. Ethical Blindness as an Explanation for Non-Reporting of Organiza-
tional Wrongdoing. Einar Øverenget and Åse Storhaug Hole, Inland 
Norway University of Applied Sciences.
8. Chronotopic Distinctions in Whistleblowing Events: X-Rays of 
Power and Sustaining Values. Sarah Amira de la Garza,Arizona State 
University.
9. Whistleblowing: Making a Weak Signal Stronger. Bjørn T. Bakken,
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, and Thorvald Hærem,
Inland Norway Business School.
Part IV: What Makes Whistleblowing a Risky Business? 
The three chapters in this part focus on the things that pique atten-
tion and stand apart whenever whistleblowing occurs. What happens 
when an organization is jolted out of the norm by an individual? Joseph 
McGlynn shows us that risk invariably increases for the person who 
blows the whistle, especially since others may shrink from taking the 
same risk. Brian K. Richardson, in his chapter on heroes and villains,
shows us that organizations don’t automatically see the whistleblower 
as a symbol of justice and fairness; instead, they’ll often question the 
person’s motives. Or they’ll ask: Why does he or she act the morally 
superior hero while I choose to remain quiet as a morally average per-
son?5 Audra Diers-Lawson shows us that crisis communication typically 
treats whistleblowing as simply another kind of problem that requires 
clarity about who the organization’s stakeholders are and what it takes 
to satisfy them.
10. Blowing the Whistle Is Laden With Risk. Joseph McGlynn, Univer-
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11. Hero or “Prince of Darkness”? Locating Peer Jacob Svenkerud in an 
Attributions-Based Typology of Whistleblowers. Brian K. Richard-
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Part V: How to Encourage Employees to Report Wrongdoing 
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three chapters in this section come to grips with why wrongdoing proves
hard to control and whistleblowing is so difficult to support—especially
in strong cultures. Åse Storhaug Hole and Therese E. Sverdrup take up the
psychological contract—the expectations—between the organization and
a person. They describe the obligations that keep the structures of confor-
mity intact. June Borge Doornitch’s chapter on internal control systems
explores this inquiry: Is it possible to structure a fool-proof organization in
such a way that wrongdoing is always handled internally? Can processes
be made seamless, so that decision-makers can rectify a problem without
the pressure of external controls? Finally,William Rothel Smith III, Jeffrey
W. Treem, and Joshua B. Barbour interrogate the concept of authority by
analyzing how it is communicated by key players at NT.
13. The Influence of Psychological Contracts on Decision-Making in 
Whistleblowing Processes. Åse Storhaug Hole and Therese E. Sver-
drup, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences and Norwegian 
School of Economics (NHH).
14. Culture Eats Control for Breakfast: The Difficulty of Designing Man-
agement Systems for Whistleblowing. June Borge Doornich, Nord 
University.
15. Whistleblowing as a Means of (Re)Constituting an Organization.
William Rothel Smith III, Jeffrey W. Treem, and Joshua B. Barbour,
University of Texas at Austin.
Part VI: Epilogue 
16. Epilogue: God and Devil, Hero and Villain, and the Long Journey 
Ahead. Rita L. Rahoi-Gilchrest, Winona State University.
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 1 Alone Against the 
Organization—Peer’s 
Whistleblower Story 
Peer Jacob Svenkerud 
Throughout most of my adulthood I had felt as if a shadow were fol-
lowing me—a feeling of general unhappiness about where my life had 
taken me, a sense of not belonging, and of failing to accomplish anything 
meaningful. I had spent countless hours wondering why I felt like this 
and thinking that the feeling would never go away, that it had simply 
become a part of me. It took many years before I found a solution, and 
my story is about that journey.
There’s a tiny bus stop between the rural towns of Elverum and Hamar,
almost lost in the vast pine forests in that part of Norway. I had gotten
used to stopping there daily to vomit in its solitude, hoping to quiet my
churning stomach.The obstacles confronting me seemed intractable. More
than two years earlier, in 2007, I had blown the whistle on the CEO of my
own organization, and it had seemed to cost me as dearly as it had him.
Whenever I now pass that bus stop, I see it as a symbol of a transformative 
period in my life, a symbol of a place and time when the question of who 
I was and who I wanted to become was essential for my development.
I remember my parents telling me that unrest and impatience were
always major features of my personality, so when, in 1994, I announced
my decision to study abroad, in the American West, it surprised no one.
It was just another sign of my impatience and need to discover. I ended
up spending many years in the U.S., concluding at the University of
New Mexico. By then I had been blessed to meet and work with Ever-
ett Rogers, one of the most famous communication researchers in the
world. My time with him gave me new confidence, encouragement,
and support. His work, on the diffusion of innovations, centered on
how new practices and ideas spread, and I knew it would have a real
impact, for it had already had that on me. Empowered by it, I had
become more focused and ambitious, and I was now doing things that
were appreciated and important. I had stumbled into the right place at
the right time.
But my unrest and yearning for a sense of belonging never seemed to 
go away. And year after year, those feelings became ever stronger and 



























4 Peer Jacob Svenkerud 
was largely fulfilling, and my private life was fine. But my unsettled-
ness pressed on me, urging me to make some sort of radical life change,
possibly even like moving back home to Norway and changing my career.
But what job could I find there? Having now spent many years abroad,
my network was small and my knowledge of Norwegian working life 
was limited.
But in the summer of 1998, I was lucky to be offered a well-paying job 
with Burson-Marsteller, a global public relations and communications 
firm headquartered in New York City. Delighted, I accepted it. Soon I 
found myself living back in Oslo, doing enjoyable work on a nice salary,
and getting to travel business class internationally. A new career path 
began to form, and my anxiety abated. I was living the dream.
I was involved in creating training programs in intercultural competence; 
giving speeches on corporate social responsibility, strategy, and leadership; 
and writing editorials about them. I was building a name for myself in the 
corporate world, even doing so well that I was invited to teach part time 
at the Norwegian School of Economics and serve on a university board.
Headhunters kept me abreast of exciting possibilities.
My specialty became issues involving corporate social responsibility. I 
focused on the idea of “doing good” and “doing well” simultaneously— 
that is, showing that it was possible for businesses both to have a pos-
itive societal impact and make a good profit. But being a consultant 
meant that I essentially just moved from task to task, billing as many 
hours for Burson-Marsteller as possible. There was no sense of owner-
ship or being part of a company culture. I yearned to be the leader that 
I was telling others to be.
So in the fall of 2000, I Ieft Burson-Marsteller and started working for 
the international telecommunications operator Telenor, one of the largest 
corporations in Norway. The work involved the responsibility of build-
ing international leadership competence by establishing a corporate uni-
versity. It was exciting. The work took me all over the world. I traveled 
with former colleagues to places such as Bangladesh, where I wrote case 
studies for Instead, a French business school, about Telnor’s operations in 
Bangladesh and its economic effect on the Bengali population.1,2,3 A high-
light was our meeting with Dr. Mohammad Yunus, founder of Grameen 
Bank and co-partner of Telenor (and later a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate),
in his simple office in Dhaka, a picture of Gandhi on the wall behind him.
There, he said something I will never forget. We were telling him about 
our work on ethics and business practices. Yunus mostly listened.
“Yes,” he finally said, “I agree. Doing good and doing well seem to go 
hand in hand. However, remember one thing, Mr. Svenkerud: we all have 
to be truthful to ourselves. Corporate social responsibility and ethics 
aren’t something that you practice in church every Sunday by passing the 























Alone Against the Organization 5 
Consultants are notorious for not practicing what they preach, so I will 
forever remember his comment on consistency. His words were timely 
because just months later, Telenor, our company, was involved in a labor 
scandal in Bangladesh. One of Telenor’s sub-suppliers had been engaged 
in child labor. It brought the Norwegian company into crisis, and my 
existential crisis returned as well.
But just after Christmas 2002, I was offered a position with Norsk 
Tipping (NT), the Norwegian National Lottery, and promptly took it,
thinking it would resolve my crisis.The company was doing exceptionally 
well. Led by a charismatic CEO, it had transformed, in just a few years,
from a traditional operator of basic lottery games such as Lotto and 
classic sports-betting into a modern, high-tech enterprise with a broad 
portfolio. The business had skilled, mostly locally based employees and a
multiplicity of products, all of which were very popular and created fan-
tastic profits, netting billions of Norwegian kroner every year.
Not only that, but it had also received top ratings on responsibility 
measures, too. NT was a monopoly with a social mission: to channel 
gaming through one responsible operator that minimized addictive 
gambling by offering responsible products and funding good causes. In 
short, it was a company on the move and seemed a perfect fit for me. It 
was even headquartered in Hamar, a town just 30 kilometers from where 
I grew up, so I could move home and find my “place,” yet still feed my 
corporate ambitions.
My new job had me responsible for all internal and external commu-
nications, national TV drawings, and external sponsorships. I reported 
directly to the CEO and was part of the top leadership group. I enjoyed 
opportunities I had never imagined so close to home.
The world suddenly seemed to be more in balance. My internal unrest 
could take a well-deserved break. It promised to be a joyous time, with 
problems that could be easily solved. I had found my place.
But I was to discover a dark personal nightmare awaiting me on the 
horizon.
Our company’s commitment to corporate modesty was a national 
watchword. Gøran Persson, the former Swedish prime minister, once told 
me, “You know, Mr. Svenkerud, in modern monopolies you drink your 
coffee from paper cups!” In short, a monopoly, being granted a playing 
field without competitors, and getting the right to handle other people’s 
money, must live up to that trust by keeping a strict focus on costs and 
efficiency. Moreover, companies, especially publicly owned ones, had all 
started to realize that they were in the midst of a paradigm shift, a new 
age of transparency, and that society expected a degree of disclosure in 
which agreements, dealings, practices, and transactions were open to 
public verification. So corporate practices that might have been accept-
able ten years ago weren’t acceptable today—and especially in an organi-


































6 Peer Jacob Svenkerud 
The new era forged difficult changes in many previous practices. For 
example, companies like the one I worked for were now expected to
report on internal expenses, like fringe benefits, and to select their suppliers
based on objective criteria and open competition.We were to be as trans-
parent as possible in all our business transactions. For state-owned organiza-
tions that enjoyed a monopoly, such as Norsk Tipping, these expectations 
were especially important.
Given that I enjoyed the use of a corporate car, an impressive budget,
and a grand office on the second floor of a bronze-plated office building,
my feeling of internal conflict came creeping back. But this time the 
signals were different and had more force. Something was terribly wrong.
Was our company synchronous with its time? Did our practices pass the 
acid tests demanded by the age of transparency? 
One day in the fall of 2005, we received a call from an investigative
journalist working for one of the largest financial newspapers. She had
questions about the awarding of a 2004 contract, worth 800 million Nor-
wegian kroner, to a small Swedish manufacturer to produce a new type of
slot machine for the Norwegian market. That manufacturer, whom I knew
well, basically had just one customer—Norsk Tipping. And its CEO was a
close friend of my boss.The intimate ties my company had with the Swedish
supplier had spurred many discussions internally, but the critical voices had
been silenced. The journalist wanted to know about the personal relations
between the two CEOs. And she had a specific question: Was it true that
my CEO had been the best man at the other CEO’s wedding? I immediately
went to ask my boss. He responded: “No! That is not true!” I reported his
disclaimer to the journalist and was puzzled when she chose not to pursue
the matter further.The CEO later confided to me that he was at the wedding,
yes, but not as the best man.“I was toastmaster,” he said, laughing.
In the months to come, more colleagues and outsiders started to raise 
questions like that journalist’s; the circle around the CEO and the company
kept tightening. My efforts to communicate this to the CEO seemed fruit-
less. Even people from top management voiced their concerns. One direc-
tor of marketing said to me: “Do you know about the gardening work 
that is taking place at the CEO’s house? Is that something the company 
really is paying for?” Another employee working with logistics informed 
me that the CEO demanded that one of the company truck drivers was to
be freed from his duties in order to serve as his private driver. An executive
in the Norwegian Athletic Association asked me,“Is it true that your CEO
has his own private chauffeur?”
The company was flying high on the expense side. This I knew for a 
fact. The many extravagant meetings and events were noticed by out-
siders, including the media. Phone calls from the media asking about 
spending and the apparent lack of transparency became harder and 
harder to answer. So far, the “big” story had not emerged, but I became 
































Alone Against the Organization 7 
Our CEO was a very charismatic and highly public figure. His 18-year 
tenure gave him tremendous internal positioning and lots of supporters.
He had thrived on the company’s modernization and economic success.
His strong will and the intense respect directed toward him combined to 
make him both loved and feared.
In an endless number of leadership classes, we had often been warned 
of what could happen to leadership and the quality of decision-making 
when no one ever spoke up and challenged decisions or practices. One 
of our lecturers, Phyllis Perlow, had written an impactful article, “When 
Silence Is Killing Your Company,” 4 in which she noted that silence in 
a company can be associated with virtues such as modesty, respect for 
others, prudence, and decorum, and that under such ingrained rules of 
etiquette, people will often silence themselves to avoid embarrassment,
confrontation, and other dangers. Was that happening in this company? 
What happens to the decision-making process in a company when 
critical voices are suppressed,5 when there is a feudal company culture 
that people quietly follow because the risk of speaking out seems too 
complicated and too consequential? Was ours a culture of pacification 
that invited wrong decisions because no one ever challenged the dominant 
voice or present practices? Did individuals who raised critical questions 
against their own organization or the CEO run the risk of punishment? 
Our CEO was so oblivious to the issue that many had begun to question
his leadership. Stories started to circulate about the leadership of the
company and particularly the CEO.There were tales of excessive spending,
questionable sponsorship contracts, and expensive trips to exotic locations
for which suppliers paid.At first, they were easy to dismiss as coincidences,
but they started to come with increasing frequency. To my distress as com-
munications director, the CEO’s practices began to gain increasing external
attention. The public and the media were on the track of “something,”
and my job was to defend or redirect attention. But the nefarious activities
became increasingly difficult to defend. Moreover, my knowledge of and
involvement in the specifics grew only deeper over time.
It was difficult not to notice what happened to people who broke 
the silence about some of the practices. One individual, a middle-level 
manager in our security department, had repeatedly questioned work 
that had been done at the CEO’s house and billed to the company. “The 
vice CEO asked me to change the invoice so that it was untraceable,” he 
told me. “And I refused.” He was about to give up when he came into 
my office. I sympathized and told him I would attempt to bring attention 
to the matter. A few months later he quit the company. Others who pro-
tested came back subdued, and sometimes frightened. One manager told 
me, “I was told to shut up and cool down—and that I would be put in 
another position if I continued.”A former executive told me directly that 
he lost his leading position because he had asked too many questions.

















8 Peer Jacob Svenkerud 
Was I a part of something that was unhealthy, and that, if it became 
public, would be a disaster? I had been with the company for more than 
five years by then so the responsibility was also on me. As part of the top 
leadership group, I knew, given my role, about most of the controver-
sial practices going on. The notion of being part of a leadership culture 
that needed to change became more and more evident, and being part 
of a silent culture was no longer a sustainable option. “You are respon-
sible,” a friend told me. “You cannot be ignorant to this situation. What 
about your own values? How can you defend and hide these things in the 
company where you are supposed to be a leader?”
I had no adequate answers, so I initiated what seemed like an endless 
number of conversations with both the CEO and the executive group 
addressing my concerns. I never made any threats; I simply attempted to 
bring critical issues to the table. The weekly top-executive meeting was 
usually the place where I tried to raise such issues, often in connection 
with a growing number of critical articles written about the company by 
the media, or when presenting external surveys which showed that the 
company had challenges meeting public expectations. I felt my arguments 
were often met with ridicule. It became a laughing matter when one of 
the executives named me “the prince of darkness.”The name stuck. I had 
become a somber, problem-oriented individual who brought important 
things into focus, namely things other than that of making money. I felt 
out of place, in the wrong place. My efforts seemed to lead nowhere.
Pressure mounted as the outside media and other stakeholders kept on 
digging into possible “company secrets.” I was there, defending them 
with rapidly increasing discomfort. My own moral and ethical questions 
were staring me in the face. Did I pass the ethical tests that all companies 
and their employees should abide by and that had become my mantra in 
business? If all other options were exhausted, what choice was left but 
to blow the whistle? Alternatively, was I simply negotiating my personal 
ethics with those found in the dominant organizational culture over 
issues that would not commonly be recognized as corruption?6 
It was difficult to face my own fundamental ethical platform. Would 
blowing the whistle mean giving up a comfortable and prestigious life? 
Would I be able to get another job? Did I even have a choice now, given 
that I was working for a governmentally owned operation that had a 
monopoly on a tremendously profitable market? Was the only option 
to finally face myself and live with the consequences? Moreover, was a 
failure to face myself the real reason for the internal disorder that had 
shadowed me for years? 
It looked as if I had three options: pretend like nothing was happening,
pray that things would go away, or find another job. The latter was 
possible but would probably not resolve my internal commotion. I was 
obviously beyond the point of pretending. I was a man who knew too 























Alone Against the Organization 9 
ethical option. To think that it would all go away was unrealistic. I had 
experienced this first-hand. I too had been told repeatedly about obvious 
ethical practices. To ignore or pretend to escape this reality would further 
push the necessity of facing myself.
It was now early August 2007 and an unusually hot summer. Nor-
wegians typically take the whole month of July off to enjoy the warm 
weather, but, for me, it had been far from joyous. I was just as stuck as 
my brand new, but unused, boat anchored on the dock of beautiful Lake 
Mjøsa, only a few kilometers beyond the office in Hamar.
One day, a friend who knew my dilemma persuaded me to join him 
for an afternoon cruise on that boat. For a long time, he was the only 
person with whom I had discussed my options. He was concerned, and 
his description of me was accurate: an unhappy individual dominated by 
internal anguish. It was painful to be told how he saw me, but he had a 
lot of credibility. He was a colleague at NT and someone who for years 
had consistently expressed his own concern about the CEO’s behavior 
and the company’s leadership.
I opened up, telling him about my upset stomach and the choice that 
seemed like the only solution but which would in all likelihood destroy 
my career.“Well, do you really have a choice?” he said.“Will your internal 
unrest ever go away if you do not finally face yourself?” He did not seem 
to want to do it himself. It was easy to see that he thought the risks were 
too high for him. Further, I was convinced he was correct when he said 
a person in the top leadership group would probably be more effective 
when addressing the chair of the board than anyone else.
What Do You Want to Stand for, Peer Jacob? Perhaps that was the 
real question. I remembered Yunus’s subtle message from years ago that 
ethics was no removable backpack. Was that the question and solution,
to finally come to terms with your own internal values and be true to 
them regardless of the challenges you face in life? I had to blow the 
whistle. McKenna says that whistleblowing is the last resort, for, once 
done, your effectiveness as an internal positive change agent is finished. 7 
The prospect for success seemed as tiny as a mustard seed, but there was 
no other choice. The boat trip turned me into a whistleblower, and now 
the circus started for real.
An old Norwegian children’s song speaks of individuals who go behind 
people’s backs and talk about them. Basically, it conjures up the image of 
an invisible person with a knife who is ready to stab you from behind.8 
The song is the scariest children’s song of all time and for many became a 
symbol of a whistleblower: a person you cannot trust, someone invisible,
ready to backstab you at any moment. Was I the person in this song? 
Would people think of me this way? 
Cut to two weeks later, in late August 2007. I’m in the house of the 
board’s chair, who supervised the CEO, in the town of Lillehammer,





















10 Peer Jacob Svenkerud 
and provided a list of real cases, including trips the CEO had taken with 
suppliers with private planes to exotic locations for salmon fishing; spon-
sorship agreements with close liaisons of the CEO such as sponsoring 
cross-country tracks around the CEO’s getaway cabin in the Norwegian 
mountains; sponsoring events with no strategic purpose yet having close 
ties negotiated by the CEO himself; questionable contracts to suppliers 
awarded to friends and associates; extravagant spending in contacts with 
outsiders exceeding official limits; use of company personnel to serve as 
private chauffeurs; work done on the CEO’s private property that was 
subsequently billed to the company, etc. All these cases were well known 
to the administration, and I and others had raised them on several occa-
sions. My body trembled with tension as I talked to him. He listened in 
complete silence. He just sat there and took notes. When I was finished,
he finally spoke. “You will hear from me,” he said. “I will look into it.”
The meeting was over. Later, when backing out of his parking lot, I was 
shaking so much that I rammed a row of mailboxes, denting my car and 
splintering the rack.
Soon, however, that splintered rack was the least of the things that 
had started to come undone. In late September at a top leadership 
meeting, the president and vice president stated that the organization 
had a problem. The vice CEO said in almost biblical terms: “We have 
an unfaithful servant. Do any of you know who this individual is?” No 
one spoke. The chair of the board must have taken some kind of action.
It was clear that they did not have a particular suspect. Everyone was 
a suspect. And everyone in the room knew that the company leader-
ship would bring to bear all its powers to find the source and silence it.
The moment looked like a scene from a movie. The CEO went around 
the table in the executive boardroom. Each person in the top leadership 
group was asked directly if he or she knew something about the case.
Each responded “No,” myself included, I confess. I was discovering that 
my earlier caution was not baseless. Soon, meetings with “suspects” all 
over the company took place. The situation had turned into a desperate 
hunt for the “unfaithful servant.”The crisis was clearly escalating.
Weeks passed and I remained silent. In early October 2007, the chair 
of the board summoned me to a meeting in Oslo. The board had received 
answers from the administration on the various accounts that had been 
reported, all involving the CEO.
A close liaison and corruption expert had advised me as to what was 
going to happen: 
The administration and board will attempt to undermine and mini-
mize the significance of your case. Be prepared. Imagine the feeling 
of being alone in a small boat, downstream on a small river, meeting 
a supertanker. That is how you will feel from now on. It will be you 



































Alone Against the Organization 11 
He was right. I met with the chair and the vice chair at an office in 
Oslo. In the meeting, case after case was dismissed with the explanation 
that it was impossible to prove, that they lacked written evidence, that,
yes, it was serious and warranted a “warning” and change of practice,
but that no further action was required. Each case ended with “Are you 
satisfied with the answer?”
One of the latter claims was about cutting grass.
Many knew that the CEO for years had had a gardener do horticultural 
work at his estate and that the company had picked up the bill. Several 
employees had warned him numerous times about the unethical nature of 
this practice. They were told either to stay away from the issue or that the 
issue was being handled. It was easy to see the frustration on their faces 
when they came into my office to tell me about their failed attempts. I 
was left with the impression that they wanted me to do something.
Not surprisingly, the chairman proceeded to dismiss this claim as 
well. Yes, this was a practice that must end, he allowed. But it had been 
approved by the board that the CEO would have the help, a few hours 
each week, of a maintenance person from within the company, given the 
CEO’s extensive world travel and his consequent absence from home.
“Are you happy with this answer?” the chair asked me.
“The question is really whether you are comfortable with the answer 
you got, as well as the other answers you have received,” I replied.
From my backpack, I handed over an envelope of receipts totaling 
approximately 10,000 USD, all from a local gardening company, not 
in-house maintenance, and all work related to renovating the CEO’s 
property, including cutting the grass—all paid by NT. 9 
The skin color of the chair and vice chair of the board changed, and 
there was a long moment of silence. “We need a moment,” they said. I 
was asked to leave the room.
That moment was pivotal. Later that day, I was informed that further 
investigations had to take place.
Just weeks later, on October 22, the CEO resigned. Further internal 
and external investigations followed. The chair stayed on and supervised 
the various investigations on behalf of the board. In April 2008, he also 
resigned. The office of the auditor general of Norway took on the case 
and launched a major investigation into the company’s activities based 
on the cases I had forwarded in the initial charges.
For months, the company was turned upside down. Everyone was a
suspect. The organizational climate stumbled to the edge of collapse. No
one knew, except my close confidant within NT, who had turned so many
people’s lives upside down. The new chair of the board and the interim
CEO knew about my role, and both of them expressed support, assuring me
“You did the right thing” and “We will protect you.” But those assurances
failed to blot out my acute sense of isolation, nor did my guilt go away. I






















12 Peer Jacob Svenkerud 
In October 2008, a permanent CEO came on board. His mission? “To 
clean up!” During the elections of September 2009, the old chair of the 
board became Norway’s Minister of Finance and left the board, and a 
new chair was appointed in November 2009. Naturally, they both wanted 
to put the case behind them and focus on the future. By this time, the 
case had dominated the company for more than two years. At that time,
the office of the auditor general of Norway was close to concluding its 
investigation. It had found serious malfunctions with the company, most 
of which were connected to the former CEO and were all issues with 
which I was familiar. As a result, the auditor general of Norway decided 
to submit a special document to the Norwegian Parliament outlining this 
issue, and further, the issue was to be debated in a special council with the 
protocol committee of the Norwegian Parliament in May 2010.10 
The protocol committee was very critical of Norsk Tipping and its 
previous practices, and also praised the whistle-blower. 11 The story domi-
nated the national press for days.
Then, one day in October 2010, now almost three years later, the
national media somehow learned who the whistleblower was. Within 
15 minutes, two of the largest newspapers in the country called me. Obvi-
ously, someone had tipped them off! My picture was plastered all over 
the front pages of national and regional newspapers. You might think this
would cause me still further turmoil, but actually it brought me incredible
relief. I was finally out of hiding. After almost three years, it was no 
longer my best-kept secret. Some of the squishy feeling in my stomach 
disappeared instantly. At the same time, I had a new feeling.Was this also 
going to be my exit from the company? 
My fear grew stronger the next morning. The phone rang at 7:30 a.m.
It was the CEO. He told me that he had called a meeting with all leaders 
in the company at 8.30 a.m., as the news about the identity of the whistle-
blower was now printed in a two-page story in Norway’s largest financial 
newspaper.
I entered the meeting five minutes late; my 40-minute car ride had 
zipped by in about 20 minutes in my attempt to be there on time for 
the meeting. There was no applause, only somber, sad, and tired faces.
The CEO led the meeting, and the topic was the whistleblowing case. To 
my shocked surprise, the discussion did not revolve around the exposure 
of right and wrong or the need for a company culture that encouraged 
people to speak. Instead, it seemed to deal with my future role in the 
company as the director for communications and external affairs.
My anxieties were quickly replaced by pure anger. How could the CEO,
who had been brought in specifically to clean up the “mess,” raise doubts 
about my credibility as Senior Vice President Information and External 
Relations? His claim was that there were different views on the case, both 
internally and externally, and that my role would be scrutinized in the 






























Alone Against the Organization 13 
jeopardy. The CEO informed the group that I was to continue in my job 
but not be involved in the whistleblowing case in the future.
Fortunately, it was possible for me to leave the company for a few 
months and take a breath. Several months earlier I had been accepted to a 
three-month top leadership program at the Norwegian War College. But 
once I returned to work, it quickly became clear that the CEO no longer 
wanted me aboard.“You are doing a very good job, but your time here is 
over,” he said. “You need to move on. If you do not, I will redesign your 
role and remove you from leadership in the company.”
It was hard to comprehend that he actually gave me that ultimatum. I 
refused his order and demanded an explanation. He gave none.
I remained in my job, buying time, and the pressure on me continued.
The CEO would regularly summon me to his office and demand a “plan 
of action.” I offered none. In our final meeting, he demanded a specific 
exit date. I refused. The situation seemed absurd. Another dilemma had 
to be confronted: to fight the situation or contact a lawyer to help guide 
me. With the latter, the natural consequence was to leave the company 
with severance pay. It was not a pleasant option, but what else could I 
do? I could no longer stand in this situation by myself.
So I went out and hired one of the best labor-rights lawyers in the 
country. He couldn’t believe what was happening, though he conceded 
that it was far from uncommon. He produced to the new CEO letters 
in which my rightful claims for such demands were presented. The CEO 
repeated his previous demands, also claiming that I had for a long time 
expressed an interest in leaving the company and that he needed “dedi-
cated long-term-thinking” individuals to help lead his organization.
Clearly, my time at Norsk Tipping had come to an end. It was now just 
about making the exit as smooth as possible. So we forwarded our claims,
which included severance pay plus coverage of all judicial expenses. The 
company met the demands fairly quickly.
But suddenly there was no job to go to. Unemployment seemed to be 
the next phase of my life. Fortunately, it turned out differently. A new job 
emerged within days, and a new career was about to start for me. Still,
my feelings of bitterness were growing by the day. Was it naiveté that 
had led me to believe that it would be possible to continue a career at the 
Norwegian National Lottery? Instead, I was in a job with lower pay and 
a change of direction I had not chosen. My story would undoubtedly fol-
low me for the rest of my life.Who would dare to trust a whistleblower? 
Nevertheless, something within me had changed. Not only had the 
constant tormented feeling of internal unrest gone away, but also a differ-
ent kind of balance had set in. With more certainty, it started to become 
clear to me that my self-confidence and ability to walk with my head held 
high in all kinds of situations had become easier.
It almost felt that the question of finding out who I wanted to be had 









   
  
 
   
 
 











   
 
 
   
 
 
    
 
 
14 Peer Jacob Svenkerud 
started to emerge. Yes, my experiences and doings at Norsk Tipping 
probably meant that many future opportunities would not come as easily 
and that some people would always treat me with suspicion, as a person 
who never could be truly trusted to stand on the hill and battle. But 
that did not matter as much anymore. What was of real importance was 
finally facing myself and asking and answering the question of who I 
really wanted to be as a person. This had been the cause of my unrest.
Yunus, who had won the Nobel Prize for Peace three years after we 
had briefed him on ethics, only to have him brief us back, was right, of 
course. You are your own value platform. Your value and sense of being 
is not something you can take on and off and practice as you please. It is 
something that is part of you, something you not only carry, but must face.
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 2 Whistleblowing, Voice, and 
Monomythology 
The Prospect for Analysis 
Larry Browning, Jan-Oddvar Sørnes 
and Peer Jacob Svenkerud 
Whistleblowing events seem made for storytelling because they involve 
a character, an ethical challenge, and the fraught search for its resolu-
tion. But the story we tell here is especially dramatic because it features 
a Dostoyevskian mix of power, transgression, charisma, secrecy, moral 
judgment, and sacrifice. And it’s notable because it’s set in Norway, long 
recognized for managing whistleblowing incidents with enviable skill 
and transparency. So what went wrong here? Why and how did the 
Norwegian whistleblowing model for resolving issues fail so egregiously? 
The whistleblower here was Peer Jacob Svenkerud, or “PJS,” who in 
2007 blew the whistle on Norsk Tipping, the government-owned com-
pany operating Norway’s national lottery. 1 Our rationale for drawing on 
14 scholars to help analyze his story follows Norman Denzin’s (2017 ) 
strategy of triangulation, which recommends using multiple viewpoints 
to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of any complex research 
subject. It’s particularly appropriate here because of the case’s “complex 
nature due to the various actors being involved” ( Culiberg & Mihelič, 
2017 , p. 787), not to mention their shape-shifting roles as they tumble 
through the story’s timeline in unpredictable ways.
Consider the following five narrative sequences that propelled PJS from 
being autonomous and in control to being isolated and out of control: 
(1) He approaches his board of directors and blows the whistle on the 
misuse of funds by his charismatic boss, the CEO; (2) the board takes his 
disclosures seriously and agrees to act on them; (3) at that same meeting 
where his accusations of wrongdoing are accepted, he offers to leave the 
organization—he has a job lined up elsewhere—and asks the chair of 
the board if he should take the outside position; (4) the chair discour-
ages that idea and instead asks him to stay on as Norsk Tipping’s  Senior 
Vice President of Information and External Relations but also to remain 
unidentified as the whistleblower so he can assist in the firm’s moral 
recovery; and (5) within a few weeks, NT’s leadership learns that there’s 
an internal, not an external, whistleblower. But instead of welcoming the 
challenge to clean house, the CEO via the leadership group declares bibli-


















16 Larry Browning et al. 
As Devine reminds us, “The first commandment of retaliation is to 
make the whistleblower, instead of his or her message, the issue: obfus-
cate the dissent by attacking the source’s motives, credibility, professional 
competence, or virtually anything else that will cloud the issue” ( 1997 , 
p. 28). This commandment is followed precisely by Norsk Tipping’s lead-
ership. In a special meeting of the leadership team, each person is asked if 
he or she is the whistleblower. Panicked, PJS declares that no, he is not. In 
our interviews with him, he candidly says, “I lied.” That self-indictment 
reflects his sense of having lost, or at least badly compromised, his moral 
high ground. And his range of options for leadership had quickly nar-
rowed, too. He had gone from acting with integrity and autonomy, to 
being called a traitor and a hunted man in his own organization—and to 
being complicit in his own cover-up.
The conflicts at Norsk Tipping (NT) emerged from philosophical,
as well as moral, differences. Whereas his company was accustomed to 
certain material comforts and lax values that its culture either supported 
or at least tolerated, PJS saw himself as an agent of change—a man pro-
fessionally committed to helping organizations, like his own, critique 
themselves and achieve a greater good. Before taking his position at 
Norsk Tipping, he had, in several roles, promoted that high-minded pro-
gram on the topic of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Its goal was to 
expand the client organization’s focus beyond profitability to a wider set 
of ecological and cultural goals while still remaining profitable—a cor-
porate mission called “doing well while doing good.” CSR proved easy 
to espouse as a value, but equally easy to set aside when the accustomed 
culture reasserted its dominance.
PJS’s initial difference with NT was over the self-interested direction 
taken by the organization, especially how it defined, approached, and pro-
moted its goals. But his position was further complicated by the demands 
of his role.As  Senior Vice President of Information and External Relations,
he was expected to match internal communication practices with what he 
communicated publicly about NT. Despite the legitimacy of valuing such 
a balance, what goes on internally and what is said publicly are often 
inconsistent communications. Initially, because PJS’s differences with NT 
were over its direction—not over wrongdoing—he first used strategies to 
move toward CSR-like goals without making an issue of past practices. It 
was not about critiquing the past but about redirecting and planning for a 
better future. So he began his tenure very much as a loyalist.
In the next section we offer a theory that explains how PJS’s loyalty 
gravitates toward his finding a critical voice.
Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Monomythology 
As a way of presenting the whistleblowing story for our chapter writ-
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Hirschman’s (1970 )  Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in 
Firms, Organizations, and States and Joseph Campbell’s (1972 ) articula-
tion of monomyth as outlined in his book The Hero with a Thousand 
Faces. When the Hirschman and Campbell positions are aligned, they 
produce an innovative frame for understanding the complex iteration of 
PJS’s whistleblowing story as it progresses, in time, across the features of 
Campbell’s monomyth.We look at Hirschman first, saving Campbell for 
the next, separate section.
Hirschman’s unique contribution reflects his training as an economist.
His economic premise here is that people exit a market or an organization 
and move into another one if it better represents their values. Exiting 
from bad to better conditions helps account for the rise and fall of orga-
nizations. It is a replacement model—one trades the stability of the old 
for the possibility of something better. Exit is a natural option to wrong-
doing because “irregularity increases the price of membership within the 
organization.” ( Pittroff, 2016 , p. 705). Yet, in practice, the exit option 
is problematic. While an exit is unequivocal—there is no doubt about 
who has left—it offers little or no information concerning how the exited 
organization might have improved.
PJS’s whistleblowing story is a prime example of Hirschman’s’  Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty, which has dominated whistleblowing theory ever since
the book was published. The book argues that conditions decline when 
“the normally bought product or the organization to which one belongs 
begins to deteriorate” (Hirschman, p. 87). And it analyzes what happens 
in markets and organizations under conditions of poor performance— 
especially how they might recover. Hirschman sees whistleblowing as a 
response to decline. In the whistleblowing literature that relies on  Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty, whistleblowing is invariably equated to voice. In the 
PJS case, the management deteriorated by its misuse of funds and crony-
ism, and PJS, instead of exiting, loyally stayed on and voiced his criticisms 
of the CEO to the board of directors. These three rubrics—exit, voice,
and loyalty—beautifully help define the essential issues of whistleblowing,
especially how to speak truth to power, how to have a  voice. 
As an alternative to exit, Hirschman conceptualizes voice, in which 
the person speaks up for changes that might improve the organiza-
tion, which results in the possibility of new and improved leadership.
Hirschman views voice as the political alternative to the economics of 
exit. Whistleblowers typically promote transformational change ( Kenny,
2019 ). Voice is attractive because it appeals to communicating via per-
suasive argumentation, but Hirschman warns that voice is also messy for 
several reasons. For example, what is seen as troubling by one person 
may simply be seen, by another, as a cultural given that requires accep-
tance to get the work done. Also, individuals who are more troubled 
by organizational practices are likely to exit early, leaving a diminished 
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But what about differences in voice? Bashshur and Oc (2015 ) note that a 
limitation of Hirschman’s formulation is that it fails to distinguish differ-
ent types of voice, especially with respect to their level of seriousness. As 
Hirschman at best acknowledges, it can range from “faint grumbling to 
violent protest” ( 1970 , p. 16). But voice can vary in significance—from,
say, complaining about the lousy coffee in the employee break room vs.
bringing charges of malfeasance against the organization’s leadership— 
so each example of voice must be weighed in relation to its context.
And there are other considerations, too. Is the whistleblowing worth the 
effort? What are the costs and benefits of it? In our case, the whistleblow-
ing ultimately did transform some aspects of the organization, but at 
great personal cost to all concerned.
Once whistleblowing became equated to voice, analyzing whistle-
blowing in relation to all three of Hirschman’s categories enlivened 
whistleblowing analysis ( Bashshur & Oc, 2015 ). The categories are 
used frequently now because the main concepts are so clean and easy 
to grasp—exit is leaving, voice is speaking up, and loyalty is staying but 
not speaking up, with the latter including letting conditions deteriorate 
( Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, & Mainous, 1988 ). Voice has remained a chief 
theme in whistleblowing research, ( Lee & Varon, 2016 ) appearing, for 
example, in studies of the effect of silence ( Brinsfield, 2014 ;  Verhezen,
2010 ); how whistleblowing affects job satisfaction ( Rusbult et al., 1988 ); 
how whistleblowing’s effectiveness depends on the governmental struc-
ture above it ( Pittroff, 2016 ); how to improve whistleblowing procedures 
( MacGregor, Robinson, & Stuebs, 2014 ;  Zhang, Pany, & Reckers, 2013 ); 
how some voices are honored and others subordinated ( Putnam, 2001 ); 
and how the perceived value of voice in whistleblowing can change across 
time, from useful to risky ( Bashshur & Oc, 2015 ).
The PJS case proves an exemplary fit with the literature on whistle-
blowing because it includes all four of Miceli and Near’s (1985) research 
basics: the whistleblower (PJS), the wrongdoing (misuse of funds), the 
wrongdoer (the CEO of Norsk Tipping), and the reporting recipient 
(the chair and vice chair of the board at Norsk Tipping). The “reporting 
recipient” is central to this case, for the literature makes a point of dis-
tinguishing two kinds of whistleblowing. One kind is  internal whistle-
blowing, which “refers to disclosing an observed wrongdoing to an entity 
within the organization through a confidential hotline or an individual 
in the organization.” The second kind is external whistleblowing, which 
occurs when the complaint goes outside the organization ( Culiberg & 
Mihelič, 2017 , p. 798). The distinction is crucial for this case because 
everyone, including PJS, accepts the generic label of whistleblowing,
when technically the event was an internal matter that PJS only brought 
to the attention of the NT board. His issues could have been resolved 
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Exit, voice, and loyalty are all relevant here, though PJS actually 
combined voice and loyalty, which isn’t a major thrust of Hirschman’s 
formulation. In  Chapter 1 of the book, he paints  exit and voice as com-
plementary and loyalty as submission to silence in exchange for the right 
to remain in the organization. In a later chapter he offers an exception to 
the conclusion that silence is given in exchange for loyalty by articulating 
the effect of personal power on loyalty. He asserts that the ability to have 
an influence will increase one’s loyalty to the organization: “the likeli-
hood of voice increases with the degree of loyalty” (Hirschman, p. 77).
He elaborates it in this way, employing the generic “he” still common in 
the era in which he was writing: 
A member with a considerable attachment to a product or organization
will often search for ways to make himself influential, especially when
the organization moves in what he believes to be the wrong direction; 
conversely, a member who wields (or think he wields) considerable 
power in an organization and is therefore convinced that he can get it
“back on track” is likely to develop a strong affection for the organi-
zation in which he is powerful (Hirschman, p. 77–78).
This fits our case because loyalty and voice are co-acting, thus co-evo-
lutionary. PJS not only presumed he had power, he advanced the CSR 
paradigm of change that he had communicated from the outset with 
Norsk Tipping. In PJS’s case, “voice signals commitment and concern for 
the organization” ( Bashshur & Oc, 2015 , p. 1533). Yet, the commitment 
is complicated by PJS’s expressing voice, and then accepting a vow to 
secrecy about his voice from the board of directors, and also remaining 
as a committed, loyal, and active employee in Norsk Tipping. Thus, he 
embodies the thesis of the present book—voice and loyalty are a para-
dox. PJS’s case is narratively dramatic because he voices semi-publicly 
but does not exit the organization. His only departure is from transpar-
ency and from telling the truth. And he only steps away to remain in 
secrecy for the months that it took for the problem to be resolved—all 
the while remaining on the leadership team.
Campbell’s Monomyth 
Campbell’s monomyth is applicable to this case because it became evi-
dent from our week of interviews with PJS, during which he fleshed out 
his story, that the various details flowed naturally, if inadvertently, into 
the sequences of a monomyth.At one point we asked him to comment on 
those concepts. He initially resisted the monomyth formulation because 
it implied that we were labeling him a hero, a very un-Norwegian char-
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specific monomyth sequences, PJS now concedes that the first part of 
the monomyth is accurate, though the finale is inaccurate because at the 
end he is not welcomed home from a foreign land as the hero who saved 
the kingdom. Instead, his story ends in contention, and he feels forced to 
move on to another organization.
Joseph Campbell’s  Hero with a Thousand Faces, which was initially pub-
lished in 1949, served for decades as a primer to track the heroe’s journey
through the movement from the normal world, to accepting an external call
for action, through trials, tribulations, and sacrifice before the story con-
cludes. After years as a narrative textbook, it became an international best-
seller after George Lucas, creator of the  Star Warsmovie series, made a point
of saying that Campbell’s monomyth—there is one universal hero story
with minor variations—was the guiding light for the movies’ sequences.
PJS enacts a “familiar narrative of the whistle-blower as a good and 
heroic individual who does the right thing and speaks up to challenge a 
clear wrong” ( Kenny, 2019 , p. 8). PJS’s path into secrecy, aloneness, stress,
and (dis)honesty ambles forward in varied combinations as he moves 
from the beginning of the story until the ending, when he leaves NT. And 
while he doesn’t go on a journey to a foreign land to slay a monster, his 
narrative sequence follows Campbell’s monomyth as he moves into a sur-
real and secret world away from the “world of common day” (Campbell,
P. 30). He hears a call to adventure, to accomplish a mission, when his 
Nobel Peace Prize mentor says to him, oracularly, “Your integrity is a 
backpack that you can never take off.” PJS initially refuses the call—as 
the Senior Vice President of Information and External Relations, he had
observed and taken part in five years of organizational decision-making 
that he had resisted but participated in enough that he, too, is implicated.
He is eventually propelled by the higher calling, traverses the threshold,
and accepts the mission. PJS’s response to the call “signifies that destiny 
has summoned the hero and transferred his spiritual center of gravity from 
within the pale of his society to an unknown zone” (Campbell, P. 58).
That zone was secrecy. Yet, he faced many tribulations that tested his 
mettle throughout the mission. On one contentious occasion, PJS passed 
out cold on the floor of the hall in the executive suite, only to recover and 
persist. PJS had a helper, someone who produced the magic object—here,
a collection of hard-copy payment receipts retrieved in darkness from the 
headquarter’s basement—that confirmed the truth of his disclosures and 
moved the story forward at a critical juncture. The helper is motivated by 
the hero. In Campbell’s words,“The hero to whom such a helper appears 
is typically one who has responded to the call” (Campbell, P. 73). PJS’s 
will is magnified by a helper; the challenge becomes a two-person project,
with the whistleblowing mission as the reason for their relationship.
The Campbell model holds up through the first two thirds of the mon-


























Whistleblowing, Voice, and Monomythology 21 
Campbell’s model. Once PJS is outed as the whistleblower, his hero’s 
welcome in Norsk Tipping is over. Rather than undergoing a supreme 
ordeal and gaining “his reward” (Campbell, P. 246), he is soon set up by 
organizational leadership with public events that are structured to shame 
him. Community members criticize him as being “biased” and unfit to 
continue as the spokesman for NT.
What is left for him is a series of negotiated exchanges among him-
self, his peers, and his supervisors—all oriented toward producing a posi-
tional advantage over one another. So his story is a monomyth with a 
ragged ending. Rather than heroic, it ends as a confusing and legally 
driven agreement.
In Table 2.1, we outline the variations of exit, voice, and loyalty that 
PJS experienced as they track forward on Campbell’s monomyth.
The PJS story departs from Campbell’s monomyth in two ways that 
may explain its disconnect from the model at the ending. In the Campbell 
model, the hero goes on a journey into a foreign land; he hopes to com-
plete his mission and return home—an odyssey ends back where it began.
In narrative theory, time and space are paramount (Browning & Morris,
2012, Chapter 4 ). In contrast, PJS’s story begins when he returns home 
from the foreign lands of international work to take on an executive job 
that, to his surprise, becomes an ethical challenge. His quest not only 
begins at home, but also his story is driven by the desire to complete the 
mission while remaining at home. PJS’s commitment to remaining home 
accounts for how the story ends.
The object of the challenge also differentiates PJS’s story from Campbell’s
monomyth. Rather than fighting off a strange beast to protect his home-
land, PJS faces the unforgiving authority of his own home organization.
“Whistleblowing” has a dual meaning. It is not only a conflict about a 
problem, but also it is a conflict about hierarchy and authority. PJS’s whis-
tleblowing is “opposition to authority” that takes place “within a context
of political conflict” ( Perrucci, Anderson, Schendel, & Trachtman, 1980 , 
p. 149).To resist one’s own structure is a battle of a different kind ( Mumby,
Thomas, Martí, & Seidl, 2017 ). The story ending looks like a tag-team
fight in the wrestling ring, with PJS standing alone in the middle of the ring
against organization members who take turns opposing him and shaming
him, until he leaves.
The Materials for the Chapter Writer/Theorists 
The 14 invited scholars who contributed chapters for this book were
asked to examine five different data sets (plus any others they chose)
for their interpretation of PJS’s story: interviews, annual reports, news-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
Whistleblowing, Voice, and Monomythology 23 
Interviews 
The chief source was a series of in-depth interviews with PJS that were 
collected two months after he had completed the first draft of the 
ethnography that became Chapter 1 of this book. Over a week, and 
during 18 different sessions, ranging from a few minutes to almost an 
hour, Browning and Sørnes interviewed PJS in English and digitally 
recorded his story on a cell phone. The recordings were subsequently 
transcribed into Word documents. Besides verifying PJS’s  Chapter 1 story,
the interviews also covered additional events. For example, we asked him 
to recall what exactly was said at crucial moments of communication 
between him and the different voices of authority at NT.
Another difference between his chapter and the interviews is the
occasional theoretical turn in the interview content. As the theme of
the interviews developed over the week, we began to ask for PJS’s own 
theoretical interpretation of his case. Because he was a fellow Ph.D. in 
organizational communication, we asked for concepts as well as data.
For example, at our urging, in one of our final interviews, PJS assigned 
the events of his story to Campbell’s features of the monomyth. That 
interview shows the sequences mapped on to Campbell’s listing.We make 
use of Campbell’s monomyth to organize the interviews into five narra-
tive sequences: (1) the normal world, interview 1; (2) the challenge and 
calling, interviews 2–4; (3) the crisis of the whistleblowing event, inter-
views 5–8; (4) the aftermath, interviews 9–17; and (5) monomythology,
interview 18. Sørnes, a long-time friend of PJS, had been his supporter 
throughout this event and served as a national cultural check. He followed 
up by asking for details about Norwegian athletics and specific names of 
leaders who had a decision-making role in this case. Sørnes’s questions 
and assessments were from a position of having witnessed the scandal 
play out in real time. He thus served as a check on the local meaning of 
the PJS story.
Another noteworthy feature of the 18 interviews is PJS’s extended 
account of his leaving Norsk Tipping. While he commented on it in 
Chapter 1 , our later interviews revealed the ending to be the most painful 
part of his entire story.Though he had prevailed by successfully managing 
the whistleblowing and the secrecy, he suffered badly once the truth was 
out. While he received the Inland Norway Communication Association’s 
Person of the Year Award and was making selected presentations on his 
whistleblowing story, he was not being supported in his own organiza-
tion. Instead, on the job he was being told, in various ways, that there 
wasn’t a consensus of support for his continuing at Norsk Tipping.
We coded these interviews as the “end game,” and this phase of the story 
began the day the Norwegian financial newspaper, Dagens Naeringsliv, 
made public that PJS was the whistleblower at Norsk Tipping. Once 
outed, PJS presumed he could relax and finally breathe freely again, but 























24 Larry Browning et al. 
attacks. The most significant addition to the story in these interviews is 
the more detailed account of how his professional life at Norsk Tipping 
came to an end. The chapter writers for this book use the interviews copi-
ously and refer to them to build their case.
Annual Reports 
The second major data source for the chapter writers was the eight years 
of NT annual reports that were produced during PJS’s tenure as Senior 
Vice President of Information and External Relations. The documents 
are notable for their high quality. Our co-editor Sørnes claims they are 
superior to the ones that came before and after PJS’s time at NT. PJS 
modestly explains in his interview that he had such a gigantic budget for 
the reports that it made producing quality easy.
Annual reports are important because the initial paradox of this story 
intersects the role of the Senior Vice President of Information and External 
Relations with that of the whistleblower. The whistleblower says, “There 
is something seriously wrong with this organization,” whereas the Senior 
Vice President Information and External Relations states that NT is
excellent, that its productivity and its contribution to the culture of
Norway are beyond outstanding—that it is a joy to work there. PJS also 
says in the annual reports that NT “is living the dream!”
The annual report is a major way the organization is seen by the public.
It is a record of performance verified by an external accountant. It is also 
a rhetorical document designed to communicate a coordinated message 
to the public as well as its own 322-person membership in 2007. Employ-
ees are attentive to the annual report and other public representations of 
their organization. They might ask the question of narrative fidelity: “Is 
this like us? Is this true for us?”
A major event in the PJS story is the brouhaha over using a gymnast 
on a balance beam for the cover of the 2003 annual report. While PJS 
had coordinated it with his CEO, a significant portion of the organization 
seemed to object. PJS’s whistleblowing story is fraught with ironies: PJS 
both speaks for the organization and speaks against it. PJS officially 
charges NT with wrongdoing and then publicly defends the same orga-
nization when asked.
The annual reports are additionally relevant because they help to high-
light the outlier nature of this case. As one of the government-provided 
advisors said about PJS’s whistleblowing, “It is odd that someone in 
your professional position is the whistleblower.” By position and pro-
fession, PJS was a veteran participant in mass media. He knew how to 
diffuse an innovation. He knew how to employ euphemistic and hopeful 
language to sweeten harsh data. He knew how to call a press conference 
and manage it as an event. He knew the shelf life of a political story. He 






















Whistleblowing, Voice, and Monomythology 25 
to best frame a story’s angle for the media. He knew how to satisfy the 
audience with a mild version of the truth. He could estimate how long 
confidential data would remain a secret. He knew how to anticipate 
the responses of his opponents and how to defend himself. All of these 
practices were enacted at the executive level between himself and the 
organization, especially the CEO he reported to. But his official respon-
sibility during all of this was to shape and sign off on the annual report.
Thus, his role, his productivity, and his value are demonstrated in the 
annual reports, and his role as the whistleblower can be interpreted in 
the context of them.
News Articles 
The third set of texts the chapter writers could study were major news 
reports covering the era. All these documents were originally published 
in Norwegian, but we translated each of them into English. These news 
stories paint a critical picture of NT. For example, one reporter estimated 
that NT had paid double the actual value for the slot machines that were 
to become a public issue because they caused gambling addiction for a 
portion of users. More scandalous still, the slot machines didn’t func-
tion properly and had to be scrapped at great cost. Such waste and the 
possibility of contract favoritism were two of the big news items made 
available to chapter writers. They might reasonably ask: How was whis-
tleblowing written about in Norwegian media? What was the gravity of 
the case? How was the whistleblower treated? The news accounts also 
covered the outing of PJS and his boss’s comments to the newspapers.We 
also included selected newspaper articles to give a frame of reference to 
the attention the case caused in the Norwegian media. Before it broke,
one reporter, for instance, argued that the contract for the new slot 
machines, which were designed to lessen gaming dependency, had been 
awarded to a close friend of the CEO. Other articles give a description 
of the actual whistleblowing and the media’s reactions to it. Further, we 
included media reactions to the various investigations that took place.
Photographs 
We also offered photographs of PJS and his family farm because the farm 
plays such complex roles in his whistleblowing story. We offered pho-
tographs of it for analysis because descriptions of it hardly do it justice.
Around PJS’s farm home is a complete community, including a larder, a 
blacksmith shop, several hay barns, and a foreman’s home.
The photographs were important because the farm, though an anchor
for PJS, is also a burden to him—a noble responsibility he cannot
unyoke himself from, though he’d prefer to walk away from it. At the
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rehabilitate the place—it had grown derelict in his years of absence— 
and yet have the professional life he so deeply values. The beauty and
panorama of the farm and farmhouse are apparent in the photographs.
There is an upstairs ballroom lined with original oil paintings of his
ancestors peering out on all who walk the floor in front of them. The
burden of the story arises from his family’s recent history of the farm
and what it takes to maintain it. His role is that of a good neighbor;
he sponsors a community effort to use his log splitter to cut enough
wood for his neighbors’ winter. In addition to that obligation is the
history to overcome. PJS’s father had almost failed in running the farm
and completely lost it. But now, as the former Norwegian secretary of
agriculture showed up to publicly announce at a party for PJS’s fiftieth
birthday, “The farm is once again in good hands.”
For PJS, it’s an effort to keep it that way. The farm continues to
anchor PJS’s story. When things fell apart at NT, PJS’s position was
that he deserved to be treated fairly by the company and, by extension,
the country of Norway. To him, fairness meant supporting his profes-
sional goals—and at the same time allowing him to remain on the fam-
ily farm. NT had seemed a perfect match for him, but the perfection of
this match was hard to maintain. The photographs help to tell this part
of the story.
External Reviews From the Norwegian Auditor General 
and Deloitte 
The third set of texts available to the chapter writers were major texts 
that covered the case, including reports and selected newspaper articles.
All these documents were originally published in Norwegian, but we 
translated into English.
Chief among them are executive summaries of the two major investi-
gations. The first summary was that of the Norwegian auditor general 
(NAG). NAG audits all sizeable Norwegian state-owned organizations,
including Norsk Tipping. After the whistleblowing went public, NAG 
decided to do an extensive audit of the company, which culminated in 
a report to the Protocol Committee of the Norwegian Parliament. We 
provided an executive summary of it. The second, by Deloitte, was com-
missioned by Norsk Tipping itself when it became known that the Audi-
tor General’s report contained details that were of such a grave nature 
that certain elements had been forwarded to the Norwegian National 
Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environ-
mental Crime (Økokrim).
Deloitte was asked to further investigate those issues for the period 
2000–2007. In Deloitte’s report, NT’s management team is criticized for 
improperly blurring personal interests and the company’s financial inter-
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implementation of various contractual relationships. It specifically noted 
that a Norsk Tipping employee had taken a leave of absence to work for 
a supplier between 2004 and 2005, and then returned to Norsk Tipping 
as an employee. In summary, while no criminal offenses were identified,
the report revealed events that provided grounds for harsh criticism of 
the company and its former senior management.
Note 
1. For simplicity, we use “PJS” to refer to Peer Jacob Svenkerud throughout this 
book because Norwegians typically use a person’s first and middle name even 
in informal conversation.
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 3 Truth-Telling and Organizational 
Democracy 
The Rhetoric of Whistleblowing 
as an Act of Parrhesia 
Ronald Walter Greene, Daniel Horvath 
and Larry Browning 
In this chapter, we combine the theoretical work of the first and second 
authors with the third author’s summary of the story he had collected as 
Peer Jacob Svenkerudʼs (PJS) interviewer and that serves as the data set 
for this book.
Whistleblowing, as popularly defined by  Near and Miceli (1985 , p. 4),
is “the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal,
immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to 
persons or organizations that may be able to effect action.” This chapter 
aims to add specificity, and historical context, to their word “disclosure.”
We view the whistleblower’s disclosure as an example of what the ancient 
Greeks called parrhesia, a particular type of free speech that is especially 
bold, risky, and, most importantly, truth-telling. Kenny’s (2019 ) treatise 
on whistleblowing in the financial community contrasts parrhesia with 
its far more common counterpart—cooperating for the sake of going 
along, being unwilling to critique the dominant narrative, or worrying 
what it means for your retirement pay (see Chapter 5 ).
We contend that whistleblowing is at its most rhetorical when it is 
approached as disclosure of organizational wrongdoing. Three related 
questions require attention: (1) What exactly is parrhesia? (2) How is 
whistleblowing a modern form of parrhesia? and (3) What does a more 
roundabout approach to going public—in this case going around the 
chief executive officer (CEO) to the board of directors (BOD)—reveal 
about the democratic power of parrhesiastic speech like whistleblowing? 
We begin with a literature review tracing the relationship between 
whistleblowing and parrhesia to more fully appreciate whistleblowing 
as an effort to circulate a claim of wrongdoing beyond the immediate 
supervisor’s organizational control. Whistleblowing is made powerful as 
a constitutive process of addressing a level in the hierarchy that might 
be mobilized to attend to organizational wrongdoing. In this case, the 
whistleblowing was an internal attempt to solve the problems with the 
least damage to PJS’s own organization. It was an effort to form a “rhe-
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that, we argue, provided the democratic value of whistleblowing as par-
rhesia. Consequently, whistleblowing as a modern form of parrhesia 
becomes paradigmatically rhetorical when it attends to the complexity of 
modern public and democratic life. We contend that the public character 
of whistleblowing is potentially a mechanism by which whistleblowing 
transforms itself from a micro-act of resistance into a potentially collec-
tive act of change made legitimate by the democratic power of speech.
The first part of our chapter approaches whistleblowing in general and 
PJS in particular from within the study of organizational communication.
The second part re-specifies PJS’s whistleblowing as a form of democratic 
parrhesia. We conclude by discussing how whistleblowing as parreshia 
can improve the normative infrastructure necessary for organizational 
democracy.
Whistleblowing as Organizational Communication 
Communication scholars, especially those interested in organizational 
rhetoric, will readily see that whistleblowing—the disclosure of organi-
zational wrongdoing to those who might effect change—is, at bottom,
your stock communicative process. A  speaker (an organization member,
former or current) speaks (discloses some wrongdoing under the control 
of their employer) to an audience (persons or organizations that may be 
able to effect action). As such, whistleblowing was initially approached 
as a species of superior-subordinate communication. The claim of wrong-
doing was conceptualized as a question of information flow mediated 
by organizational hierarchy ( Stewart, 1980 ). Vestiges of the superior-
subordinate relationship are, of course, evident in the present case. Our 
whistleblower, PJS, was subordinate to the CEO and blew the whistle 
on him by going around him to the chairman of the board (COB) to 
register his complaint. Stewart viewed the typical communicative situa-
tion of whistleblowing as having an internal organizational component 
sometimes coupled with an external public component: “When potential 
whistleblowers attempt to take their concerns through an organizational 
hierarchy, they may be attempting to increase, or at least alter, the upward 
flow of information. They express their concerns directly to the public 
when they feel they cannot alter the flow of information or get a suitable 
response from the organization” (p.  97). At first, PJS was sufficiently 
satisfied with the response of the COB that he sanguinely accepted the 
man’s invitation to remain in the organization and protect it. Three things 
are worth noticing about this initial configuration of the communica-
tive process. First, whistleblowing was approached as an organizational 
rhetoric that was usually both internal and external to the organization.
PJS and others had voiced concerns internally and gotten nowhere. Only 
after this, indeed much later, did he decide to go to the COB. Second, the 
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superior to an organization member. The different audiences for PJS vari-
ously included close colleagues who shared his dismay over how things 
were handled; his mother; his external advisors; his former boss; and the 
COB. All of them deserved and received different message formations.
Third, the pivots among audiences showed that PJS as whistleblower had 
encountered a non-responsive organization. He went to the COB only as 
a last resort. Stewart would conclude his analysis with a call for future 
research in organizational dissent, implying that whistleblowing was one 
genre of it (p. 99).
Five years later, Charles Redding (1985 ) would explicitly agree with 
that suggestion. Redding distinguished two figures of organizational dis-
sent: “boat rockers” and “whistleblowers” (p. 246). “Boat rockers,” he 
said, voice their complaints within the organization, whereas the whistle-
blower “voices his or her protest to people outside” it (p. 246). Redding,
then, would label PJS a boat rocker, not a whistleblower. But Redding 
wrote in 1985. By PJS’s time, the label “boat rocker” was unknown to 
Norsk Tipping (NT) (see  Chapters 1 and 2 ). There, all parties simply 
called it “whistleblowing,” and the term stuck (see Chapter 13 ).
Unlike Stewart (1980 ), who saw whistleblowing as both a constructive 
and a destructive process that might be managed with better internal 
communication, Redding, something of a boat rocker himself, advocated 
for a more politically active kind of organizational communication that 
would promote even more boat rockers and whistleblowers. Organiza-
tional dissent, he felt, should be an important proactive goal of orga-
nizational communication (and of communication studies, too, for that 
matter) in order to push back against the “dominant organizational 
ideology” (p. 249) that demands conformity to the internal hierarchy and 
the elitist notion that “management knows best” (p. 250). NT seemed to 
have an organizational culture with zero tolerance for boat-rocking. The 
CEO was an imperious boss whom others seemed unwilling to confront 
for fear of retribution. Hence, a culture of silence, of craven acceptance.
And it was confirmed to varying degrees in the external investigations 
recounted in Chapter 2 . But PJS’s answer to “management knows best”
was to contest it internally. Ironically, he was a manager himself, officing 
in the executive suite, but he was also an outlier by moral conviction and 
courage.
It’s worth our noticing another difference between Redding and 
Stewart, this one in the audience that the whistleblower addressed.
Redding’s distinction between boat-rocking and whistleblowing makes 
the latter a public process (i.e., speaking external to the organization),
whereas Stewart construed whistleblowing as having both an internal 
and (sometimes) an external component. Stewart’s position seems to have 
gained ascendancy. Except in a few writers, both internal and external 
accusations get labeled “whistleblowing.” In PJS’s case, of course, the 
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have seen it, it was an act of loyalty. PJS was essentially saying, “These 
things need to be fixed, and I’m on board for leading the effort to fix 
them.” We must concede, then, that “whistleblowing” is an inherently 
ambiguous term.What it means to the layman and what it means in orga-
nizational practice can be two distinctly different things.
In the end, Redding pulls back some, saying that whistleblowing should 
be a rare practice, one reserved for disclosing “intolerable evils” (p. 246).
By “intolerable,” he means things that absolutely cannot be accepted,
that insist on being confronted. Bruno and Conrad’s analysis ( Chapter 5 ) 
contends that lavish benefits are typical in high-level government jobs to 
offset their comparatively modest salaries. For PJS, chief among the intol-
erables were chummy contacts with outside vendors and the CEO’s use 
of influence to choose outside sponsorship partners who didn’t align with 
the company’s avowed values. PJS saw these issues as internal matters 
and thus went to the COB rather than to the Norwegian media.
As such, the disclosure of wrongdoing is not just any wrongdoing but 
should be of such a magnitude—“an intolerable evil”—that a turn away 
from the organization and toward the public is warranted. We ourselves 
contend that if it can be managed internally, going public is not neces-
sary. Elsewhere in this book (see Chapter 13 ) we find agreement with our 
position. Handling whistleblower complaints internally is not only pref-
erable but also a sign that managers can resolve problems constructively,
without fanfare—one of the goals of good management (see Chapter 2 ).
PJS tried to make his complaints internal, to the BOD. There was no 
public announcement until he was outed by Norway’s major financial 
newspaper,Dagens Næringsliv. 
Redding’s call for a more politically active approach to organizational 
communication became the warrant for “critical organizational commu-
nication studies” ( Mumby, 1993 , p. 8). As such, the question of organi-
zational power and resistance emerged as the primary objects of study.
This is shown in PJS’s hesitance to work with the COB’s own consulting 
firm, which had PR contracts and event management fees with the same 
organization he oversaw from his position on the board.
Recognizing Redding’s point that organizational communication is 
all too easily perceived as a species of management discourse, critical 
organizational scholars have tried to better account for whistleblowing 
as a species of organizational resistance ( Mumby, Thomas, Martí, &
Seidl, 2017 ). They catalogued whistleblowing as a case of insubordina-
tion (p.  1169). Well, “insubordination” is a pretty mild term for how 
PJS’s whistleblowing was actually viewed at NT. A full-press search for 
the whistleblower occurred there. In one news article, the first CEO 
exclaimed, histrionically, that he’d been “stabbed in the back with a 
rusty knife.” The entire leadership group was interrogated: “Are you the 
whistle-blower?” PJS recalls in his interviews that there was an active 
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Like others kinds of insubordination, whistleblowing is imagined as a 
public form of individual, or micro, resistance to organizational power.
For that reason, whistleblowing is increasingly aligned with Foucault’s 
notion of parrhesia, or frank speech (Mumby et al., 2017, p. 169; Weis-
kopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016 ). It’s important to note, once again, the 
public character of whistleblowing; its insubordination gains leverage to 
change organizational behavior when it achieves escape velocity beyond 
“organizational control” (p. 1170). That’s reached in this case when the 
COB and vice COB go forward with PJS’s complaint, leading to two inves-
tigations and a revamping of how NT would now handle whistleblowing.
Why might it be important that the public character of whistleblowing 
escape organizational control? Gabriel (2005 ) provides one answer: As 
organizations become more public-facing and therefore act in a context 
“dominated by spectacle, images, and pictures” (p. 311), whistleblowing 
becomes increasingly threatening because it may damage an “organiza-
tion’s image and reputation” (p. 311). In the name of brand protection,
organizations are motivated to be responsive to any whistleblower who 
goes public. At NT, though, brand protection seems to have been sec-
ondary, for the immediate response to the whistleblowing there was 
reprisal—get this person, this backstabber.
At the same time, however, the media increased the ability of whistle-
blowing to generate radical change. In fact, media drove the change in this 
whistleblowing case, repeatedly coaxing PJS to answer questions about 
NT’s practices. Such coaxing allowed PJS to claim, “The public will not 
accept this.” Norwegian media often had the inside track on many of NT’s 
issues, and they pressed for answers. The plot of this story formed over 
PJS’s unwillingness to offer media justification for the CEO’s behavior.
Whistleblowing as Parrhesia 
Parrhesia Then: Speaking Truth to Power 
Michel Foucault’s (2001 ) interest in the classical history of parrhesia
prompted much of our current discussions of whistleblowing as a modern
example of truth-telling. Foucault, Gros, Ewald, Fontana, and Burchell
(2010 ) found a cluster of meanings embedded in the Greco-Latin use of
parrhesia, including “saying everything,” “speaking frankly,” “stating the
truth,” and/or “frank-spokenness” (p.  43). Foucault’s history tracks the
movement of parrhesia from the Athenian Assembly (the Periclean moment)
as its theatre of deployment, to the Prince’s soul as psychagogy (the Platonic/ 
Socratic moment), and, then slowly, to the streets, where it was viewed as a
way to live a true life, embodied there in the practice of the cynics.
Foucault (2001 ) understands parrhesia as “a kind of verbal activity”
that’s distinguished in four ways: “the speaker has a specific relation to 
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danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criti-
cism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific relation to 
moral law through freedom and duty” (p. 19). Frankness, danger, criti-
cism, and duty—all deserve unpacking, and all appear in our present case 
of whistleblowing.
“Frankness,” as Foucault glosses it, means saying everything one has in 
mind—that is, holding back nothing—so it’s a seamless, one-to-one “rela-
tionship between the speaker and what he says”; moreover, what he says 
“is his own opinion” ( Foucault, 2001 , p. 12). Glossing frankness’s rela-
tion to “truth,” Foucault explains that aletheia, ancient Greek for “truth,”
also has four defining characteristics: (1) “that which, not being hidden,
not concealed, is given to view in its entirety, is completely visible, no 
part of it being concealed or secret,” (2) that “which is not added to or 
supplemented . . . not altered by any foreign element which would thus 
distort it and end up concealing what it is in reality,” (3) “that which is 
straight . . . direct,” and, finally (4) “that which exists and remains beyond 
any change, which remains in its identity, immutability, and incorrupt-
ibility” ( Foucault, 2011 , p. 219). In other words, “the unconcealed, the 
unalloyed, the straight, and the unchanging and incorruptible” (p. 220).
For Foucault, this fourfold understanding of truth can be applied not only 
to the logos itself but also to the ways of being, to modes of actions and 
conduct. So, for Foucault, logos alethes is not simply that which is true 
empirically,“a set of propositions which turn out to be exact and can take 
the value of truth,” but also is “a way of speaking in which, first, nothing 
is concealed  .  .  . second, neither the false, nor opinion, nor appearance 
is mixed with the true; [third], it is a straight discourse, in line with the 
rules and the law; and finally .  .  . a discourse which remains the same,
does not change, or become debased, or distorted, and which can never 
be vanquished, overturned, or refuted” ( 2011 , p. 220). Foucault’s defini-
tion and explanation fit this case because the principal effort after PJS’s 
whistleblowing was to discern the veracity of his claims.Was he telling the 
truth? Except for the hard copies of the gardening bills that PJS’s helper 
hived out of NT’s basement records (see  Chapter 2 ), there was little to 
distinguish the veracity of PJS’s claims. It had all been said before.
As Foucault contends, the danger “comes from the fact that the said 
truth is capable of hurting or angering the interlocutor” ( 2001 , p. 17).
The function of parrhesia, adds Foucault, “is not to demonstrate the 
truth to someone else, but has the function of criticism” (p. 17). The par-
rhesiastes, aka truth-teller, “is always less powerful than the One with 
whom he speaks,” meaning that parrhesia “comes from ‘below’ . . . and 
is directed ‘above’” (p. 18). Whistleblowing, too, typically comes from 
below and is directed to someone above. Such a flow of direction—from 
down to up—is the oldest presumption in organizational communica-
tion. Critical information moves slowly, if at all, from the bottom to the 
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In personal relations, says  Monoson (2000 ), parrhesia operated (and 
indeed still operates) as “candid speech among friends,” whereas in the 
classical comedies, it got expressed as “hurling insults at identifiable indi-
viduals and ridiculing Athens,” while in oratory,“speakers also utter blunt,
and at times nasty criticisms of policy and of specific people” (p. 63). In 
all these contexts, Monoson notes, “parrhesia is consistently and closely 
associated with two things: criticism and truth-telling” (p. 63). Speak-
ing with parrhesia “was to confront, oppose, or find fault with another 
individual or a popular view in a spirit of concern for illuminating what 
is right and best” (p.  63). Markovits (2008 ) adds danger to the mix: 
“to have the quality of parrhesia, a speech must criticize someone who 
has the power to somehow injure the speaker” (p. 66). For  Saxonhouse 
(2006 ), parrhesia, when (mis)understood simply as free speech, “ties 
the word too strongly to the passive language of rights rather than the 
active expression of one’s true beliefs” (p. 86). Saxonhouse argues that 
the anachronistic language of rights conceals “the daring and courageous 
quality of the practice . . . the exposure of one’s true thoughts, the resis-
tance to hiding what is true because of deference to a hierarchical social 
and political world or a concern with how one appears before the gaze of 
others, that is shame” (p. 88).
All of these definitions point to criticism as a defining feature. Indeed,
if anything, parrhesia is  dangerous speech because its frankness puts 
the speaker at risk of the target’s reaction to being criticized. And we 
see just that in the present case. PJS’s speaking up created tremendous 
upheaval—literally. He recalls how he would travel to a rural bus stop to 
relieve his stomach every day on his way home from work. But even that 
relief wasn’t enough. He eventually felt compelled to leave the company 
(Conrad, Chapter 5 ).
Still, if you’re a true parrhesiastes, like PJS, you’ll see it as your duty 
to disclose. As Foucault notes, parrhesia “is a verbal activity in which 
a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life 
because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other 
people (as well as himself)” (2001, p. 19). PJS acted out of duty, even 
though the pushback he incurred had been predicted by his personal advi-
sors. Markovits (2008 ) similarly sees in parrhesia a notion that empha-
sizes “not just the right to speak but also the duty to speak the truth”
(pp. 65–66). As Saxonhouse notes, “freedom of speech is enshrined not 
for the benefit or freedom of the individual; it exists in the vision of these 
orators for the sake of the city” ( 2006 , p. 96). In this case the “city” is 
Norway, and its benefits the resources generated by the national lottery 
(NT) that fund sports and culture throughout that country.
As Foucault (2001 ) notes, however, there are many and diverse modali-
ties of telling the truth. Speaking specifically about ancient Greek culture,
he points to prophecy, wisdom, and teaching as, alongside parrhesia,
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sage, the teacher, the parrhesiastes—he says that all four can be truth-
tellers, but how many actually face danger? How about the teacher, for 
example—the man of tekhnē, of technical knowledge, whatever the kind,
even his own kind (for he himself was a teacher)? Foucault has a quick— 
perhaps too quick—flat answer: “Clearly this teacher, this man of  tekhnē, 
of expertise and teaching, does not take any risk in the truth-telling”
( 2011 , p. 24). (Young teachers facing tenure might disagree.) For Fou-
cault, then, “someone is said to use parrhesia and merits consideration as 
a parrhesiastes only if there is a risk or danger for him in telling the truth”
( 2001 , pp. 15–16). So the proof of one’s sincerity, he contends, is  cour-
age. “The fact that a speaker says something dangerous—different from 
what the majority believes—is a strong indication that he is parrhesias-
tes” ( Foucault, 2001 , p. 15). On that score, PJS certainly qualified. One of 
his advisors had warned him what would lie ahead: “Expect a situation 
when you are sitting in a rowboat, meeting a supertanker head-on—that 
is the kind of resistance you will meet.”
So, yes, PJS certainly qualified. “There is always parrhesia,” says Fou-
cault, when the fact of telling the truth “will, may, or must entail costly 
consequences for those who have told it” ( 2010 , p. 65). The danger of 
telling the truth entails a parrhesiastic pact “of the subject with himself”
in which the speaker binds him- or herself to the content of the state-
ment and to the act of making that statement ( Foucault, 2010 , p. 65). As 
we learned in Chapter 1 , PJS felt he had three choices: Leave, accept the 
status quo, or speak out. The ultimate challenge for him was foreseen by 
Muhammad Yunus several years earlier—the challenge of being true to 
himself.
When one states the truth, one states what one knows and believes to
be true; at the same time, one binds oneself to the act of stating the truth
given that stating the truth entails risk. To put it differently, “the par-
rhesiastes is someone who emphasizes his own freedom as an individual
speaking” ( Foucault, 2010 , p. 67). For PJS, his freedom from the domi-
nating culture also freed him both to think critically and to speak. Par-
rhesia brings to the forefront a fundamental philosophical question: the
connection between freedom and truth. Foucault again: “How and to
what extent is the obligation of truth—the ‘binding oneself to the truth,’
‘binding oneself by the truth and by truth-telling’—at the same time the
exercise of freedom, and the dangerous exercise of freedom?” ( 2010 , 
p. 67). Parrhesia is a way of telling the truth, a way of entailing a risk,
binding the speaker to the statement of truth and to the act of stating it
in the form of a courageous act. That reads like a summary of the story
of this book: PJS risks to tell the truth, and his statement is so danger-
ous that he is bound to secrecy for 29 months, to enact the courage via
solace and a network of secrecy. Also noteworthy in Foucault’s stance
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Parrhesia Now: Whistleblowing 
Parrhesia’s constitutive elements—truth, frankness, criticism, danger, cour-
age, duty, and freedom—are useful for describing the rhetorical interven-
tions of outspoken critics of oppressive regimes, conscientious objectors,
national-security leakers, and corporate whistleblowers. To imagine the 
whistleblower as one who binds him- or herself to a truth of organiza-
tional wrongdoing is useful for respecting the dangers that such a speech
act entails. Mansbach (2009 ) describes whistleblowers as truth-tellers who
“re-appropriate speech in the workplace in their struggle to shape their 
identity and the way in which they are identified by others” (p. 369).Mans-
bach (2009 ) and  Mumby et al. (2017 ) share the transformational character
of this re-appropriation of speech as an end to voluntary subordination to
organizational hierarchy and the inauguration of a critical act of resistance
or insubordination to the speech norms regulating organizational life. PJS
was a high-level leader of an organization that required everyone to treat
it as one you had no reason to complain about. Only a fool (it implied) 
would upset the munificent environment it offered. Yet, PJS felt obliged to
speak the truth even though it was costly for him to do so.
Over the past couple of decades, viewing whistleblowing as a contem-
porary example of parrhesia is a central organizing theme of the whis-
tleblowing literature ( Kenny, 2019 ). How does whistleblowing work to 
inaugurate a “game” between truth-telling and the exercise of freedom? 
Or, in the more current language of critical organizational studies, how 
does it express a speech act of resistance? 
First, leading scholarship in business ethics imagines the parrhesiastic 
relationship between the whistleblower and the authorities from within 
the organization. For example, Vandekerckhove and Langenberg (2012 ) 
describe the truth-telling of whistleblowers as a rupture in the normal 
flow of communication. They describe the parrhesiastic character of 
whistleblowing as generating a “disorganization of the organizational 
dynamic” (p. 40). From within the organization, whistleblowing gener-
ates a “parrhesiastic chain” that implicates different sets of speakers and 
hearers as the claim of wrongdoing moves through the chain of com-
mand. For PJS, breaking the chain of command meant going around the 
CEO directly to the BOD in a private meeting, making claims, and pro-
viding proof that said something had to be done. What is important is 
not simply the “courage” of the whistleblower but the responsiveness of 
the person who receives or hears the difficult news.When PJS pushed the 
COB into a corner, basically giving him no choice but to act, the COB 
responded by coaxing PJS into continuing in his official role as Senior 
Vice President Information and External Relations.
In some organizations, procedures are in place that allow for imple-
menting an immediate planned response to a wrongdoing once it’s dis-
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his whistle (see Chapter 4 ). The organization was caught flat-footed. PJS 
was almost equally unprepared. How could he have ever guessed that 
he would be invited to stay on and act as an undercover agent? Worth 
noting is that the company actually did implement such procedures after 
the fact.
It’s also possible that the audience of a whistleblowing will fail to “hear 
truth” and help protect the organization (see  Chapter 7 ).When that hap-
pens, the whistleblower is in danger of retaliation. But sometimes the 
whistleblower will activate a sense of courage in their hearer/audience.
At NT, when top management learned of the whistleblowing, they started 
a search for his identity, determined to penalize him for his apostasy. At 
this point, a disorganizing process moved up the ladder, multiplying the 
need for a parrhesiastic relationship at every level of the hierarchy as 
organizational decision-makers were called on to be brave and support 
the apostate. Kenny (2019 ) similarly argues for a new conceptualization 
of whistleblowing that departs from viewing whistleblowers in a narrow 
frame, as “lone operators,” since it discourages “ideas of commonality 
and collective action” (p. 3). She advocates for rethinking whistleblow-
ers as part of a collective entity that enrolls others in speaking up when 
organizational wrongdoing is witnessed and impacts more than one indi-
vidual. Such a perspective, though informed by the critical spirit of par-
rhesia, works within the context of upward communication flows that 
are associated with subordinate and superior communication.
A positive outcome of whistleblowing is the correction of organiza-
tional wrongdoing from within the organization. This case is an excep-
tion to the need for upward communication because PJS was the Senior 
Vice President Information and External Relations at NT; he reported 
directly to the CEO. He chooses to go around his direct report to the 
COB. This correction transforms the disorganizing work of parrhesia 
into a moment of re-organization so that the organization might move 
forward. For Vandekerckhove and Langenberg (2012 ), the parrhesiastic 
chain allows for a re-organization of the organization when a new set of 
procedures “establish a receptive determinacy” (p. 40). Is the critical spirit 
of parrhesia attenuated by the courage of management to be responsive 
to the speech of the whistleblower? 
This model of the parrhesiastic chain is an argument for how the orga-
nization might benefit by keeping the claim of wrongdoing under its 
organizational control (Henderson, 2007). By keeping the whistleblow-
ing within NT, it allowed the organization through the COB to keep 
the secret for 29 months following the whistleblowing. As long as the 
truth-telling remains under organizational control, the organization is 
likely able to fend off more collective critiques of its norms, practices, and 
behaviors. PJS’s purpose in his internal whistleblowing was to change the 
organization with as little outside interference as possible. After all, PJS 
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book demonstrates, he intended to both critique the organization and to 
be part of the solution.
The emphasis on the courage of speaker and hearer as actors located 
within the organization often participates in the replication of a moral 
story of individual heroes challenging organizational wrongdoing, or, in 
the case of a responsive management, a story of organizational repair and 
re-form, (see  Chapter 5 ). Parrhesia, imaged as a series of courageous con-
versations, multiplies the number of discursive interactions generating 
new opportunities for transforming speakers and hearers into parrhesi-
astes, but it does so at the expense of maintaining organizational control 
over the circulation of the claim of wrongdoing. A responsive manage-
ment obviates the need to go public. An organization’s ability to prevent 
the public circulation of wrongdoing is a good rhetorical explanation for 
understanding how the resistant character of whistleblowing is brought 
back under the control of the organization. Moreover, an overemphasis 
on demonstrating the courageous character of whistleblowing risks limit-
ing the critical spirit of parrhesia to a virtue psychology.
Regimes of Truth and the Rhetoric of Danger 
As an antidote to moral psychology and in an effort to secure whistle-
blowing as a critical practice, Mansbach (2009 ) and others ( Perry, 1998 ; 
Weiskopf & Willmott, 2013 ;  Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 2016 ) have 
advocated the whistleblowing/parrhesia relationship to be one that ampli-
fies how whistleblowing participates in the contestation over the practices 
and regimes of truth. The regimes of truth in contest here were the CEO’s 
claim that nothing was wrong and PJS’s claim that numerous things were 
wrong and demanded attention. The emphasis on truth does not so much 
displace the subjective elements of parrhesia as it refashions the ethical 
character of truth-telling as being “contingent on the development of a 
critical self-relation that allows the subject to resist specific normative 
demands and to act and intervene in power relations that are perceived 
as “intolerable” ( Weiskopf & Willmott, 2013 , p.  485). Put differently,
regimes of truth are always already contextual and speaking initiates the 
replication of the norms and/or, possibly, their means of transformation.
For example, the voluntary subordination of organizational life is made 
possible by a regime of truth—in this case, treating the CEO’s actions 
as normal and defensible, but so too the duty that inaugurates an act of 
whistleblowing generating a contest of truth regimes. To isolate whistle-
blowing as a practice that participates in a contestation over regimes of 
truth puts in suspension the validity of the truth claim made by the act 
of whistleblowing. Yet, the contextual character of truth regimes sug-
gests that organizations might also be held accountable to regimes of 
truth. It is from within a regime of truth that the subjective element of 
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as a virtue ethics for organizational management, but instead, appreciate 
how whistleblowing participates in a set of procedures and mechanisms 
that establish how its revelation of wrongdoing might necessitate action 
(see Chapter 4 ). Put differently, the responsiveness desired by an act of 
whistleblowing is itself subject to participation in a regime of truth that 
makes hearing the truth possible.
The tendency of rhetorical scholars approaching whistleblowing as par-
rhesia is to approach parrhesia as an ethic that underwrites rhetorical 
performance. Parrhesia is activated as a way to evaluate rhetorical perfor-
mances defined by courageous frankness in the face of danger.As a critical 
standard of judgment and/or as a way to assert rhetorical agency, rhetori-
cal critics can avoid the question of the classical relationship between rhet-
oric and parrhesia. According to  Chu (2016 ), the public narratives and 
arguments about whistleblowing tend to draw a distinction between the 
moral decision to act and a question of rhetoric embedded in discussions 
concerning how to disclose, to whom, with what effect, and with what 
impact on oneself. This case involved the same bundle of moral and prac-
tical issues. Chu (2016 ) advances the claim that government and military 
whistleblowers are the paradigmatic cases of parrhesia because “unlike 
conventional whistleblowers, who are able to rely on legal and civil pro-
tections, the primary defense of whistleblowers like Ellsberg, Snowden,
and Manning is the strength of their evidence and their ability as orators 
and storyteller to communicate that truth to the public” (p. 241). In con-
trast, PJS intended in this instance to use the least force possible, to draw 
the least public attention possible. Yet, his is a parrhesiastic action that 
risked retaliation. One point to emphasize about the danger of retaliation,
if whistleblowing is to remain a form of parrhesia, is that the danger of 
retaliation must be present; it cannot be legislated away or be managed 
away through better procedures for disclosing wrongdoing. Otherwise, it 
is not parrhesia.As Haugen (see  Chapter 4 ) states, it is the goal of the Nor-
wegian state to support whistleblowing, yet like much of the rest of the 
world the evidence shows that the whistleblower, in the main, is punished,
which means that it remains parrhesiastic speech ( Kenny, 2019 ).
The rhetorical character of whistleblowing is expressed in the enact-
ment of the revelation, its choice of audience, its effect, and the public 
defense or attack on the revelation.These questions are rhetorical because 
they are strategic considerations that implicate the act of truth-telling 
into a rhetorical calculation about the “methods best suited to tell the 
truth” (Chu, p.  232). Given the heightened sense that a public revela-
tion of wrongdoing will initiate a higher threat of retaliation, one should 
take seriously how the decision to go public becomes a central rhetorical 
problem ( Near & Miceli, 1996 ;  Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005 ).
PJS’s strategy for publicizing the wrongdoing was to (1) go internal, as 
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(2) commit to a vow of secrecy that he was the whistleblower; and (3) act 
as the point of the arrow in defending the organization from the abuses 
he had claimed in his whistleblowing. As  Skivenes and Trygstad (2010 ) 
note about Norway, the willingness to go public, or in this case private,
is often an effect of contextual variables associated with models of labor 
relations inscribed in law (see Chapter 4 ).
Conclusion: Organizational Resistance and Democracy 
To magnify the focus of whistleblowing as a public effort to escape orga-
nizational control orients scholars toward a more nuanced understanding 
of the rhetorical dimensions of parrhesia. Rhetorical decisions as to the 
methods of “rocking the boat” instead of going public reveal a complex 
processual infrastructure that activates and constrains the responsive-
ness desired by the whistleblower. The strategy here was to privately 
place a variety of concerns on the COB’s agenda, knowing that the hard 
copy evidence of payments to the gardener changed the story. PJS’s use 
of negotiation skills, to hold the strongest evidence until it is necessary,
meant that PJS was a particularly strategic communicator.
By entering into a cross-current of textual circulation, whistleblowing 
brings about the possibility of a public being attentive to the truth-telling 
of the whistleblower. The strategic need of a whistleblower is to invent 
and activate a rhetorical audience with the agential power to correct orga-
nizational wrongdoing. In this way, whistleblowing’s status as fearless 
speech is more than a micro-individualized act; it calls forth a collective 
“we” that demands organizational responsiveness often in combination 
with state actors or other public forms (like social movements). Going 
public, therefore, activates core principles of accountability that extend 
democratic values to organizational wrongdoing (state or corporate) 
( Mansbach, 2011 ). The Norwegian National Lottery (NT) was especially 
attentive to accountability because it was a public monopoly and had to 
emphasize discipline to show its consciousness. In ancient Athens, the use 
of parrhesia in public discourse did ideological work by buttressing a par-
ticular understanding of democracy, of the relation among citizens, and 
it was deployed as a specific practice of celebrating freedom and righting 
tyranny through speech ( Monoson, 2000 ). Monoson demonstrates that 
the Athenian “coupling of freedom and parrhesia in the democratic self-
image . . . functioned to assert two things: the critical attitude appropriate 
to a democratic citizen, and the open life promised by democracy” (p. 55).
Whistleblowing often serves similar ideological work today as it links 
truth-telling to the promise of a democracy that can hold organizations 
responsible for their wrongdoing. Whistleblowing as a kind of parrhesia 
offers insight into how individuals negotiate asymmetrical relationships of 
power to make public organizational wrongdoing (Novak, 2006).
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 4 Smothered by Paradoxes and 
Swamped by Procedures 
The Legal Context of the Case 
Anne Oline Haugen 
Imagine an employee who has spotted possible irregularities in his hos-
pital’s registration of data. Worried, he looks into the problem further,
discusses it with some colleagues, then looks into it yet again. With the 
months passing, and still worried, he eventually approaches a manager 
about his concerns. The manager assures him that the registration is done 
correctly and that he needn’t worry. Unpersuaded, the employee decides 
to contact the Privacy Protection authorities. It’s now a year and a half 
since he first started worrying. The Privacy Protection authorities look 
into the matter and, after another full year, conclude that the employee’s 
concerns are justified: the hospital’s registration of data is indeed illegal.
Meanwhile, not only has our employee been shunted to another office,
he has also been denied an expected raise in salary.Worse still, he is then 
asked to resign. Why? Because his position has been declared “redun-
dant.” It is now two and a half years since he first started worrying. And 
now he faces a brand new problem: Should he sue the hospital because of 
how he’s been treated? The outcome of a trial will be uncertain, he knows.
Besides, being emotionally spent, how can he summon the strength to 
keep fighting? We will leave our employee here, but the point is, it’s not 
enough to be right; you also have to be very persistent.
Peer Jacob Svenkerudʼs (PJS) story is about certain actions—or, more 
specifically, good deeds—that are supposed to be protected by legislation.
PJS finds that the protection was not strong enough to shield him.
The legislation of whistleblowing aims to protect any individuals who 
find the courage to expose organizational wrongdoing that is harmful to 
society. In this story, the whistleblower blew the whistle about the use of 
public funds that he considered illegitimate. No one disputed the justness 
of his charges, but he still received no protection from recrimination.
How could this happen? 
Whether it involves going to court or making new legislation, the law is
all about stories and human behavior. Stories always have a message, plus
central characters ( Bruner, 2002 , p. 7;  Horn, 2010 ). A legal story is usually
told before a court of law ( Bruner, 2002 , p. 37), but often the main char-
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or not, the two opposing characters, or “parties,” will tell their own ver-
sion of what happened, so the two stories invariably contradict each other.
Both stories will consist of supposed facts of supposed legal relevance. Our
story is told by just one of the parties, namely PJS. His story is about how
he observed questionable incidents at the workplace, discussed them with
both colleagues and senior management, and concluded that the incidents
were indeed wrongdoing. His views, and his actions based on his views,
had severe consequences for his future career in the organization.
Norwegian Law as It Relates to This Case 
The law has some distinctive features, especially when compared with the
stories found in the social sciences, literature, and theory, none of which
share its gravity. For example, each nation’s laws are its own, hence truly
national. But they also operate within a larger legal context—that of the
world ( Evju, 2010 , pp. 239–253). We have human rights, the European
Union (EU) convention, and in Europe, the vastly influential EU court ( Mik-
kola, 2016 , p. 430). Throughout Europe, the national courts of its member
countries will always look to the EU court. But they will, of course, also
look principally to their own court decisions, especially those from their
nation’s supreme court. In legal research, national supreme court decisions
are important documents. In addition, we have parliamentary documents,
which are part of the lawyers’ and courts’ so-called preliminary work, as
they help clarify how the laws themselves are to “be understood” ( Lewis &
Trygstad, 2009 , pp. 374–384). When it comes to different kinds of juridi-
cal evaluations of the law, the broad legal literature, and not only national
law, is taken into consideration ( Vaughn, 2014 , pp. 239–266; also  Lewis,
Devine, & Harpur, 2014 , p. 350, and Weltzien, 2017 , pp. 31–49). These
juridical evaluations of the law are important in whistleblowing cases. But
the central question comes down to this: Does the legislation work?
This chapter takes a legal point of view, hence only the facts of legal 
relevance are included here. For example, I ignore any reasons for why 
PJS became a whistleblower—explanations connected to him as a person 
or his tasks at work. I also skip over how PJS describes the way the 
pressure on him mounted and how he was tagged “the prince of dark-
ness.” I just focus on facts relevant to interpreting the legislation. Of 
course, it’s hardly obvious which facts are actually the most relevant.
As Jerome Frank once observed, “But the law as we have it is uncertain,
indefinite, subject to incalculable changes” ( Frank, 1931 ).
Labor Law in General 
Because this story is about whistleblowing, it’s important that Norway’s 
whistleblowing legislation be set in a legal context, specifically its labor 
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appreciate just how fully a whistleblower is theoretically protected because 
any weaknesses in the whistleblowing legislation may be compensated by 
other labor-law protections. The Norwegian Working Environment Act 
(WEA), which relates to the working environment, working hours, and 
employment protection, is an important factor in the safeguarding of the 
employee, for as a rule, this legislation cannot be set aside by a contract.
A central part of its protection is that the employee “cannot be dis-
missed unless this is objectively justified” (WEA, § 15–7). In short, it 
must be clear that the employee has not fulfilled his or her obligation 
according to the contract agreed upon with their employer. Suppose, for 
example, you sell trade secrets to a competitive company. A disgruntled 
Coca-Cola employee once tried to do just that—sell top-secret Coke doc-
uments to Pepsi. It cost him a guilty verdict and eight years in prison.
The employee also has the right to be given adequate notice of dismissal,
ranging from one to six months. There are also formal requirements with 
regard to that notice of dismissal (WEA, §§ 15–3 and 15–4). For exam-
ple, the dismissal must be in writing, and it also must be delivered by 
hand or registered mail. In addition, the dismissal must contain the right 
to demand negotiation and to institute legal proceedings. This law also 
protects against harassment in general (WEA, § 4–3), the latter covered 
under Norway’s discrimination act.
Also important in the Norwegian model are the collective agreements 
( Skivenes & Trygstad, 2017 , p. 122), which also provide further protec-
tion. As Skivenes and Trygstad state, 80% of all employees in the public 
sector are members of a trade union, while 37% of employees in the pri-
vate sector are also members.That means that a large portion of employees 
have additional protections, such as ones governing the period of dis-
missal and part-time employment. (See the collective agreement between 
the union of communities and the labor organizations, Hovedtariffavtalen 
kapittel 2). Additionally, Skivenes and Trygstad emphasize the importance 
of an enterprise’s obligation to have a safety representative, elected by 
and among its employees (WEA, § 6–1), whenever it has more than ten 
employees. The public sector also is governed by the principles of unfair-
ness. For example, an employee who blows the whistle and is then treated 
differently than his colleagues is considered unfairly treated ( Eckhoff & 
Smith, 2018 , p. 404, and  Moen, 2018 , p. 341). Together, the legislation 
and the collective agreements are a part of the protection of employees.
Even beyond these safeguards, however, there are special rules con-
cerning whistleblowing. To them we turn next.
Legislation About Whistleblowing 
The background for Norway’s legislation about whistleblowing starts
with the hallowed rights of freedom of speech and freedom of expression,
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European Convention of Human Rights also articulates the right to free-
dom of expression, as does Article 19 of the United Nations International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( Mikkola, 2016 , p. 430). The con-
nection between Norway’s legislation about freedom of speech and its 
legislation about whistleblowing ( Boe, 2009 , pp. 67–92) is an important 
one to consider. Freedom of speech is guaranteed in the constitution and 
is unlimited there. But later legislation has enacted some limitations, such 
as on hateful speeches. The purpose for legislation about whistleblow-
ing is to protect whistleblowers against retaliation when they exercise 
their freedom of speech. Any limitations in employees’ freedom of speech 
are grounded only in assumptions of loyalty to their employer, not as a 
limitation in the legislation. For if an employee is to enjoy unabridged 
freedom to practice his freedom of speech in the workplace, the legis-
lation’s protection is important. That’s especially so in the public sec-
tor, where promoting whistleblowing can also serve as a weapon against 
criminal offense in the area of economy, such as blowing the whistle on 
embezzlement ( Eriksen, 2014 , p. 177, and also  Brown & Dworkin, 2013 , 
pp. 652–713).We find some of these arguments in the preliminary works 
to the Norwegian legislation, where the need to expose misuse of public 
funds is an argument for protecting the whistleblower ( Ot. prp. nr. 84,
2005–2006 , p. 17; also NOU, 1999 : 27). The misuse of public funds is 
looked upon by the legislator as more serious than the misuse of private 
ones. In the United States, the Civil Service Act of 1978 covers nearly all 
public-policy misconduct by the federal government. Examples include 
disclosures of illegality, abuse of authority, substantial and specific dan-
ger to public health or safety, and gross waste and gross mismanagement,
to name a few ( Lewis et al., 2014 , pp. 351–380).
In today’s academic literature, whistleblowing is defined as the disclo-
sure by organization members (including former members and job appli-
cants) of “illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices (including omissions) 
under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations who 
may be able to effect action” ( Near & Miceli, 1985 , pp. 1–16, and  Near & 
Miceli, 2013 , p. 183). This definition departs somewhat from how whis-
tleblowing is defined by the Norwegian legislation, especially regarding 
morality. For example, it holds that there may be immoral practices that 
are not punishable. To act disloyally to a colleague may be immoral but 
not punishable.The Norwegian legislation will above all cover actions that 
are punishable. But its definition is so similar to the prevailing academic 
one that it is still useful for our purpose.
These rules don’t protect whistleblowers against every kind of retali-
ation. To enjoy protection, they must follow an appropriate procedure,
which includes following certain rules. As long as they do, they get to 
enjoy this constitutional right of freedom of speech.
Compared with employees in other countries, Norwegians score 
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retaliation. The Nordic labor-market model, plus Norway’s approach 
to whistleblowing as found in the legislation, helps explain these scores 
( Skivenes & Trygstad, 2017 , p. 136). The WEA affirms one’s right to 
report misconduct, and workers who report misconduct shall be pro-
tected from retaliation. The model we find in the WEA exhibits such
features as “high degree of unionization and centralized agreement and 
co-ordinated bargaining at several levels” ( Skivenes & Trygstad, 2010 , 
p.  1073). Together, both employees’ unions and the organizations on 
the employers’ side are part of a public decision-making system. Yet,
this only begins to tell the story. Legislation typically aims to have pre-
cise, clear rules to protect employees who blow the whistle. Even so,
those employees may be running a risk ( Dworkin, 2006 , p. 1757). It can 
be difficult for them to decide whether the conditions for whistleblow-
ing are severe enough to be fulfilled; then they must balance that assess-
ment against their loyalty—whether to their employer, colleagues, or the 
workplace. They may ask themselves, “Should I overlook this incident? 
Is it worth the effort? What will it cost my colleagues who had no role 
in it?” Internal whistleblowing will therefore often be an easier choice 
to make than external claims of wrongdoing ( Lewis & Vandekerckhove,
2012 , pp. 253–264). What kind of protection will the employee have 
( Tsahuridu & Vandekerckhove, 2008 , pp. 108–118)? What are the risks? 
What are the consequences of different actions for the whistleblower 
( Callahan & Dworkin, 1992 , p. 273)? This also includes the action of 
not blowing the whistle. What responsibility will I have for the wrong-
doing? What about my conscience? Will it be possible to continue as a 
part of the leadership team after I’ve blown the whistle? Is it possible to 
minimize such uncertainties? All of these questions were central to PJSʼs 
decision-making.
The PJS story is an example of internal whistleblowing and retaliation,
and this story will focus on the enforcement of the legislation.
Mind that Norway’s legislation, rather than referring to “the work-
place,” often uses the more general term “the undertaking.” (See further 
in WEA, § 2 A-1.) That’s significant, because it means that the rules cover 
more than the immediate workplace ( Gimmingsrud, 2017 , p. 808). If a 
person works in, say, the local government administration, the under-
taking will be the township (EMD Langner v. Germany application no.
14464/11; see also Eggen, 2004 , pp. 2–24). The consequence of this is 
that a whistleblower enjoys protection not only with respect to incidents 
at his own workplace, but also at the whole undertaking. If, for example,
you work in some department at a huge hospital and become aware of 
the theft of medicine in another department of that same hospital, you 
will still have the whistleblower’s legal protection. You do not have to 
stay in your lane when reporting wrongdoing.
Although the legislation gives the employee protection, several Nor-
wegian investigations show that many employees choose not to blow 
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the whistle after observing censurable conditions. Possibly it’s because 
of their aversion to conflict, or maybe it’s out of their respect for loyalty.
Though legislation typically aims to provide very specific rules to protect 
them, they still may be running a risk if they speak out ( Dworkin, 2006 , 
p. 1757). That fear is genuine, say Trygstad and Ødegård (2016 , p. 55).
Their report reveals that employees are afraid of retaliation, great unpleas-
antness toward themselves, great personal strain, and even “destroying 
my career” ( Trygstad & Ødegård, 2016 , p. 37). The same investigations 
show, alarmingly, that increasing numbers of employees have been sub-
ject to retaliation. For example, from 2006 to 2016, retaliation has more 
than doubled, from 12% to 25%.What explains this? Trygstad and Øde-
gård’s investigation documents the increasing numbers of whistleblowers 
who got negative reactions when whistleblowing, and the falling numbers 
who got positive reactions. Norwegian working life is clearly changing 
in a negative way for whistleblowing, and there are reasons to be wor-
ried about that development. You would think that given the additional 
focus on protecting whistleblowers, retaliation would decrease, but,
sadly, the opposite has happened, despite Norway’s giving employees’ 
better legal protection than several other countries ( Skivenes & Trygstad,
2017 , p. 136). On the other hand, we don’t know enough yet to state 
that this protection makes it easier to blow the whistle in Norway. We 
need comparative studies of “wrongdoing and whistleblowing, especially 
comparative studies conducted under different labor market models”
( Skivenes & Trygstad, 2014 , p. 113).
Two factors that may play into these trends, according to  Dahle-Olsen 
(2015 ), are globalization and increasing competition among companies 
over borders.
Conditions for Protection 
While we’ve established that Norway’s whistleblowers will have protec-
tion, we haven’t yet spelled out  which conditions must be fulfilled to give 
them this protection. The Norwegian legislation expressly addresses this 
in WEA, § 2 A-1. First, the whistleblower can blow the whistle only about 
“censurable conditions.” These include “punishable actions, other illegal 
actions that are not punishable and unethical and damaging activity”
( Ot. prp. nr. 49, 2004–2005 , pp. 132 and 305).
Take the case of a division economist who was dismissed because of 
alleged curtailed operations—or so his employer argued. The employee 
responded that his dismissal was not objectively justified and that the real 
reason for the dismissal was outside consideration. The court’s finding? 
The dismissal wasn’t reasonably justified. The court decided that there 
were indeed outside considerations. The employee had first notified the 
group about irregularities in prices in an agreement with the ministry 
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dismissal, the whistleblower notified the media, and his dismissal was 
voided. In addition, he was awarded 1.5 million Norwegian kroner in 
compensation ( TOSLO-2004-99016 ).
Harassment and discrimination are also censurable conditions. So 
are actions that conflict with a business’s ethical routines ( Auglend & 
Jakhelln, 2017 , pp. 183–291). But it can sometimes be difficult to decide 
whether the conditions are actually “censurable,” both because the 
employee may not have known all of the relevant facts, and also because 
it’s difficult to anticipate just how the court will consider those facts. In 
one Norwegian court case, an employee blew the whistle about the lack 
of his company’s security routines, which had consequences for custom-
ers’ privacy ( Rt. 2003 –1614). The court held that the consequences for 
the private parties were correctly described. But it also held that an email 
sent to all the company’s employees alleging fraud by the company’s lead-
ers was enough to justify the employee’s dismissal. The moral? You can 
rightly identify a problem, but if you then give it an inflammatory label 
and assign blame, you lose your protection.
The second condition is that the employee must carefully follow the 
appropriate procedure ( LB- 2009–70215 and comments by Sønsteli & 
Stueland, 2015, p. 121). In one case, a professor found a mistake in an 
examination’s results. He made a note of this and gave it to a student,
who then forwarded it. According to the court, the professor acted inap-
propriately. He should have simply informed the management or the 
board. But a case with an opposite result was the one ( LB, 2009 –36995) 
in which the court found that the employee did follow appropriate pro-
cedures. The court concluded that an NDT technician—“NDT” is short 
for “non-destructive testing”—had exposed a number of highly criticized 
and illegal conditions at the company’s branch office in Oslo, all of them 
involving violations of the Radiation Protection Regulations. The court 
found that several of the proven conditions were very serious because in 
working with radioactive material, one can run the risk of major health 
damage. The employee’s warning had indeed been sound, as was his 
handling of it. He had first notified the head of the department at the 
Oslo office, then the CEO, and finally the Norwegian Labor Inspection 
Authority. For this, he had several times been subjected to illegal retali-
ation from the head of the department in Oslo. He was thus awarded 
compensation.
It’s important to understand that “appropriate procedure” is not meant 
to limit the right to blow the whistle. The demand of appropriate pro-
cedure is based on, or is a prolonging of, the principle of employees’ 
loyalty toward their employer ( Ot. prp. nr. 84, 2005–2006 , p. 51). The 
employer’s right to rule is mirrored by the employee’s duty to be loyal and 
to obey the employer’s instructions. There are, of course, several limita-
tions in the legislations addressing this principle, and one of them con-
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The legislation about whistleblowing states that an employee is free 
to speak, and any limitations to that right must be argued for (WEA, § 
2 A-1). An example of the need to constrain speech is the demand that 
an employee act responsibly, which is to say loyally, and that is a limi-
tation in freedom of speech. After all, in PJSʼs case, disloyalty was the 
CEO’s first charge. What might irresponsibility look like? I mentioned 
earlier the court decision about the professor who handed out a note to 
a student criticizing the censorship. The court found that his involving 
the student was irresponsible. There were several other ways he could 
have handled it—for example, by delivering it directly to the board. An 
important point is whether the interests of the employer are unneces-
sarily damaged ( Ot. prp. nr. 84, 2005–2006 , p. 51). Could the whistle-
blower have handled the situation in any other way—say, by blowing the 
whistle internally—to avoid destroying the reputation of the institution 
and at the same time solving the problem? In short, having the same 
aim, but with less damage? If the employee makes comments on Twitter 
and other social media about his leader and his negative qualities—for 
example, that he is afraid of making decisions, or that he lacks the neces-
sary qualifications—it may damage the employer’s interests and even the 
company’s interests.
To follow the appropriate procedure, a whistleblower should also blow 
the whistle internally (WEA, 2005 § 2 A-1). The legislation states that an 
employee has the right to notify in accordance with the undertaking’s 
routines for whistleblowing, and to notify supervisory authorities or 
other public authorities. Such notification would be appropriate, and the 
whistleblower is then entitled to protection.
The Difficulty of Following Procedures 
Following organizational procedures made by the undertaking will
therefore always be seen as appropriate. This sounds as if it is not
complicated, but it may be. First, it’s a challenge to frame organiza-
tional procedures that are clear, straightforward, and consistent with
the corresponding legislation. A Norwegian public administrative body
once drafted guidelines for whistleblowing that ran 47 pages! Luckily,
the document was not confirmed, and they had to rewrite it. If, as an
employee, you have to read and understand 47 pages before you dare
to blow the whistle, you probably won’t bother. How sad, because the
guidelines are meant to help ensure that whistleblowing happens, and
that it happens correctly. Second, the procedures, if stricter than the
legislation, are of course not legal. For example, they may demand that
you do your whistleblowing in writing. After the Norwegian legislation
was enacted, that is not necessary. On the other hand, the whistleblower
may want to put his or her complaints in writing, just to have proof
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employee must not be minimized in the procedures. These procedures
must also be well publicized in the organization, and readily available.
The rules concerning retaliation are also important here, for evidence
rules can have a “significant effect on how rights can be asserted” ( Fast-
erling, 2014 , pp. 331–349). Importantly, the employer bears the burden
of proof that notification has been made “in breach of this provision”
(WEA, § 2 A-1, number 3).
When our story took place, did PJS’s workplace have such procedures? 
I checked with PJS while writing this chapter, and he says that as far as he 
recalls, they had none, and that procedures were added shortly after the 
whistleblowing incident took place. I have gone through their reports and 
found none myself. Of course, I can’t know for sure. On the other hand, if 
they did have such procedures and the procedures weren’t freely available 
to the employees, how could the employees be expected to follow them? 
How could they know what the “appropriate procedure” was? In 2007,
the government published guidelines spelling out how governmental 
companies should make local procedures for whistleblowing. That year,
2007, was the same year that PJS blew the whistle. Although the under-
taking did not have the same clear obligations as the legislation demands 
today, the workplace did have this obligation if the circumstances in the 
undertaking implied it, and it probably did (WEA § 3–6)—but again only 
from 2007. Why Norsk Tipping (NT) didn’t develop these routines, one 
can only speculate. Since 2017 the legislation states that every workplace 
with more than five employees has to have routines, and those routines 
must be easily available for all its employees ( Prop. 72 L, 2016–2017 ).
This has several implications. The lack of routines made it more difficult 
for PJS to blow the whistle the right way. On the other hand, he could not 
be criticized for not following the routines.
As stated earlier, it will nearly always be correct to blow the whistle inter-
nally. But what about external whistleblowing? External whistleblowing 
covers whistleblowing to the media, blogging, websites, and other com-
munications channels with several receivers. It also includes emailing the 
information to several receivers outside the company ( Jakhelln & Løne,
2017 , p. 131). In which situations can this be responsible behavior or 
appropriate procedure? Well, it can be connected to various issues—acci-
dents, the environment, and safety for employees and other groups, such 
as patients ( Dege, 2009 , p. 855). The main rule, according to the pre-
liminary work, is that the employee must blow the whistle internally  first
before going public with it ( Jakhelln & Løne, 2017 , p. 131). But is this an 
absolute demand according to the law? What if there are no supervisory 
authorities? What if management on all levels is involved in the censur-
able conditions, and these conditions can endanger people’s health? What 
if big sums of money are involved? In such situations, contacting the 
media is justified ( Devine, 2017 , pp. 59–76). For financial incentives for 
whistleblowers against corporate fraud, see Faunce, Crow, Nikolic, & 
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media ( TOSLO-2004–99016 Siemens Business Services)? What will hap-
pen if the media contact the whistleblower? Will there be the same restric-
tions on the whistleblower’s freedom of speech as if he himself contacts 
them? The preliminary works state that if the whistleblowing concerns 
censurable conditions, and if internal whistleblowing has already been 
tried, and if the whistleblowing meets the standard of common interest,
external whistleblowing is justified ( Jakhelln & Løne, 2017 , p. 131).
What Are Employees Protected From? 
Exactly what protection will whistleblowers be accorded ( Tsahuridu & 
Vandekerckhove, 2008 , pp. 108–118)? What are their risks? What are 
the consequences of different actions by them ( Callahan & Dworkin,
1992 , p. 273)? Is it possible to minimize these uncertainties for them? 
The legislation states that any unfavorable treatment that occurs as 
a consequence of, or a reaction to, whistleblowing shall be counted as 
retaliation ( Ot. prp. nr. 49, 2004–2005 , p. 306). Examples include harass-
ment, change of workplace, and reduced salary. In PJS’s case, it was the 
pressure on him to get him to resign. Expressions such as “your mission 
is complete” and “new blood is needed” are unequivocal.
As mentioned, it’s important to remember that the employee enjoys 
general protection against retaliation thanks to WEA, § 2 A-2.
Our Story 
We have looked into the legislation governing PJS’s situation, including 
the conditions that must be met to ensure whistleblower protection, such 
as censurable conditions and following the appropriate procedures.
But here’s an important point: employees themselves will not neces-
sarily ask, as a lawyer surely would, “Are these censurable conditions?”
True, they might wonder if certain actions qualify as wrongdoings, but 
not necessarily in the same terms as the legislation. However, after a short 
while, PJS noticed several worrisome incidents at NT. The number of 
these incidents grew rapidly. In time, he felt certain that they counted as 
censurable conditions.
The employee may, as in our story, wonder if he is part of something that 
is “unhealthy, and that, if it became public, would be a disaster.” Later on,
the employee may wonder if he should blow the whistle. The whole pic-
ture of protection becomes important at such moments of bewilderment.
In our story, the whistleblower mentions examples such as questionable 
contracts, extravagant spending, trips with suppliers, and different kinds 
of questionable sponsoring. Neither the company nor the chairman of the 
board contradicted the content of PJS’s claims or argued that these were 
not censurable conditions. With this background, it would be natural for 
the whistleblower to conclude that the conditions of censurable condi-
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executive group about his concerns. That may not have counted as whis-
tleblowing per se, but perhaps as more just an attempt to clarify what was 
going on. The board’s chairman, who supervised the CEO, was informed 
by PJS about the incidents mentioned earlier; he was also given PJS’s docu-
mentation. This act must be viewed as whistleblowing. According to PJS,
when he met with the chairman of the board, he handed over documen-
tation of approximately $10,000 USD spent on the CEO’s property. The 
investigation stimulated by PJSʼs whistleblowing showed that amount to 
be approximately $77,000 USD (2007 currency value). PJSʼs interactions 
with the board must also be considered internal whistleblowing.
As mentioned, an employee is entitled to blow the whistle about cen-
surable conditions as long as he or she proceeds responsibly and follows 
the appropriate procedures. The legislation states that whistleblowing,
when it respects the company’s own routines, will always count as acting 
responsibly. But according to PJS, the company didn’t have its own 
routines for whistleblowing. The preliminary work of the legislation also 
states that internal whistleblowing is nearly always responsible. PJS had 
met with the CEO, the executive group, and the board’s chairman. These 
contacts would all count as internal whistleblowing. But did PJS damage 
the working environment? Apparently not. PJS was acting as responsibly 
as the legislation stipulates. When these conditions are fulfilled, as here,
retaliation is forbidden.
What happened to PJS after he blew the whistle? Was he exposed to 
retaliation? He relates several incidents. The most interesting of them,
from a legal point of view, concerns the correspondence between PJS’s 
lawyer and PJS’s workplace. PJS’s lawyer references statements from the 
management such as “Your time is over, it is time for new blood, we will 
redesign your role, remove you from leadership.”True, this is not an out-
right dismissal in action, but it surely can be viewed as pressure on PJS 
to resign. Any pressure to resign would clearly constitute retaliation. It’s 
also important to remember that at this point, PJS had been under severe 
pressure for a long, long time. As mentioned earlier, it’s not enough to be 
persistent; you also have to be very persistent. In reality, PJS deserved the 
protection guaranteed by the legislation. One problem here, though, is 
how it’s enforced. How, in other words, to make the protection actually 
function? Significantly, PJS was encouraged by his legal support simply 
to take the deal to leave—a conservative response, and maybe a sensible 
one, too. Even with protection in the legislation, a process in court could 
well prove too costly to him.
Conclusion 
PJS blew the whistle properly, just as the legislation requires, and that 
guaranteed him protection against retaliation.The conversations with the 
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But then what happened? Eventually PJS experienced retaliation. The 
Norwegian legislation is unambiguous: retaliation is forbidden. Ah, but 
to prove retaliation, you have to go to court. PJS declined to do that,
partly because of the legal advice he got. It was impossible for his law-
yers, or him, to divine what the final outcome of going to court would 
be. He might in fact lose the case. As a whistleblower, he had been under 
enormous pressure. For him to then take his case to court and face an 
uncertain outcome was a major decision to make—the grinding pressure 
would simply continue, perhaps for months, perhaps even for years. This 
shows how, as a whistleblower, you are the driving character in your 
own story. You are in fact a lonely traveler. Whistleblowing is almost 
always done alone, rather than in a group. Yes, the system offers sup-
port, but no guarantees of justice. You bear the burden of fate on your 
own shoulders.
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 5 Whistleblowing, Identity 
Construction, and Strategic 
Communication 
Corey Bruno and Charles Conrad 
In some ways, the story of Peer Jacob Svenkerud (PJS) is distinctive.
Whistleblowers like him rarely come from the ranks of upper manage-
ment, even less frequently maintain their anonymity for many months,
and almost never are charged with managing their organization’s image 
during the very crisis they initiated. Also, relatively few employees who 
find organizational practices to be unethical voice their concerns to super-
visors or other overseers, such as ombudspersons or human resources 
specialists. Fewer still continue to dissent after management either rejects 
their appeals or accepts their concerns and makes changes. Only a tiny 
proportion “go public” with their concerns, and almost none continue 
their quests to the bitter end.
But in many other ways PJS’s story is typical—in, for example, the moti-
vations, effects, and outcomes of principled dissent in large, bureaucratic 
organizations, as well as the processes of image/identity management that 
usually are employed when charges of illegal or unethical organizational 
behavior reach the public policy or media agendas.What it provides us is 
a detailed case study of how a dissenter grapples with the often contradic-
tory actions of the key players, including his own (see Weick  Chapter 6 ).
In this chapter, we examine PJS’s story through the perspective provided 
by “strategic communication,” broadly defined as the purposeful use of 
symbols to achieve individual, organizational, and/or political goals. We 
suggest that social actors narratively construct, enact, and revise their 
individual identities ( Gergen, 1994 ;  Gergen & Gergen, 1983 ), as they 
interpret and strategically manage organizational and communicative 
situations, which in turn influences their interpretations of those situa-
tions and their choice of communication strategies. Thus, self-knowledge 
and self-perception at a given point in time/space guides and constrains 
actors’ symbolic action and their identity narratives (Giddens, 1991; 
Weick, Chapter 6 ).
The Same Old Story 
Like many concepts in the human sciences, research on dissent/whistle-
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employee, usually someone highly committed to their organization, detects
organizational practices that appear either illegal, unethical, or illegiti-
mate ( Hananel, 2002 ;  Kassing, 2002 ,  2005 ;  Miceli, Near, & Dworkin,
2008 ). Although sometimes based on seemingly objective observations 
(e.g., questionable budget allocations), attaching the label/interpretation 
is a subjective and inter-subjective process. This explains why dissenters 
sometimes are the only ones upset about the practices and also stresses 
that communication between the potential dissenter and other employ-
ees is an important part of the initial decision to act.
Once dissenters decide that unethical actions are taking place, they 
search for signs that the organization is willing to take corrective action.
If they conclude otherwise, they may become demoralized, experience 
declining morale and job satisfaction, emotionally (or even physically) 
withdraw from their jobs, and/or search for employment elsewhere.
Alternatively, they may try to foster organizational change, usually by 
following the chain of command, although circumventing their imme-
diate supervisor does occur ( Kassing, 2007 ). Significantly, almost every 
observer of perceived wrongdoing who eventually reports it to an
outside entity had reported it to at least one person inside their orga-
nization (Martin, 2008;  Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008 ;  Near, Rheg,
van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004 ). They balance concerns about both their 
risks (to their position, careers, and image) and the likelihood of success 
mixed with retaliation (Dozier & Miceli, 1985;  Miceli, Near, & Dworkin,
2008 ) against their ethical codes, particularly regarding harm to innocent 
third parties, broad issues of human rights, and/or the defined purpose 
of the institution. It is the third concern that PJS most often reported 
as his primary motivation. Of course, dissenters sometimes are simply 
naïve—they believed by dissenting that they were just doing their jobs,
pointing out that rules had not been followed, or filing a grievance using 
standard procedures. And sometimes they are motivated by narrow self-
interest or malice or envy (Martin, 2008). But the decision to dissent is 
complex—multiple “additional variables affect the cost-benefit analysis 
of blowing the whistle, including the whistleblower’s attributions about 
why the wrongdoer acted and the wrongdoer’s attempt to influence the 
whistleblower through impression management” ( Miceli, Near, & Dwor-
kin, 2008 , p.  91). In addition, the existence of co-workers who legiti-
mize the potential dissenter’s allegations and support their intention to 
dissent increase the likelihood of their acting, continuing in the face of 
resistance, and escalating the strategies used. If the employee does decide 
to act, he or she will likely opt for factual appeals combined with pro-
posed concrete solutions. In many cases, perhaps half, dissenters actually 
can influence organizational practices, especially if they have supervisory 
rank/responsibilities, are perceived as being generally happy in their job,
and have amicable relationships with their supervisors and upper man-
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There are, however, many reasons for leaders to refuse to change their 
practices. Some are concrete or material. For example, the desired change 
may be seen as threatening a key income generator for the organization 
or one of its core functions. Or it may threaten the rewards and power 
of the administrative elite. Or it may put at risk key relationships with 
people in the organization’s environment ( Perry, 1992 ;  Miceli & Near,
2002 ). Similarly, leaders, and especially boards of directors, often have 
close network ties to one another, and a threat to one is viewed as a threat 
to all, as well as to the organization itself ( Kuhrana, 2002 ).
Other reasons may be cultural. If the local culture would define an 
unethical behavior as “serious,” either in itself or in its effects, dissent 
is more likely, both because dissenters find allies among other employ-
ees and because dissent is viewed as normal. Ironically, seriousness of 
wrongdoing also increases the likelihood and intensity of resistance to 
the dissenter because it threatens the identities, status, and livelihood 
of both managers and the dissenters’ co-workers ( Staw, Sundelands, & 
Dutton, 1981 ). If the behavior is frequent (but not enough to be “nor-
mal”), the link between the behavior and undesirable effects is clear; and 
if the victims of the activity are obvious and viewed as innocent or pow-
erless, dissent is more likely ( Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008 ). Con-
versely, dissent is less likely when the victims are a large and amorphous 
group, such as taxpayers or “society.”That’s often the case in instances of 
theft, waste, inadequate safety, or anti-discrimination practices, or where 
victims have been dehumanized through existing rhetoric, as with some 
civilians during wartime ( Kelman & Hamilton, 1989 ).
At the level of organizational cultures, even in the 21st century, it’s now 
normal for organizations to be undemocratic or even anti-democratic 
enterprises ( Cheney & Lair, 2008 ;  Jackall, 2010 ). As Charles Redding 
observed long ago, the attitude of leaders often is that “we don’t par-
ticularly need boat-rockers” ( 1985 , p.  245; see also Sprague & Rudd,
1988 ). When the questioned policies or actions are deeply embedded 
in an organization’s history, or “loyalty” is a core organizational value,
dissent is particularly upsetting. As a result, firms that engage in illegal 
behavior are likely to repeat it ( Baucus & Baucus, 1997 ), especially if 
they are in industries or sectors of the economy, like defense procure-
ment, where such behavior has been normalized. Wrongdoing becomes 
entrenched in patterns of acting, embedded in organizational memory,
normalized through socialization of newcomers, and hidden in organi-
zational structures (including reward systems) and routine operations so 
that members engage in it “mindlessly” or rationalize it through rhetoric 
that has been legitimized within their organizations ( Ashforth & Anand,
2003 ;  Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004 ;  Gino & Bazerman, 2007 ). In 
so-called strong culture organizations, members who are highly satisfied 
with their jobs and rewards may view the dissenter as a threat to both of 
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may view dissent as a threat to their very identity ( Fairhurst & Zoller,
2008 ). For example, Enron’s excesses—massive spending on perks for 
upper management and bacchanalia for the less entitled—enacted much 
of the identity of the firm, and the rituals differentiated it from its previ-
ous, staid identity ( Bryce, 2002 ).
Once dissenters conclude that internal appeals won’t bring desired 
changes, they must decide if and how to take the issue public. Faced 
with a vague or ambivalent response, or outright rejection, the mix of 
self-oriented, ethical concerns and a desire to protect or defend her or 
his organization begins to shift. Individual ethical concerns become more 
salient ( Kassing & Armstrong, 2002 ;  Kassing, 2011 ), and they focus more 
on getting desired changes made and less on possible retaliation ( Miceli,
Near, & Dworkin, 2008 ). If those concerns are openly supported by their 
peers, informal retaliation is less likely. But formal retaliation is still likely 
unless they are supported by upper management ( Conrad & Poole, 2010 ).
If dissenters become whistleblowers who take their concerns outside the 
organization, the likelihood and intensity of both formal and informal 
retaliation increases, and co-worker support is either silenced or replaced 
with stigmatization ( Hewlin & Rosette, 2005 ;  Lipman-Blumen, 2008 ).
Escalating cycles of dissent/intransigence and retaliation take over.
Formal retaliation begins with verbal strategies of discursive closure 
(nullification and/or issue containment/minimization); escalates to verbal 
harassment, denial of resources necessary for the whistleblower to do 
his or her job (often combined with being subjected to repeated psy-
chological evaluations or arbitrary/negative performance reviews); to 
job redefinition, demotion, pressure to resign and dismissal (when legal 
barriers to do so are minimal). Informal retaliation includes ostracizing,
threatening, or intimidating. In sum, “external reporting leads to more 
retaliation and more retaliation leads to external reporting” ( Miceli,
Near, & Dworkin, 2008 , p. 114; see also Ashforth & Mael, 1998 ). Even 
in industries covered by presumably strong “whistleblower protection”
laws—nuclear power plant safety, defense procurement, hospital care— 
retaliation seems to be almost inevitable and “protection” is meaningless 
( Conrad & Poole, 2010 ; see, e.g., Marsh, Aug 14, 2017 ). Because these 
costs are widely known, only some 10% of dissenters go public, and of 
those who do, many withdraw their complaints before corrective action 
is taken ( McMillan, 1990 ).
Finally, the small proportion of whistleblowers who persist in press-
ing their claims often find that external review fails to effect change.
The problem then is something called “regulatory capture.” Regulatory 
bodies often are “captured” by the industries they regulate, more often 
through the actions of policy-makers who limit their power than through 
regulator failures ( Baker, Conrad, Cudahy, & Willyard, 2009 ;  Graham,
1986 ). If a whistleblower manages to elevate a case of malfeasance to the 
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available to placate public pressure while making minimal and/or inef-
fectual changes ( Cobb & Ross, 1997 ). The usual whistleblowing story 
ends when management either refuses to make desired changes, makes 
only trivial changes, or silences dissent. The dissenter’s often long story 
of sensemaking, cost/benefit analysis, strategy selection, and exhaustion 
ends with a whimper or a purge. PJS’s experience uniquely works itself 
into the typical dissenter story, though his construction of his identity 
makes it distinct and thus theoretically interesting.
PJS’s Story as More of the Same 
In 2010, PJS entered what contemporary advocates of “corporate cul-
ture” strategies of organizing would have called a “strong culture orga-
nization,” but it was a culture enjoying the distinctive advantages of a 
monopoly. Through its managerial elite and board of directors, NT was 
tightly connected, both internally and externally. Personal and financial 
ties linked its elite to suppliers and recipients of its legally mandated 
financing of nonprofit organizations. Similarly, it was linked closely to the 
political elite—during PJS’s tenure, two new chairmen of the board were 
appointed, both former government officials, with ties to the two major 
political parties. The organization itself occupied a unique position at 
the boundaries among multiple political organizations. As the summary 
report of the parliamentary investigating committee clearly indicates, this 
structure provided the organization with exceptional autonomy because 
agencies that oversee its operations, including government auditors, have 
little or no enforcement powers, and those with power must rely on other 
agencies, or independent contractors, for information on the organiza-
tion’s operations. Compounding the situation is the dual mandate of the 
Gaming Commission, to support the gaming industry  and regulate it.
Like the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission before the Three Mile Island 
incident, and the now-defunct Minerals Management Service regulating 
offshore drilling during the Deepwater Horizon accident, this dual man-
date inhibits oversight and facilitates regulatory capture.As a result, while 
potential whistleblowers can appeal to public opinion, legal and political 
appeals are unlikely to change organizational practices or culture.
Indeed, in many ways the report of the Standing Committee on Scru-
tiny on Constitutional Affairs was laughable. The committee repeatedly 
commented that NT’s “particular situation” relies almost completely 
on the integrity and ethical commitments of its management, but just 
as frequently demonstrated that there was little or no direct oversight 
of its actions, and that there was a serious lack of transparency in the 
operations of the agencies involved in that oversight. For example, the 
Auditor General’s Report of June 2009, which took place only because 
of the actions of a whistleblower, included “especially severe criticism” of 
















66 Corey Bruno and Charles Conrad 
any of the agencies that might have provided oversight, or to Parliament 
(Auditor General Report p.  2). In addition, it notes that the Ministry 
of Cultural Affairs has “several instruments available for government of 
NT” but offers multiple comments that suggest “regulatory capture”—an 
extensive pattern of “informal” interactions “between the administration 
and civil servants at the ministry,” and between the company and its sub-
sidiaries, patterns that were condemned by the auditor general, and that 
the committee concluded undermined the transparency that it repeatedly 
notes is essential for a government organization, particularly one with 
a lucrative monopoly position. Yet, the committee accepted the Minis-
try of Culture’s promises to “do better” in the future and provided the 
ministry with excuses for past failures, stating that it “is not natural for 
the Ministry to take charge of any details of ongoing business operations 
(Auditor General Report p. 3). In the end, it recommended—but did not 
mandate—that the ministry enhance its oversight of the organization’s 
“relations with its contractors”; provide guidelines for doing so; actually 
begin to keep formal, written records of interactions between the orga-
nization’s management and the ministry, contractors, and the auditor 
general; and consider use of an independent (external) auditor (Auditor 
General Report p. 4), all of which are standard operating procedures in 
developed democracies. Moreover, “the Committee is satisfied that the 
board of directors at NT has initiated an independent investigation of 
the two matters that were not discussed in Auditor General Report, p. 14 
(2008–2009) [those not involving landscaping].” No enhancement of the 
enforcement powers of various regulatory groups, or of their level of 
transparency, either with one another or with Parliament, were proposed.
In short, the committee failed to take any steps that might prevent a 
recurrence of the problems identified in their hearings.
Like many new hires, PJS excitedly swallowed NT’s rhetoric. The firm 
boasted a charismatic CEO; an avowed commitment to corporate social 
responsibility, both directly in its mission to stop gambling addiction 
and indirectly in its largess to sports-related non-profit organizations; 
a strong brand identity; and widespread popular support. Added to all 
these appeals was the promise of “a joyous time with problems that easily 
could be solved.”
But as PJS encountered outsiders questioning the organization’s opera-
tions and ethics, and heard murmurs of disenchantment among workers,
the bloom quickly left the rose. He faced the dissenter’s dilemma— 
sacrifice one’s personal moral code or speak out, ever more pointedly,
which would threaten his position and, in a tightly interconnected indus-
try, risk ending his career and reputation. All of this was complicated by 
his professional responsibility to publicly defend an organization that in 
some ways was indefensible: 
What were my choices? My own moral and ethical questions were 
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that all companies and their employees should abide by and that had 
become my mantra in business? If all other options were exhausted,
what choice was left but to blow the whistle? Alternatively, was I 
simply negotiating my personal ethics with those found in the domi-
nant organizational culture over issues that would not commonly be 
recognized as corruption? 
NT also seems to have developed a typical set of responses to inter-
nal dissent. As employees learned more and more unsettling informa-
tion about budgets and contracts, informal discussions of ethical issues 
became increasingly common. Questioning by external sources increased 
as well. Management then stepped in to silence dissent, both externally 
and internally, just as PJS’s friend, the corruption expert, had predicted. 
Some dissenters left the company, while others were threatened with 
demotion and/or transfer to less desirable positions and assignments. All 
of these examples were well known throughout the organization. Some, 
like PJS’s primary confdante, found that the threats would be imple-
mented. In PJS’s case, and his communication through his lawyer to NT, 
he claims the evaluation systems were manipulated to legitimize predeter-
mined negative conclusions.These response strategies—from labeling dis-
senters “traitors” (or “unfaithful servants,” adding a religious overtone), 
to McCarthyite grilling of innocent workers so as to persuade them to 
turn on their colleagues, to giving PJS multiple ultimata once his identity 
was known, some cast in the form of “helpful career advice”—intensifed 
after multiple resignations of upper-level executives and members of the 
board of directors. Thus, it seems clear that intolerance of dissent was 
deeply embedded in the organization’s culture. It may be, as PJS points 
out, that “the CEO was very much an institution in the company,” but 
it’s also clear that his values and attitudes toward dissent had become 
institutionalized there. 
Given such a closed, autocratic culture, it’s not surprising that co-workers
who had agreed with PJS’s assessments of wrongdoing and potential dam-
age to the organization’s reputation and mission, and who had encour-
aged him to pursue remediation, largely disappeared once his identity was
widely known. Once a whistle has been blown, colleagues are relieved of 
the dissonance that they feel from observing activities that violate their 
own ethical/moral codes ( Burke & Cooper, 2013 ), and once retribution 
begins, their own cost-benefit analyses shift markedly. For PJS, and for the
organization, these shifts meant that important sources of hard evidence
no longer were available to him. It proved a crucial change, because upper
management and Deloitte’s internal investigation dismissed all but one 
charge as lacking sufficient evidence (Deloitte report).
In sum, multiple elements of PJS’s story come as no surprise; they 
provide yet another example of principled dissenters detecting organi-
zational wrongdoing and taking exceptional personal, financial, career,
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same situation, would remain silent. Given the risks they face, doing so 
is the rational course of action. A very few do speak out, usually follow-
ing the chain of command. Some, perhaps half of those very few, succeed 
in achieving a degree of organizational change, although it’s often more 
symbolic than substantive. Those who fail must make a fateful decision 
about whether to take their message outside the organization. Most 
do not. But once someone else tells their stories, they’re celebrated, or 
reviled, as “whistleblowers.”
Ironically, the most celebrated dissenters in recent U.S. history—Sherron
Watkins of Enron, Coleen Rowley of the F.B.I., and Cynthia Cooper of 
WorldCom—provide examples of all three outcomes. Cooper took her 
case over the head of her supervisors to the board of directors and made 
a case so compelling that the board took corrective action, including dis-
missing the upper management. Meanwhile, she experienced extensive
harassment from her superiors and co-workers—and serious financial
losses when her employer went bankrupt. Through it all, though, she
took her case to no one outside of WorldCom. Rowley, on the other hand,
took her concerns to F.B.I. Director Robert Mueller and eventually told 
her story to various congressional committees. She, too, faced extensive 
internal harassment and reprisals but retired from the F.B.I. some years 
later. As for Watkins, she sent a letter to Enron C.E.O. Kenneth Lay, but,
like Rowley, did not “go public” until congressional hearings investi-
gated what was, by then, old news. Of course, all three should be cele-
brated for their integrity, bravery, and tenacity. Still, they did not do what 
PJS did.
PJS’s case forces us to examine a very different question: Why do a 
handful of dissenters continue their efforts to the “end of the line”? 
Sometimes the answer involves the malfeasance itself. Take Vera English,
pioneer whistleblower in the 1980s, fired by General Electric for expos-
ing the company’s widespread radiation contamination, and whose 
response to her dismissal reached the U.S. Supreme Court ( English v.
General Electric). For her trouble, she lost her career, underwent years 
of excruciating emotional pain as government oversight agencies and 
federal courts delayed acting, discredited her, and dismissed her well-
supported complaints, and in the end found that it cost her more than 
ten times as much money as GE was fined for a pattern of practices that 
created what Charles Perrow has labeled high “net catastrophic poten-
tial” ( 1984 ). (For a summary of the case, see Conrad & Poole, 2010, pp.
270–271.) At first her whistleblowing may have been influenced by the 
widespread presumption that the Three Mile Island accident had elevated 
safety to the top of the industry’s concerns, and that it had among the 
strongest whistleblower protection laws in the country. But even after 
these presumptions were punctured, she persisted.
But PJS persisted because of ideals, not potential catastrophes. He 
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to be open, honest, and efficient (maybe even frugal), that all organiza-
tions touting themselves as “socially responsible” should actually act that 
way, and that regulatory agencies have a responsibility to, well, regu-
late. The actions taken at NT did not threaten a Chernobyl-like disaster; 
indeed, not a single person would lose life or limb if the practices contin-
ued. Yet, he refused to back down.Why? 
We think that PJS’s story provides an excellent opportunity to explore 
that question, as it relates to most other whistleblowers as well. Yes,
rational considerations are always relevant, but all of us are guided and 
constrained by complex processes of sensemaking, and that emotional-
ity sometimes drives decision-making. The key process involves the con-
struction of our individual identity in conjunction with our construction 
of the ethical situation.
Narrativizing Identity and Whistleblower Storytelling 
Traditional research on individual identity, Kenneth and Mary Gergen 
argue, tends to be both “mechanistic” (treating its subject as a relatively 
stable internal attribute that is determined by external pressures) and 
“synchronic” (an individual’s self-characterization at a given point in 
time; Gergen & Gergen, 1983) See also Gergen, 1997). As a result, the 
processes through which a social actor’s identity is formed and trans-
formed and the impact that personal history has on those processes is 
lost. Humans’ efforts to understand fragments of experience separated 
by time, or to develop coherent connections among life events, require a 
perspective that is reflexive and diachronic. Identities are created through 
symbolic interaction and, ironically, interaction encourages (or requires) 
one to articulate an account of oneself that is both stable and capable 
of change and adaptation; “one must be changing but maintain a sta-
ble character” (Gergen & Gergen, 1983, p. 266). A given self-narrative 
can be maintained only if an individual is able to negotiate “successfully 
with others concerning the meaning of events in relationship with each 
other” (Gergen & Gergen, 1983, p. 268, citing De Waele & Harré, 1976).
Conversely, sustaining an identity narrative is enabled by the active con-
tribution of a supporting cast; self-construction is dialogic. Thus, self-
narrative is a strategic resource, “a linguistic implement constructed and 
reconstructed by people in relationships, and employed .  .  . to sustain,
enhance, or impede various actions” (Gergen & Gergen, 1983, p. 256; 
see also Gergen, 1994 ). Its use is guided and constrained by the struc-
tural configurations ( Frye, 1957 ) and dominant myths (Campbell, 1991; 
Browning, Sørnes, & Svenkeurd, Chapter 2 ) surrounding an interaction.
In this sense, interactants appropriate “from a cultural repertoire of sto-
ries certain forms that become synthesized as personal stories” ( Gergen,
1994 , p. 20), particularly those that posit a positive outcome (enlighten-
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Ethicality is central to self-narratives because autobiographical accounts
are moral tales. Indeed, “narrative requires an evaluative framework in 
which good or bad character helps to produce unfortunate or happy out-
comes” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 456). The details of personal narratives are 
selected based on the degree to which they “fit” the plot and characteriza-
tion that are being constructed. They also are reflexive—the details that 
are included and the stories that are chosen as components of the narra-
tive lead to revisions in the overall creation. Plot is the connective tissue 
(Frye, 1957) that links events and actions together via systems of meaning.
It provides more than a chronicle of events; it establishes causal connec-
tions among them and deliberatively arranges them in ways that reveal 
their dramatic, thematic, and emotional significance. To answer ques-
tions such as “Am I improving,” “Am I maintaining the high standards I 
once committed myself to,” or “Am I growing as a person,” the individual 
selects discrete events and/or images that occur over time, evaluates them,
and links them together through an ethical self, and in turn revises his or 
her ethical self through the interpretive process.
The self-construction process—the ongoing interaction among situational
guidelines and constraints, a hero’s emerging identity, strategic choices,
communication with others, and perceived impact on an organization— 
can expand the resources available to a dissenter/whistleblower, reduce 
them, or transform them in ways that call for different strategic choices
and relationships. For example, choosing to engage in open dissent within 
one’s organization may activate supportive relationships or collaborative 
action with like-minded co-workers (see Fairhurst & Zoller, 2008 ). At 
the same time, it may encourage others to initiate counter-discourse
that functions to limit the dissenters’ voices, exploit fissures or contradic-
tions within their identities (e.g., labeling principled dissent as treachery 
or disloyalty), or push dissenters toward the exits ( Ashforth & Mael,
1998 ). On the other hand, successful dissent may encourage dissenters/ 
collaborators to define themselves as “radicals,” reducing their credibil-
ity with other members of their organization and limiting their strategic 
options by defining compromise as a denial of their selves, or leading them
to re-define their initial goals as too accommodating. Their new identi-
ties require “radical” action and deny them the option of accepting their 
success as adequate.
PJS’s Story as Self-Construction 
We and our fellow authors in this volume stepped into PJS’s ongoing 
process of integrating his identity story with his experience at NT. By 
the time these chapters become available to other readers, he will pre-
sumably have revised his narrative many times and in many ways, large 
and small—through his communication with the editors both inside and 
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drafts became available to him, and with himself as he grapples with 
their disparate readings of his story. The process will even continue after 
the book is published, and beyond. Consequently, the analysis that we 
present in the remainder of this chapter focuses on only one moment in 
that ongoing process, on the narrative being constructed during his com-
munication with us authors during the preparation and refining of the 
book proposal, both the interviews and his “introduction.”We believe it 
is a story about whistleblowing, but it is more fundamental, more per-
sonal, more human than that. It is finally about his sense of belonging, of 
connection, and the paradoxical nature of solitude.
When PJS arrived at NT, he brought with him a version of the mon-
omyth described by Svenkerud, Browning, and Sørnes (and borrowed 
from Joseph Campbell)—the notion that societies depend on their heroes 
for their stability, their excellence, and their ability to sustain their integ-
rity from external and internal threats.
PJS’s version of the monomyth included three subordinate myths. One 
has come to be called the “business case” for organizational ethics—the 
assumption that “doing good” in the long run helps organizations “do 
well,” that businesses and their heroes can be both economic and social/ 
cultural heroes.
The second assumption is that both not-for-profit and governmental 
organizations have a nobler purpose than maximizing profits, namely,
being good stewards of the resources that are made available to them, and
serving the broader society, protecting its weaker members from exploi-
tation, and so on. The resources they use and distribute are public goods,
and the donors and taxpayers who provide them must rely on regula-
tors and on the organization’s management to protect their investments 
because they are too removed from the organization’s operations to do so 
themselves. PJS, the parliamentary investigating committee, Deloitte, and 
virtually everyone else involved in the saga articulated this myth and did 
so repeatedly. In it, leaders become “heroes” through subordinating their 
own gains to those of other stakeholders.
A third, and related, subordinate myth is that the compensation 
afforded the leadership of those organizations should (and will) at least 
in part involve “donated labor” motivated by the leaders’ commitment to 
the mission of the organization. As a result, their compensation will tend 
to be more limited than in comparably sized firms in the private sector 
( Frumkin & Keating, 2001 ;  Hallock, 2002 ).
Unfortunately, the available empirical evidence suggests that all three 
subordinate myths are unrealistic. First of all, there are many critiques 
of the business case for CSR (as well as the “business case” for other 
issues), all of which explain why the perspective rarely leads corpora-
tions to actually behave in social responsible ways, in part because they 
naively assume that market processes will enforce ethical standards (see,
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“regulatory capture,” mentioned earlier, suggests that external oversight 
often fails to generate, or even define, ethical organizational behavior.
Even more so than in the for-profit sector, financial regulation of non-
profits is weak, and oversight is diffused across multiple levels of gov-
ernment and government agencies, which means that it is sometimes 
haphazard and often minimally constraining. Finally, while it is true that 
executive salaries in government agencies and non-profit organizations,
especially religious organizations, are lower than in comparable for-profit 
firms, the gap in total compensation is much smaller, especially if psycho-
logical rewards are taken into account. For example, many government 
and nonprofit organizations somewhat compensate for lower incomes by 
providing extensive executive benefits, both financial (compensation and 
extensive expense accounts) and social (amenities such as flexible hours,
more stable job prospects, and a slower pace of work), even if there is 
little or no link between these elements of executive compensation and 
organizational performance. The greater ambiguity of non-profit and 
government organizations’ goals, combined with the greater difficulty in 
measuring concepts such as “progress to mission,” limit boards’ abilities 
to link executive performance and compensation. Instead, quantitative 
measures such as organizational size and cash flow are used to legitimize 
executive compensation, which in turn creates incentives for managers 
to focus more on these outcomes than on adhering to the organization’s 
mission. Similarly, lower levels of direct competition in the government/ 
non-profit sectors reduce pressure to rein in compensation packages.
In this subordinate myth, leaders are “heroic” if they sacrifice financial 
gain and associated trappings of wealth and status, and do so despite 
the absence of effective external controls. But, the available empirical 
evidence suggests that many of the practices that PJS found offensive are 
rather standard aspects of organizational functioning.
At first, NT seemed to offer PJS the capstone of his personal history.
He would finally be living the ethical life that Mohammad Yunus has 
persuaded him was possible by becoming a driving force for the kind of 
organizational transformation(s) that Ev Rogers had studied. Earlier,“liv-
ing the [CSR] dream” had proved insufficient for him, much as Yunus’s 
Fulbright, Ph.D., and assistant professor position had not been for him.
To enact his identity, the hero of PJS’s own narrative required a leadership 
position through which he could have a sustained, significant impact.
True, consulting and professoring both  could be noble activities, but they 
were insufficient. NT, which had a recent history of ethical lapses and 
transformation, a strong organizational identity, and a popular image,
offered him a position that would crown his narrative—“it promised to 
be a joyous time with problems that could be easily solved. I had found 
my place.”
More precisely, PJS seems to have idealized NT as a special place
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despite its ambiguous history. Research on organizational socialization
suggests that both before and immediately after entering a new orga-
nization, all of us try to construct a congruence between ourselves and
our surrounding; this seems a common aspect of sensemaking (Louis,
1980; see also Weick). But PJS found no such congruence. By the end
of his fifth year, his initial surprise at the contradiction between NT’s
purported commitments and its internal operations had morphed into
a disappointed understanding of how the organization handled dissent.
For example, a manager who had refused to cover up the CEO’s pri-
vate use of employees had been “educated” by the vice CEO and subse-
quently left the company; another “told me, ‘I was told to shut up and
cool down—and I would be put in another position if I continued.’ A
former executive told me [PJS] directly that he lost his leading position
because he had asked too many questions.” But, for PJS, neither exit
nor compromise was consistent with the identity he was constructing.
He eventually realized that he faced precisely the kind of constrain-
ing situation faced by dissenters in general: abandon his own values
and opt for job security, or blow the whistle and experience retribu-
tion both by his firm and by his industry. His anguish was exacer-
bated by his realization that dissenting would destroy his ability to
be an “internal change agent.” It was further exacerbated by his being
assigned to defend the organization against allegations, like his own, of
wrongdoing. He found himself acting in ways that utterly contradicted
his beliefs, values, and identity narrative. The pain that most potential
dissenters/whistleblowers face—of impotently remaining silent when
wrongs are being committed—was replaced by the even greater disso-
nance of actively articulating untruths and thereby helping perpetuate
those wrongs ( Chapter 1 , Svenkerud, p. 9–10).
Secrecy had similar effects. Commonly used by leaders to silence dissent 
( Lipman-Blumen, 2008 ), secrecy took a different form in PJS’s case by 
uniquely limiting his options and violating his identity as a change agent.
It also accelerated the usual processes through which dissenters become 
progressively more isolated from their co-workers and potential support-
ers. In his idealism, PJS was doubtless naïve about the willingness of his 
sources and supporters to stand behind him if he went public with his 
claims, a faith that he maintained, at least for a while, even after they 
failed to act and/or abandoned him.Watching people who supported him 
and encouraged him to fight the battle sit silently by when he needed 
their help only exacerbated his feelings of abandonment. Retreating to 
the Norwegian War College provided temporary relief by inserting him 
into a pattern of interactions that reaffirmed his identity narrative. And 
retreating to the farm provided further solace. But neither provided him 
an opportunity to continue the process of constructing an integrated self.
Because identities are developed and legitimized through interaction with 
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Conclusion 
Even two years after leaving NT, PJS observed that he still “felt unhappi-
ness about where his life had taken him.” But by the time he finished his 
introduction to this volume,
Something within me had changed. Not only had the constant tor-
mented feeling of unrest gone away, but a different kind of balance 
had set in. With more certainty, it started to become clear to me that 
my self-confidence and ability to walk with my head held high in all 
kinds of situations had become easier. It almost felt that the question 
of finding out who I wanted to be had been answered. Slowly and 
surely, a new feeling of self-contentment started to emerge.
It may be that PJS’s retreat to the farm severed his connections with the 
situation and people who had created his divided self. It may also be that 
his interactions with people who weren’t part of NT allowed him to con-
tinue developing an integrated self-narrative. Or it may be even simpler: 
for a man whose identity was fundamentally tied to his professional life, 
his new position provided the space within which self-construction could 
continue. John Shotter has observed ( 1989 , p. 146): 
People not only have to have a life history, they are expected to be 
knowledgeable about it in some way, and that knowledge is expected 
to be influential in their actions.They have had (and are still susceptible 
to) traumas and triumphs, joys and regrets, delights and disasters, and 
what has happened to them in the past makes a difference to how 
they act now. They cannot just exist as ahistorical, atemporal beings.
But narrative theory suggests a more fundamental social explanation. 
Tragic heroes, Northrup Frye argued, are removed from society at the 
end of their stories—Oedipus is blinded; Lear, Hamlet, Othello, and Willy 
Loman die. In the “high mimetic” form of tragedy, the hero is superior to 
other characters and to the audience—“but what he or she does is subject 
both to social criticism and to the order of nature” ( Frye, 1957 ). High 
mimetic plots involve disillusionment—a deep change of world view 
from positive to negative, powerful to impotent, and/or certain (morally 
and/or pragmatically) to lost and/or confused. The sagas of high mimetic 
heroes ask the audience to engage psychologically and emotionally, to 
identify with the hero’s struggle, and to want her or him to succeed. In 
self-narratives, the narrator is himself part of that audience. As the chaos 
around him increased (see Browning, Sørnes, & Svenkerud, Chapter 2), 
and PJS’s identity was increasingly threatened, the intensity of his efforts 
to construct a new identity intensifed. As his narrative construction con-
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For example, his early-morning meeting with the new CEO initiated a 
series of interactions in which he expected to tell his story but was not 
allowed to do so. The interlude between jobs allowed him to resume the 
process, as did his interviews with the editors of this volume, plus his 
opportunity to write, revise, tell, and retell his story, together with the 
opportunities he will have to interact with the chapter authors, and even-
tually readers of the published volume. PJS’s experience provides a rather 
straightforward answer to why some whistleblowers continue their battle 
long after it seems reasonable to do so—they must do so to confdently 
answer the question of “Who am I?”—and to be, fnally, proud of the 
answer. Telling and retelling their story is the key process through which 
that revised identity is constructed. 
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 6 Sensemaking and Whistleblowing 
Karl E.Weick 
We’re all put to the test . . . but it never comes in the form or at the point 
we would prefer, does it? 
(David Mamet, source unknown) 
The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas 
in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function. I’ve 
always disliked the unnecessary comma in the middle of this famous 
Fitzgerald dictum, suggestive as it is of an inability to hold two opposed 
ideas in the mind at the same time while still retaining etc.
( Shields, 2011 , entry #401) 
These two insights, applied to this case of whistleblowing, foreshadow a
story about sensemaking in the face of multiple unexpected tests. These
tests are composed of opposed ideas that become increasingly difficult
to manage. As these incompatible ideas evolve, they form “surfaces of
apprehension” ( Taylor & Van Every, 2000 , pp. 40–41), meaning that
they add to understanding but also to wariness. Peer Jacob Svenkerud
(PJS) apprehends more of what the organization is really like and grows
more wary of future trouble and what to do about it. This disquieting
apprehension steadily becomes more dominant in his sensemaking.
To flesh out a sensemaking interpretation of the Norsk Tipping (NT) 
case, I describe the concept of sensemaking, sensemaking in the service 
of whistleblowing, and the management of sensemaking in the context of 
whistleblowing.
On Sensemaking 
Sensemaking is an explanatory process, built out of the cyclical 
entanglement of actions and interpretations, which tends to be accen-
tuated by incompatible psychological implications, interruptions, and 
confusion. “Sensemaking privileges epistemological anxiety and it is for 

























82 Karl E.Weick 
( Keenoy, 2008 , pp. 467–468). Maitlis and Christianson (2014 ) describe 
sensemaking as “a process, prompted by violated expectations, that 
involves attending to and bracketing cues in the environment, creating 
intersubjective meaning through cycles of interpretation and action, and 
thereby enacting a more ordered environment from which further cues 
can be drawn” (p. 67).
The term sensemaking is not hyphenated because sense is literally made,
created, and enacted when actions of bracketing and the extraction of 
cues shape what is sensed as a story, and what happens next.“Signifcance 
and valence do not pre-exist ‘out there,’ but are enacted, brought forth,
and constituted by living beings” ( Thompson, 2007 , p. 158).
When expectations are disconfirmed and significance and valence are 
enacted, phenomena are carved out of raw experience and “conceptually 
fixed and labeled so that they can become the common currency for com-
municational exchanges” ( Chia, 2000 , p. 517). In more general terms,
sensemaking occurs when an imbalance or incompatibility between 
the organism and the environment is triggered, and efforts are made to 
restore a balance and reduce tension. In John Dewey’s words ( 2008 ),
“Life is interruptions and recoveries. . . . At these moments of a shifting 
of activity, conscious feeling and thought arise and are accentuated”
(p. 125). During these moments of accentuation, four important things 
happen. First, our experience gets sifted, and much of it gets lost. Second,
we name the parts that remain. Third, we act in order to discover what 
the names mean. And fourth, we step back and inquire about our process 
and its products.
When thoughts and feelings are accentuated, data given to sense are 
sifted. We 
transform the order in which experience comes into an entirely dif-
ferent order, that of the conceived world. . . . The conceptual scheme 
is a sort of sieve in which we try to gather up the world’s contents.
Most facts and relations fall through its meshes, being either too 
subtle or insignificant to be fixed in any conception. But whenever a 
physical reality is caught and identified as the same with something 
already conceived, it remains on the sieve, and all the predicates and 
relations of the conception with which it is identified becomes its 
predicates and relations too; it is subjected to the sieve’s network, in 
other words.
( James, 1981 , p. 455) 
But what if the reality that is caught is not the same as something 
already conceived? What if the conceptions that exclude the insignifi-
cant and the overly subtle, themselves turn out to be limited by norms,
experience, and expectations? What if that which falls through the 
































Sensemaking and Whistleblowing 83 
of significance and prominence that disconfirms the “sieve’s network”? 
Now two questions dominate: “what’s the story here?” and “what should 
we do?” ( Weick et al., 2005 , p. 410).
Sensemaking involves turning circumstances into a situation that is 
comprehended explicitly in words and that serves as a springboard for 
action ( Taylor & Van Every, 2000 , p. 40). Circumstances are the flowing 
stream.A situation is what is caught on the mesh of a sieve.And the pred-
icates and relations are the words, categories, and descriptions that serve 
as a springboard to action. We are able to make sense when we seem to 
capture continuous experience in discontinuous concepts, when actions 
and comments fit into a finite number of types, and when experiences are 
edited in the interest of collaboration.
Sensemaking can be seen as both episodic and continuous. It appears
to be episodic in the sense that it increases when there is a breach
and recedes once a breach is restored. “[S]ensemaking is confned to
specifc episodes (in which some organizational activities are inter-
rupted until they are satisfactorily restored)” ( Sandberg & Tsoukas,
2015 , p. S26). However, sensemaking also appears to be continuous
in the sense that it is an ongoing process that produces and sustains
a sense of shared meaning ( Gephart, Topal, & Zhang, 2010 , p. 284).
Gephart et al. assert that there is “no timeout from sensemaking”
(p. 281) and ground that assertion in their definition of sensemaking:
“An ongoing process that creates an Intersubjective sense of shared
meanings through conversation and non-verbal behavior in face to
face settings where people seek to produce, negotiate, and maintain a
shared sense of meaning.”
Both positions can be reconciled if we argue that episodic sensemaking 
does not stop once a breach is restored. Instead, the reconstituted sense 
is built into the evolving present by means of altered activity, redrafted 
expectations, and lessons learned. While a breach does accentuate sense-
making, restoration doesn’t terminate the sensemaking. It terminates the 
accentuation . . . until the next breach.
On Sensemaking in the Service of Whistleblowing 
Several of the properties of sensemaking just mentioned are visible in the
NT case. For example, we see instances of interconnected actions and
interpretations, disconfirmed expectations, selective attention to cues in
the environment, imbalance or incompatibility, accentuation of conscious
feeling and thought, and the creation of images that rationalize what people
are doing. These conceptual labels suggest a story. But more importantly,
they focus that story on reasons why, for PJS,“every day is a struggle,” and
why those discomforting struggles grow harder and harder to reduce.
One way to focus the story is to center it on seven factors ( Weick,
1995 , pp. 17–63) that are proximal influences on the specific sense that 
 
       
          

























84 Karl E.Weick 
is made. These seven factors include social context, identity formulation,
retrospective interpretation, meaningful cues, ongoing events, plausible 
stories, and effortful enactment (SIR-COPE).
All seven figure prominently in PJS’s account. His social context is 
made up of associates such as an applauding board, subdued employees,
a majority, and mentors. PJS continues to ponder the questions, “Who 
am I?” and “When am I?”—questions regarding  identity. He describes a 
long-standing “feeling of general unhappiness about where my life has 
taken me, that has resulted in a sense of not belonging and a feeling that 
I have failed to accomplish anything meaningful.” PJS often relies on ret-
rospect for meaning, looking back at his CSR roots, success at Telenor,
early recruiting promises at NT, earlier counsel from mentors, and early 
misgivings. Normal occurrences become  cues of something that is not 
right: 
The company was flying high on the expense side. This I knew for 
a fact. The repeatedly extravagant meetings and events were noticed 
by outsiders, including the media. Phone-calls from the media asking 
about spending and apparent lack of transparency became harder 
and harder to answer.
(see Chapter 1 ) 
These cues, when combined with those of invoices for gardening
payments, apparent board indifference to his cautions, and question-
able buyer-seller interactions, are hard to ignore. Over several years 
the inconsistencies are ongoing, as are complaints, deadlines for posi-
tive annual reports, executive meetings, and external reporting. Nothing 
stops or goes away, and disorder increases (e.g., “We have an ‘unfaithful 
servant’ in our midst”). Plausible meanings are seemingly everywhere,
but seldom align with one another. A plausible good company co-exists 
with a plausible “dirty culture.” The board’s efforts to provide “satisfac-
tory answers” to PJS about the first CEO’s conduct are incompatible with 
PJS’s plausible hunches that the board is trying to minimize its own cul-
pability. In the role of whistleblower, PJS says,“There is something wrong 
with this organization,” but as the Senior Vice President Information and 
External Relations he “says that NT is excellent” (see  Chapter 1 ). Finally,
efforts to enact order into this growing chaos seem to heighten disorder 
(e.g., PJS lists a collection of problems at NT for the board chair, who 
listens silently, and then advises PJS not to leave the firm but to pretend 
like nothing happened and create a strategy to answer the questions that 
he has secretly raised).
To consolidate these observations even further we can take a closer 
look at PJS’s comment that, “Certainly, I think I experienced some disso-
nance. In some aspects, I tried to reduce the dissonance by saying, ‘Okay,
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as the months pass, the “right way” becomes more and more elusive and 
more of a source of contradictions in which PJS has a stake.
Consider this description in interview 18: 
The way in which the company was using its resources [to mow the 
CEO’s lawn, travel for fishing trips, pay for the CEO’s driver, award 
expensive contracts to buddies] became a very disturbing element 
in my job. I keep telling the public that this company is using its 
resources in a socially responsible manner while privately, I am see-
ing more and more instances where they are not.
PJS affrms a CSR agenda publicly while observing privately that it is 
being violated. 
Conceptually this is a story of a deepening struggle to make sense under 
conditions in which a growing set of implications become increasingly 
incompatible. This unfolding can be crudely represented by a cognitive-
dissonance ratio of elements tied to a generative cognition ( Beauvois & 
Joule, 1996 ). By generative cognition we mean “the representation of the 
subject’s behavior” (p. 6), which is treated as the focal element. Such a 
generative cognition could be PJS’s efforts to convince the public that NT 
is a virtuous, socially responsible, well-run firm, while attempting “to do 
this the right way.” Given this anchor, relevant elements that rationalize 
the behavior are either dissonant or consonant. Given a generative cogni-
tion, the ratio consists of elements that are dissonant with the generative
cognition (e.g.,“I am hiding the truth which is not the right way”), relative
to the total number of the relevant elements that are dissonant and conso-
nant (e.g., “I am fostering a balancing act”). An increase in dissonant ele-
ments (e.g., “the company is suffering from your presence”) without any 
corresponding increase in consonant elements, leads to increased tension 
(e.g., sleep and digestion problems) as well as increased efforts to reduce 
the ratio (e.g., PJS adds a “social report” section to the 2005 and 2006 
annual reports). As the ratio increases or fails to decrease, sensemaking 
becomes more and more filled with thoughts, feelings, and actions whose 
sense is shaped by their relevance to the ratio (e.g., my days seem to be 
filled with a CEO who won’t listen to me, employees who keep complain-
ing about leadership, people who urge me to “do something”). PJS appre-
hends more about NT while he simultaneously grows more apprehensive
about his future and that of NT. Both forms of apprehension are conveyed
in at least four forms: “(1) as a question (‘Did you know that . . .?’ (2) as 
an exclamation, ‘That . . . is terrible!’ (3) as an injunction, ‘Do something 
about . . .!’ (4) or as a mere statement of fact, ‘It is the case that’” ( Elliston,
1982 , p.  168). All of these forms are incorporated into the dissonance 
ratio and into sensemaking itself. As Eliot Aronson (1999 ) puts it, “cog-
nitive dissonance theory is essentially a theory about sense making: how
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thus, to lead lives that are (at least in their own mind) sensible and mean-
ingful” (p. 105).
Thus, one interpretation of this case is that PJS is troubled by the belief 
that this is a corrupt firm, which contradicts his public communications 
that this firm is virtuous, socially responsible, well run. Common methods 
of dissonance reduction appear to be blocked. Because interfacing with 
the media is his job, PJS can’t treat the dissonance as unimportant. There 
are few consonant elements to add, since he knows too much to do 
this. It is also hard to remove dissonant elements since he keeps seeing 
and hearing more complaints about the CEO’s use of resources and his 
flawed leadership. He can’t plead that he was forced to do this job since 
he chose to join the firm. Over time, PJS experiences growing rather than 
diminishing importance of the focal element, more dissonant elements,
fewer consonant elements, and growing feelings of responsibility to do 
something.
He carries this imbalance through time by means of ongoing sense-
making. The imbalance infuses sensemaking by means of what John 
Dewey called the “continuity of experience.” “Every experience enacted 
and undergone modifies the one who acts and undergoes.  .  .  . [T]his
modification affects, whether we wish it or not, the quality of subse-
quent experiences. For it is a somewhat different person who enters into 
them. .  .  . (T)he principle of continuity of experience means that every 
experience both takes up something from those which have gone before 
and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after” ( Dewey,
1997 , p. 35). PJS “becomes” a different person as he faces unresolved 
contradictions, sees more of the subsequent world as cues that become 
relevant to the contradiction, all while carrying around a “backpack”
labeled, “We all have to be truthful to ourselves.”
On Managing Sensemaking in the Context of Whistleblowing 
Whistleblowing can be treated as a deepening struggle to make sense under
conditions in which a growing set of implications, tied to a generative 
cognition, become increasingly incompatible. In the case of NT, the 
evolving implications of opposed ideas consume more and more atten-
tion. This growing attention heightens both provisional understandings 
and fear, the two faces of apprehension.While this sensemaking interpre-
tation may be, in William James’s words, a “monstrous abridgement,” it 
also serves as a “sketch map for showing us our bearings [although it] 
can never supersede perception” ( 1996 , p. 100).
Sketch map or not, it remains true that “There is no theory-neutral 
observation, description, interpretation, theorization, explanation, or
whatever. There is, in other words, no unmediated access to the world: 
access is always mediated. Whenever we reflect upon an entity, our sense 












   
     














Sensemaking and Whistleblowing 87 
which we use to interpret, make sense of and understand what is, and 
take appropriate action” ( Fleetwood, 2004 , p. 30).
The conceptual resources of sensemaking suggest several possibilities 
for “handling” and managing whistleblowing. We sample some of these 
in terms of the dissonance ratio, the properties of sensemaking, and orga-
nizational culture.
Dissonance 
The dissonance ratio itself can be managed toward less tension if more 
than one generative cognition is salient (e.g., self-concept and a public 
irrevocable action and an explicit expectation and a confidential conver-
sation); if fewer cognitions are treated as relevant; and if interpretations 
of action include more frameworks than those of morals and ethics.These 
modifications, along with the more traditional methods of dissonance 
reduction such as adding consonant elements, decreasing dissonant ele-
ments, reducing the importance of the issue, and emphasizing being 
forced to confront the issue, all affect the ratio. With less dissonance to 
reduce there is less felt pressure to interpret the world largely in terms of 
its potential effects on the ratio.
An especially troublesome generative cognition is the label “whistle-
blower.’ PJS observes that he was “advised, don’t let them label you a whis-
tleblower because it has negative connotations.” Different consequences
would likely flow from labels such as guardian, issue seller, lookout, futur-
ist, advisor, representative, or communication hub. Literally, the label of
whistleblower is inaccurate anyway since a corporate whistleblower can’t
stop the action the way a referee’s whistle can.
Sensemaking 
The process of sensemaking itself can be modified to manage whistle-
blowing. For example, suggestibility is heightened when one’s self-concept
is unstable rather than more secure. The heightening should be intensified in
the midst of upheaval. If feelings of doubt and uncertainty change into 
feelings of assurance, then those changes can be mistaken for knowledge.
That is likely if active needs override a less-biased look at the particu-
lars of the situation ( Bacon, 2012 , p. 54). Thus, a secure self-concept that
is built around resilience and adaptability can reduce a dissonance ratio
and enact a broader range of responses. PJS has a tough time building
clearer knowledge of clear-cut harm since his evolving identity of integ-
rity and autonomy is made more unstable when he is treated as a traitor,
liar, and hunted man.
A related mechanism of sensemaking involves expectations. Expectations
that are less realistic produce more discomfort when disconfirmed because



























88 Karl E.Weick 
sensemaking. Thus, from my own authorial position of hindsight, I hear 
PJS’s expectations firm up with positive images when he says, “The new 
job entailed responsibility for all internal and external communications,
national TV drawings, and external sponsorships. I reported directly to 
the CEO and was part of the top leadership group. The job provided 
opportunities I had never imagined so close to home. The world seemed to
be more in balance.”That is a formidable positive scenario that seems vul-
nerable to consequences such as disconfirmation, an intense interruption,
and recovery that are likely to remain salient in subsequent sensemaking.
A different format that could guide how people handle whistleblowing 
involves a focus on options and volatility. Roe and Schulman (2008 ) 
suggest that operators in high-reliability firms (e.g., electric grid-control 
rooms) adopt just such a focus. To answer the question “Now what?”
one can ask, “Would the proposal, if implemented, reduce (or at least 
not increase) the volatility faced by operators who are really frontline 
defenders? Would it increase (or at least preserve) those  options to respond 
to volatility” (p. 213, i.a.). A similar set of questions can help people try to 
make sense when there is silence in the presence of questionable practices.
If one anticipates that volatility will increase and options decrease, this 
provides a clearer understanding of how one might handle whistleblow-
ing. That clarity may take several forms. Options and volatility, which 
are more salient, can be modified directly. For example, installation of a 
hotline increases options while declaring a stand-down decreases volatil-
ity. Perceptions can be managed if, again, an increase in options is pro-
posed (e.g., we can solve this in small steps) and if apparent volatility is 
decreased (e.g., this is an outlier).A balance between options and volatility 
can be highlighted if balance itself is treated as a generative cognition (see 
the discussion of balance later in the chapter).
Sensemaking can be directly managed if the 7 properties summarized 
in the acronym SIR-COPE are used as a checklist. Pressures associated 
with whistleblowing can seem overwhelming when social interactions are 
restricted and redundant, identity is in flux, retrospect is focused on a 
specific time period rather than being more free-ranging, cues are mis-
judged because they are gathered to confirm a developing bias, ongoing 
events get ahead of efforts to cope, everything or nothing seems plausible,
and enactment violates important norms that, if violated, diminish one’s 
influence.
Culture 
Organizational culture has become a hasty label for any residual pattern 
of orderliness that can’t be explained by concepts such as power, author-
ity, centralization, or routine. Mindful of that caveat, there do seem to be 
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Formally, we treat culture as “the system of meanings which are shared 
by members of a human grouping and which define what is good and 
bad, right and wrong, and what are the appropriate ways for members of 
that group to think and behave” ( Watson, 2001 ). Less formally culture 
is “how we see and do things around here” or, with less latitude, “We 
do things in a particular way around here, don’t try doing things differ-
ently.” For our purposes, we modify these summaries slightly and argue 
that culture is also “what we expect around here.” Cultures affect both 
what people expect from one another internally (these expectations are 
often called “norms”) and what people expect from their dealings with 
the external environment of customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders.
Consider this description of NT’s culture found in PJS’s third interview: 
it was a very subdued culture, where—to summarize it—subdued 
culture, where no one—not very many asked questions. And, if you 
asked questions, there was an internal understanding that if you 
asked too many questions, that will have a consequence. You should 
really be glad that you’re getting an opportunity to work here.
More broadly it would seem that a culture whose reputation is built 
on fun, joy, and positiveness, as was true at NT, makes it more difficult to 
give voice to concerns that are more negative. The spectacle of a Viking 
ship emerging from the fog with the CEO at the bow in Viking gear,
staged for a select few, may be fun, but when it’s paid for with resources 
destined for charities, blowing the whistle can carry a considerable cost.
The grounds for whistleblowing can be reduced if the enactment of 
culture is sensitive to two findings from research on high-reliability orga-
nizations ( Schulman, 2004 ). Schulman describes these two this way. First,
it has been found that the major determinant of reliability in an organi-
zation “is not how greatly it values reliability over other organizational 
values, but rather how strongly it disapproves of mis-specification, mis-
estimation, and misunderstanding of things.” Second, it has been found 
that the more people in an organization “who are concerned about the 
misidentification, mis-specification, and misunderstanding of things, the 
higher the reliability that organization can hope to achieve” (p.  39).
These three errors of mis-specification, misestimation, and misunder-
standing are all errors of sensemaking. When made part of the culture,
this frame of reference can forestall the development of larger prob-
lems that are more difficult to solve and more obvious candidates for 
whistle blowing.
A striking image in the NT case is PJS’s effort to introduce greater 
social responsibility at NT by using a picture of a balancing act on a bal-
ance beam as the cover of the 2004 annual report. This image points to 
a larger issue of the emphasis that firms place on balancing. Notice that 
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“The image of tightrope walkers depicts such dynamic balancing; their 
stability on the thin rope depends on consistent, ongoing microshifts.
Smith and Lewis (2011 , p. 386) propose a dynamic equilibrium model,
which invokes such “constant motion across opposing forces” ( Schad,
Lewis, Raisch, & Smith, 2016 , p. 38).
It could be argued that balancing was precisely what PJS was doing 
as he shifted his attention back and forth between communicating what 
is good and bad, right and wrong. Aside from his heroics, however, the 
more general point is that balancing as a norm is a buffer against excess,
an ongoing acceptance of alternatives, and support for moving between 
contradictory poles. All of these cultural conventions can lead to adapta-
tion with modest dissonance rather than to fixation with stronger disso-
nance that edits sensemaking more severely.
SIR-COPE again suggests a form of organizing that manages occasions 
so that they trigger whistleblowing less often and deal with it more wisely 
when it does occur. Other things being equal, an organization that encour-
ages more diverse and questioning conversations, clearer and more stable 
identities, more use of elapsed action as a guide to interpretation, unob-
structed access to a wider range of cues, more focused attention on inter-
ruptions whenever projects are disrupted, wider dissemination of stories,
and deeper acceptance of the reality that people face situations that are 
of their own making, should be less susceptible to sustained whistleblow-
ing. The NT “culture” falls short on most of these. It is possible that these 
shortcomings made this a more visible and disruptive set of events.
Conclusion 
Whistleblowing can be portrayed as a surface of apprehension that 
persists because of an unresolved dissonance ratio and continuities of 
experience. Both of these mold sensemaking. Such a portrayal highlights 
different qualities of the PJS story than do Hirschman’s exit, voice, and 
loyalty or Campbell’s hero’s journey. A sensemaking portrayal does not 
privilege moral or ethical issues, but neither does it dismiss them. What 
a sensemaking interpretation does suggest is a pathway by which an 
incompatibility or paradox can become an ethical issue.
A sensemaking interpretation also suggests that whistleblowing is 
something other than a rare, vivid exposé of wrongdoing. Everyday life 
often generates small-scale focal cognitions that connect with relevant 
elements whose implications are consonant and dissonant with the focus.
These are what Dewey referred to as “interruptions and recoveries.”
Since interruptions can accentuate thoughts and feelings, these accen-
tuations can alter subsequent sensemaking. Subsequent sensemaking can 
strengthen, weaken, or remove issues that foster whistleblowing. Taken 
to the extreme, this argument suggests that whistleblowing is as much 
in the eye of the whistleblower as it is in the actions of the wrongdoer.



























    
     
 
    
   
     
    
 
      
   
Sensemaking and Whistleblowing 91 
“Signifcance and valence do not pre-exist ‘out there,’ but are enacted,
brought forth, and constituted by living beings.”
In the final analysis, sensemaking boils down to living forward with
flawed foresight and understanding backward with flawed hindsight
( Kierkegaard, 1997 , p. 306). As William James put it: “The present sheds
a backward light on the world’s previous processes. They may have been
truth-processes for the actors in them. They are not so for one who knows
the later revelations of the story” ( James, 1975 , p. 107). Marianne  Paget
(1988 ) made a similar point when she argued that medical mistakes are
“complex cognitions of the experience of now and then. . . . The now of
mistakes collides with the then of acting with uncertain knowledge. Now
represents the more exact science of hindsight, then the unknown future
coming into being” (p. 48). People believe ahead of the evidence. And this
is why sensemaking is infused with faith, presumptions, and expectations.
The fundamentals of sensemaking are still summarized well by an early 
(1983) description: 
The basic idea of sensemaking is that reality is an ongoing accom-
plishment that emerges from efforts to create order and make ret-
rospective sense of what occurs.  .  .  . [I]ndividuals are not seen as 
living in, and acting out their lives in relation to, a wider reality, so 
much as creating and sustaining images of a wider reality, in part to 
rationalize what they are doing. They realize their reality by ‘reading 
into’ their situation patterns of significant meaning.
( Morgan, Frost, & Pondy, 1983 , p. 24) 
The tone of a sensemaking perspective leans toward the existential.
Life is nothing until it is lived. But that living tends to be understood after 
the fact, based on rolling hindsight. Usually that understanding occurs 
just in time. Sometimes, however, it occurs too late.
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 7 Ethical Blindness as an 
Explanation for Non-Reporting 
of Organizational Wrongdoing 
Einar Øverenget and Åse Storhaug Hole 
Introduction 
“If you know what is right, you will do what is right,” Socrates says in 
one of Plato’s dialogues.
It’s easy to dismiss that statement as false. Everyday experience shows 
us that a person can know what is right, or at least what is consistent 
with common ethics, and still act against it. A person is also able to watch 
others behave unethically and still not protest, even when he or she knows 
better. But we don’t have to conclude that only a bad individual would be 
guilty of such ethical inconsistency. Probably all of us have done wrong,
even if unintentionally. We can also retrospectively admit to an ethical 
misstep—and admit that we knew it all along. We can also sometimes 
behave unethically without being aware of it and may even be convinced 
we’re doing the right thing.
The phenomenon known as “ethical blindness” helps explain why,
how, and under what conditions we all fail to make ethical decisions.
This chapter builds on ethical blindness research as it relates to whistle-
blowing ( Rhodes & Strain, 2004 ;  Rendtorff, 2014 ;  Near & Miceli, 1995 ; 
Near & Miceli, 2016 ).
For the past decades, research on whistleblowing has tried to explain 
why some people righteously report wrongdoing, and why others stand 
by, doing nothing ( Olsen, 2014 ;  Near & Miceli, 2016 ;  Vandekerckhove,
Brown, & Tsahuridu, 2014 ). Whistleblowing has been comprehensively 
defined as “the disclosure by organization members, including former 
members and job applicants, of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices,
including omissions, under the control of their employers, to persons or 
organizations who may be able to effect action” ( Near & Miceli, 1985 , 
p. 4). The decision to blow the whistle—or not—turns out to be a sur-
prisingly complex process, and raises several intriguing questions ( Near &
Miceli, 1995 ;  Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991 ;  Chen & Lai, 2014 ). Both 
individual and situational factors can affect one’s decision to blow the 
whistle. Is the issue at stake part of the employee’s responsibility? Is 
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anybody listen? Is the wrongdoing serious enough? Answering these 
questions may create problems and conflicts for oneself, one’s organiza-
tion, and society.
Most employees who observe wrongdoing won’t report it, but they 
tend to do so if the wrongdoing is serious, the evidence is clear, the 
organization has implemented whistleblowing routines, and manage-
ment provides a culture receptive to hearing and acknowledging bad 
news ( Near & Miceli, 2016 ). If, on the other hand, they fear retaliation,
or believe that nothing can or will be done about the problem, or feel 
uncertainty about the seriousness of the wrongdoing, or lack trust in the 
recipients of their concerns, then they’re likely to just stand by ( Near,
Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004 ).
Most ethical decision-making models are based on rational assump-
tions. The process usually consists of four stages ( Jones, 1991 ;  Chen & 
Lai, 2014 ): recognition, attitude, intention, and action. Ethical decision-
making begins when a person recognizes that some issue poses an ethical 
concern. Next, the person makes a judgment about the issue at hand,
and this influences intention, which is the subjective probability or 
willingness to act. Intention is influenced by attitudes, subjective norms,
and perceived behavioral controls. Finally, intention is a good predictor 
of subsequent behavior ( Chen & Lai, 2014 ).
But not all ethical decision-making processes are expressly rational.
Sometimes the decision not to blow the whistle stems from mere habit or
unconscious perceptions and processes. Ethical fading and ethical blindness
are theoretical constructs that might help explain these unconscious pro-
cesses in ethical decision-making ( Palazzo, Krings, & Hoffrage, 2012 ).
Our own way to explain non-reporting behavior is to focus on more 
unconscious processes and the temporary state of ethical blindness.
We start by considering how different perceptions of the seriousness of 
particular wrongdoing can influence whistleblowing intent and actual 
whistleblowing.
Wrongdoing 
How one rates the seriousness of the wrongdoing significantly affects 
whether one reports it ( Olsen, 2014 ). The now classic definition of 
wrongdoing in empirical research on whistleblowing describes it as “ille-
gitimate, illegal or immoral actions or practices” ( Near & Miceli, 1985 ; 
Miceli, Near, Rehg, & Van Scotter, 2012 ;  Skivenes & Trygstad, 2014 ).
The very broadness of this definition helps explain why it may be difficult 
for employees to rate the seriousness of the issue at stake. Employees’ 
decisions about whether to blow the whistle appear to be influenced 
by their organizational context, their perceptions of the seriousness of 
the wrongdoing, their beliefs about whether reporting the wrongdoing 

























Ethical Blindness 95 
wrongdoing ( Trygstad, 2017 ; ( Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2009 ,  2013 ; 
Near et al., 2004 ).
The likelihood of reporting increases when employees assess wrongdo-
ing to be more serious and frequent, when they have solid proof of the 
wrongdoing (as opposed to passively observing it), and when it affects 
them personally. The likelihood of reporting decreases, meanwhile, when 
these features are not present, when employees determine that the wrong-
doing involves multiple participants, or when the participants are at
a higher organizational level than the observer. According to Skivenes 
and Trygstad (2014 ), six dimensions can influence how one assesses the 
wrongdoing: (1) The perception of its seriousness can be highly subjective,
and others don’t necessarily share the whistleblower’s private perceptions
and reactions to the wrongdoing.This is a well-known problem in whistle-
blowing research ( Miceli et al., 2009 ;  Skivenes & Trygstad, 2014 ). (2) The
wrongdoing may be related to facts or to values and norms, any of which
may be subject to different evaluations. (3) Frequency may be a criterion 
for assessing the seriousness of the wrongdoing. Did it happen once, or 
often? (4) Is the wrongdoing intentional or unintentional? (5) Is it of public
interest? (6) Does the wrongdoing imply vulnerable persons? Is a powerless
person affected by the wrongdoing?
Many explanations have been proposed to account for the myriad 
perceptions of wrongdoing. One implication of the foregoing discus-
sion is that perceptions and considerations of wrongdoing are rational 
processes. In some cases, they doubtless are. But we aim to extend the 
understanding of non-reporting behavior by applying the theory of ethi-
cal blindness. Why do some employees simply not  see the problem? 
Ethics and Practical Rationality 
Socrates’ statement in our opening sentence expresses a now conventional 
understanding of ethics: there is an intrinsic relation among virtues, prin-
ciples, and actions. By knowing what is right, we act accordingly. By exten-
sion, bad behavior springs from bad people. This assumption has had a 
profound influence upon moral philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to 
Kant and beyond. Modern ethical theories, such as deontology and utili-
tarianism, still have in common that they are epistemologically driven.
Actions are a result of self-aware humans making explicit decisions based 
on their knowledge of virtues and ethical principles, whether these be 
utilitarian calculations, the categorical imperative, or the Aristotelian 
notion of the golden mean.
But we’re coming to recognize the shortcomings of this view, especially 
in relation to ethical failure. We will not fully understand ethical failure 
if we assume an intrinsic relation between virtues and actions. Moreover,
if we keep trying to describe what goes on mentally when decisions are 
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very optimistic, of what is referred to as the prescriptive approach— 
namely, that “People are  rational human beings, who make conscious 
decisions about how to act” ( De Cremer & Vandekerckhove, 2017 ).
Rejecting that view, these two scholars recommend an alternative one,
a descriptive approach, that focuses on what is going on, contextually,
when decisions actually are being made. By doing so, they place them-
selves in a tradition of the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger.
The phenomenological slogan “Zu den Sachen selbst” (“to the things 
themselves”) advocates the necessity of describing specifically what is 
going on in our everyday dealings with the world rather than assuming 
what ought to take place ( Øverenget, 1998 ). Heidegger points out that 
we are always already involved in a web of meanings and assignments 
he calls, simply, the world. That implies that our reasoning is always 
situated. It does not imply that we are not rational but rather that our 
rationality is embedded. Accordingly, it does not even imply that we are 
unconscious. In the phenomenological tradition going back to Husserl,
who was influenced by Brentano, consciousness does not imply reflec-
tive awareness. To be conscious of something is to be somehow directed 
toward it, involved with it; and the most original way of dealing with the 
world is by pre-reflexive practical coping. That means that any dealings 
with the world, including those of an ethical nature, are rational, yes, but 
this very rationality is embedded in a practical and instrumental context.
Accordingly, actions typically are not preceded by reflective deliberation 
but by a practical everyday orientation and familiarity toward the situa-
tion ( Øverenget, 1998 ).
De Cremer, Van Dick, Tenbrunsel, Pillutla, and Murnighan (2011 ) 
employ a descriptive approach to account for ethical decision-making 
in general, and ethical failure in particular, but such an approach does 
not necessarily imply the lack of rationality or consciousness. On the 
contrary, this is a result of the workings of instrumental rationality and 
consciousness in its most original form. If we take description to its full 
measure, we must avoid implicitly understanding it within the frame-
work of scientific rationality—and hence, by that token, realize that the 
lack of scientific rationality implies something irrational. The concept of 
theoretical or scientific rationality does not exhaust the concept of ratio-
nality. Heidegger suggests that it is a subset of a more original form of 
practical rationality ( Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011 ).
In all likelihood, it was Arendt’s deep understanding of phenomenology 
and the philosophy of Heidegger that led to her analysis of Eichmann and 
the concept of the “banality of evil.” Zimbardo’s Stanford prison experi-
ment and Milgram’s experiments on obedience to authority suggest 
similar ways of understanding ethical failure. It is not a product of non-
rationality or the unconscious, but a pre-reflexive, context-familiarity-
driven state, nurtured by forces such as instrumentality, conformity, and 






















Ethical Blindness 97 
enable us to see what is right within a given context, but they will also 
blind us to whether the right thing is a good thing. We are, temporarily 
at least, ethically blind.
Ethical Blindness 
Ethical blindness speaks to one of the great human puzzles, namely, why 
‘‘good people behave in pathological ways that are alien to their nature’’ 
( Zimbardo, 2007 , p. 195). Put another way, what is it that makes people 
unable to access ethical values or prototypes that, in principle, are avail-
able to them ( De Maria, 2006 ;  Reynolds, 2006 )? 
Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004 ) argue that under specific circum-
stances the ethical aspect of a decision fades away so that the decision-
maker gradually becomes unaware of it. There are several triggers of 
this so-called ethical fading. One is the use of euphemistic language. For 
example, euphemisms like “We didn’t bribe anyone, we just did our job”
help people disguise or overlook their own wrongdoing. Another trigger 
is noted by Chugh and Bazerman (2007), who, in their work on bounded 
ethicality, analyze how the computational limits of the human mind lead 
to the use of simple heuristics, which might, in turn, give rise to unethical 
decisions beyond the decision-maker’s awareness. Ethical fading is similar 
to moral disengagement. Bandura (2002 ) argues that unethical decisions 
are promoted by disengaging from the decision’s moral dimension, and 
he shows how moral disengagement is driven by individual, situational,
and institutional forces. A consequence of ethical fading might be that 
employees and leaders in organizations are unable to see the wrongdoing 
and thus also are unable to report it.
Palazzo et al. (2012 ) define ethical blindness as the temporary inability 
of a decision-maker to see the ethical dimension of some decision. They 
understand the phenomenon as identity, temporary state, and uncon-
scious. The first aspect is that although people have values and principles 
that are part of their very identity, and though they have tried to live by 
this identity in the past, they are still able to act against their principles.
As already mentioned, the main reason for that is that everyday decision-
making in general, and ethical decision-making in particular, cannot be 
fully understood in terms of deliberately applying theories or engaging in 
self-aware reflection. Even if we actually have virtues, we would be naive 
to assume that everyday ethical decision-making necessarily is based on 
these virtues. Constant practical rationality entails a different orientation 
and does not take its point of departure in theoretical deliberation. The 
second aspect is that the blindness is a temporary state, being context-
bound. It describes a psychological state of people with normal (or even 
high) levels of integrity and the ability for moral reasoning. For some 
reason(s), however, often related to the situation, they are not able to 
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changes, however, they are likely to return to practicing their original 
values and principles—and might be surprised or even shocked by their 
own prior behavior ( Chugh & Bazerman, 2007 ). The third aspect of 
ethical blindness is that it is unconscious. We argue that a better way of 
describing this aspect is to say that it is pre-reflexive. Ethical blindness 
can be conscious in the sense that it is a result of engaging with the world: 
the person is directed to something and can be absorbed to an extent that 
she is not thematically aware of. This state of being deeply absorbed, or 
“conscious of,” creates the unawareness that partly constitutes ethical 
blindness.
In the following, we relate these three aspects of ethical blindness to 
the concept of framing, particularly focusing upon how rigid framing can 
cause ethical blindness. Further, we show how the theory of ethical blind-
ness helps us understand the internal dealings in Norsk Tipping (NT) as 
presented by Peer Jacob Svenkerud’s (PJS) story of whistleblowing, the 
audit reports, the annual reports of the company, and discussions of it in 
the national press.
Frames and Rigid Framing 
A general observation in the hermeneutic tradition is that every time we 
understand something, our understanding rests on some prior under-
standing ( Porter & Robinson, 2011 ), which eventually establishes a cer-
tain frame for understanding. Likewise, every time we perceive something,
it occurs within a framework of prior experience. We are therefore able 
to see more than what actually meets the eye. Frames filter what we see 
and how we see it and structure how we apprehend reality. Typically we 
aren’t conscious of this structuring. Frames describe how we always view,
understand, and approach the world from a certain perspective ( Palazzo 
et al., 2012 ). They are both indispensable and unavoidable. They are also 
exclusive in the sense that we only use one frame at a time. According 
to the constructionist view ( Weick, 1995 ,  1996 ), individuals act upon 
frames that they develop while interacting with their environment.
Frames are ‘‘mental structures that simplify and guide our understanding 
of a complex reality” ( Russo & Schoemaker, 2004 , p. 21). They constrict 
our view of the world to one particular, and thus necessarily limited,
way and guide how information is processed and controlled, selected 
and obscured. Without these mental structures, we would not be able to 
perceive, let alone understand, a complex situation.
But sometimes a frame can be so rigid that we get ourselves locked 
into it, unable to switch to another frame ( Schoemaker & Russo, 2001 ).
A defining feature of rigid framing is that we are less able to view the 
world from a different perspective, as when a mother suggests to her 
inconsiderate child, “What if someone did this to you?” The change of 
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often looks perfectly fine from our point of view. Thus, frames have blind 
spots because they impose ‘‘mental boundaries on options’’ ( Russo & 
Schoemaker, 2004 , p. 137). Blind spots in attention and perception affect 
our ability to understand a complex situation ( Moberg, 2006 ). In sum,
rigid framing makes it hard to transcend a specific view on the world 
and adopt a different frame. Thus, it prevents us from compensating for 
a frame’s blind spots and from developing a deeper understanding of a 
situation.
Further, the more homogenous a group is, and the more conformity 
within it that is allowed to flourish, the less probable is the urge to change 
perspective. Rigid framing will typically develop within a context of con-
formity where situational forces make it practically impossible to adopt 
a different frame, to view the situation from a different perspective. The 
group will consolidate its perspective and likely ignore information that 
does not endorse the normative paradigm ( Lakoff, 2004 ;  Vuori & Huy,
2016 ). Hence, what appears unethical from the outside may be consid-
ered perfectly acceptable on the inside. The danger is that the culture 
will be unable to recognize unacceptable practices ( Brief, Buttram, & 
Dukerich, 2001 ).
A consequence of rigid framing is thus that it limits our ability to 
acknowledge other possible frames.The more rigidly people apply specific 
frames when making decisions, the lower their ability to switch to another 
perspective ( Palazzo et al., 2012 ). So, for example, a homogenous group 
of trained economists applying a strictly economic frame may find it hard 
to identify ethical, cultural, and reputational aspects of their dealings.
Likewise, lawyers operating within a rigid legal frame may find it difficult 
to identify essential moral aspects of their decisions.
Ethical blindness may thus result from framing a decision-making sit-
uation too rigidly. Using these frames unbendingly increases the prob-
ability that people won’t see the ethical dimension of their decision
( Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004 ).
Examples of Rigid Framing in the PJS Narrative 
So one possible explanation of the ethical failures as described by PJS is in 
terms of rigid framing. Based on his story, and also on the data from the 
interviews, newspaper articles, annual reports of NT, and reports from 
the auditor general, we suggest that the following three frames might 
have sufficient rigidity to cause ethical blindness: 
1. We have a good company
The company’s reputation was excellent, both in the region and on 
national-level assessments, rating reputation, and customer satis-
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and prestigious workplaces in its region. The company culture was 
proud, and through its munificent sponsoring of many outside orga-
nizations with millions every year, it did good for many people. The 
company had also won international prizes for excellent “knowledge 
management”—a buzz term in the early 21st century.
2. We do as we please
It is popularly believed that a state-owned Norwegian company will 
be thoroughly supervised by both the Ministry of Culture and NT’s 
board appointed by the ministry. But with NT, the Audit General 
Report concluded that there were insufficient controls with respect 
to policies, procedures, budgets, and regulations. Indeed, it received 
serious criticism for its lack of control, including the way it had spent 
money on extravagances, such as providing company cars, gifts, and 
business travel perks.
3. We do not ask questions here
Reading the interview data, one infers a somewhat suppressed, sub-
dued company culture, where few people raised critical questions.
Several reasons might explain this. When you ask critical questions,
and then sense that asking them will jeopardize you, you will stop 
asking. There seemed to be an unwritten agreement among both 
employees and leaders to uphold a corporate identity of happiness.
Raising critical questions might undercut that positive picture.
Analysis 
Our analysis follows the aforementioned framing structure. We give 
examples and discuss how these three rigid frames may have caused 
a temporary state of ethical blindness, and thus made central actors 
unwilling or unable to report on the wrongdoing.
Frame 1:  We Have a Good Company
NT was by far the most prestigious organization in its hometown of 
Hamar, Norway, and the careers it offered were unmatched there. Its 
annual reports from 2003–2010 give an impression of a hugely success-
ful company, not just locally but internationally, too. For example, in 
2004, an international committee consisting of managers and experts 
in knowledge management ranked NT among the ten “Most Admired 
Knowledge Enterprises” of the world (the MAKE reward). Other 
companies on the list were Nokia, Shell, and Siemens. Criteria for the 
knowledge-management ranking include achievements concerned with 


























Ethical Blindness 101 
and creating value through knowledge management. NT was the best 
company among this group with respect to maximizing the values of its 
intellectual capital (Annual Report, 2004, p. 2). Further, NT had also 
been successful with innovations, and had endured, without missing 
a beat, major technological and organizational changes. For example,
the company went through a major transition from an analog gaming 
industry to an electronic industry offering services online. This period of 
service innovation received international attention, and the CEO’s lead-
ership through these organizational changes gained him a lot of praise,
both internally and externally.
Immense success for many years created a tradition of organizational
pride among employees, as well as a reputation, among external stake-
holders in the local community, that was beyond reproach. The com-
pany’s impressive copper-dome exterior and plush interior seemed to
confirm this proud identity. The company culture, though, had traits
that could lead to rigid framing. The rigidity of a frame depends on
both proximal (internal) and distal (external) contextual factors ( Pala-
zzo et al., 2012 ). We argue that both these factors may have caused a
rigid frame: We have a good company, so we needn’t change anything
here. Hence, the CEO’s comment, as recalled by PJS, when a new strat-
egy of corporate social responsibility (CSR) was discussed: “Why are
we drawing so much attention to this? Let’s continue as we have always
done.” Instead of listening to occasional corrective advice from consul-
tants and advisors, it seemed more important to maintain the positive
image, by reinforcing NT’s reputation as a happy and exceptionally
enlighened workplace.
Indeed, it’s not hard to see how the view that “we are a good com-
pany” can develop in an organization that donates millions of dollars 
to very good causes, like athletics. After all, in a country that esteems 
physical fitness, what can be better than to finance sports and, by doing 
so, help create good role models for young people at the same time? 
Not only was the company doing good, but also eventually it felt itself 
beyond criticism because whatever it did was inherently good. This view 
was probably so deeply rooted in the organization that it was nearly 
impossible for anyone working there to see it differently. It was the very 
model of a rigid frame.
Frame 2:  We Do as We Please
There are many descriptions of NT’s virtual autonomy, and PJS describes 
it in terms of a lack of control by the Norwegian government: “We had 
company cars, newspapers, telephones—everything paid for. Which is 
not abnormal. But what I think, in the aftermath, became the greatest 
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The Ministry of Culture appointed the board members. Even so,
control was weak, and it received critical notices from the auditor gen-
eral. Just a few government executives were working directly with NT,
and they seemed to have an indulgent relationship with the top execu-
tives in the company. As PJS put it, “The Board members appointed by 
the Ministry of Culture are not really controlling us.” When Norway’s 
Office of the Auditor General made an extended audit of NT in 2008 
and 2009, it concluded that there had been a general lack of control 
( Document 3:14 [2008–2009 ]). For instance, it questioned whether the 
board had sufficiently been monitoring the CEO’s execution of role and 
responsibility (p. 15), and it found it critical that the board as well as the 
ministry had not sufficiently managed these problems. It stated that “the 
Ministry’s follow-up of the Board has been inadequate in a period where 
high-risk decisions have been made” (p.  15). The lack of control had 
trickled down to the organization. The General Audit report also pointed 
out that “due to the inadequate follow-up by the Board, the CEO has 
been given a larger room of maneuver than the Board formally should 
have accepted” (p. 27).
This trickle-down of inadequate control in the end might have created 
such a view as this: “In this company, we do as we please. The Ministry 
is not really controlling the Board, and the Board is not really controlling 
the CEO.” Over time, this view seems to have been embedded in the orga-
nization to an extent that it developed the kind of rigidity—in the name 
of autonomy—that can cause ethical blindness.
Frame 3:  We Do Not Ask Questions Here
In its report, the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional 
Affairs stated that it was pleased that an individual had the courage to 
notify the public about censurable conditions at NT but was concerned 
that these same conditions weren’t detected by the company’s internal 
control routines ( Committee hearing, 2010 , p.  2). The committee also 
noted the Office of the Auditor General’s especially severe criticism of 
the company in Document No. 3:14 ( 2008–2009 ) and wondered why 
the facts in such a serious matter were not revealed earlier. The committee 
stated that some of the conditions were so serious that they should have 
already been discovered and dealt with. Throughout his narrative, PJS 
points out that the organizational culture of the company didn’t welcome 
critical questions. There was a common belief, it seems, among both 
leaders and employees that asking too many questions might jeopardize 
one’s career. PJS describes how a former executive had been replaced 
because he was too inquisitive, “that he had been asked to step aside 
because he asked too many questions. Because he was too critical.”
According to PJS’s observations, the board members and the top man-
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had raised some critical questions, he got no visible support from the 
board itself. He was a chair for ten years. “It all happened on his watch,”
PJS said, “and he had been there for such a long time, not seeing it or 
understanding it or grasping it.”
Given the rigid frames described earlier—we are a good company (and 
are not to be criticized) and we do as we please (since we do not need 
to be controlled)—it’s hardly surprising that a third rigid frame evolves: 
We do not ask questions here.When examining the first two frames, that 
third frame follows almost inevitably. In many ways, it would have been 
more surprising if the first two rigid frames did not produce the third 
one. This evidently became a top-down strategy. One way to exercise 
control is by asking critical questions. When the Office of the Auditor 
General pointed out that the control had been inadequate, the reason 
for this might have been that critical questions simply were not asked.
The strategy of not really answering to anybody can also be described 
in terms of not really listening to anyone, which in turn can cause what 
is known as the “deaf effect,” which occurs when the decision-maker 
does not hear, ignores, or overrules bad news ( Cuellar, Keil, & Johnson,
2006 ). Several factors can sustain a kind of organizational deafness, and 
entrenched hierarchical status is a central tenet ( Mannion & Davies,
2015 ). The internal control system did not manage to reveal censur-
able conditions criticized by the auditor general. Hence, not surprisingly,
nobody challenged any actions and decisions. Organizational deafness 
might have created a culture of silence at NT that not only had con-
sequences top-down (not listening and not answering) but also caused 
silence bottom-up as well (not asking).
Discussion 
We contend that descriptions of the organizational culture and attitudes in 
the company delineate frames, and that these frames had enough rigidity 
to cause ethical blindness ( Russo & Schoemaker, 2004 ).A temporary ethi-
cal blindness can in turn cause non-reporting of organizational wrongdo-
ing. As mentioned previously, rigid framing will typically develop within a 
context of conformity where situational forces make it practically impos-
sible to adopt a different frame or to view a situation from a different 
perspective. The first rigid frame,we have a good company, was made up 
through a shared impression of great organizational pride and long-term 
success ( Deal & Key, 1998 ;  Schein, 1985 ;  Bittner, 1965 ).
The working conditions were positive, and the salaries were high.
In addition, NT had a splendid reputation, in part because it contrib-
uted generously—and very publicly—to society through sponsoring
voluntary organizations. The consensus was that NT was doing good
for both the local community and Norwegian society at large. NT is
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also describes the powerful position of the CEO in the local community,
where hierarchies were starkly visible. If people recruited into higher
positions in the company usually were part of the same network, the
ground was prepared for conformity. Within the context of this confor-
mity, a certain organizational pride might have developed to a level of
blindness: we are a good company, we do good things, we are proud of
our achievements. Under such circumstances, who would be inclined to
question NT’s good intentions? Thus, the blindness is not just a mat-
ter of not seeing because of fearing what you might see, but also it is a
matter of not seeing at all. Although some may argue that there were
people seeing and addressing problems, the prevalent attitude was not
to recognize information that would challenge the view that this is a
very good company.
This practice is closely linked to the second frame: We do as we 
please. If whatever we do is good, why should we not do as we please?
The general attitude of the culture described in PJS’s narrative draws 
a picture of an autonomous organization, with inadequate measures of 
external control. The attitude of “doing as we please” was dominating,
even though its employees might have been willing to accept, on a more 
reflective level, the view that NT cannot do as it pleases. The rigidity is 
connected to practice, not argument. Although people might behave in 
accordance with this frame, they would most likely be hesitant to accept 
it as a valid argument. The rigidity of the frame ensures that people never 
really find it necessary to question established practice ( Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 2004 ;  Russo & Schoemaker, 2004 ).
Given the two rigid frames described earlier, the third, we do not ask
questions here, follows almost inevitably. If working at NT in fact discloses
a practical, everyday coping that does not entail the possibility of there
being something questionable with established practice, nobody asks ques-
tions.Wanting to ask questions, but refraining from doing so, is one thing.
More interestingly, there is reason to believe that the reason for not asking
questions is more than having questions but fearing to ask them. It may
simply mean that you have no questions to ask, period ( Brief et al., 2001 ). In
a subdued culture, there is perhaps no room for having questions—without
exception. After all, what is the use of having questions if there is nowhere
to air them? People soon learn that questioning is futile. It’s like babbling
on the street corner. There might also be a national twist to this frame. The
general view in Norway is that we live in an open, transparent society, and
that is, of course, mostly true. If we compare Norway to other countries, we
will certainly find it ranking somewhere near the top of the list of open and
transparent societies. But this view can also establish a narrative that in turn
can become a rigid frame: We are so open and transparent that there is no
need for questions.We have nothing to hide, so why even ask?
The three frames have enough rigidity to cause ethical blindness. This 








   
 
 













Ethical Blindness 105 
in a practice that promotes certain ways of dealing with the world that 
ignore other perspectives. Thus, one of the possible explanations of the 
non-reporting of wrongdoing at NT was the ethical blindness that had 
its origin in rigid framing.
If so, one may ask, how could the whistleblower not be blind himself? 
One explanation might be that he wasn’t recruited from the same net-
work as some of the other people who were hired into managerial posi-
tions in the company. The rigid frames had existed in the company for a 
long time, and the whistleblower was perhaps not locked into one specific 
frame and was therefore able to switch into a different frame. This may 
have helped him escape the ethical blindness caused by rigid framing.
Recent research into whistleblowing has found that whistleblowers tend 
to have altruistic motives as well as more power, status, tenure, and edu-
cation than their colleagues ( Near & Miceli, 2016 ).
Flexible framing may be a partial solution to avoiding rigid framing.
Flexible framing reduces the risk of ethical blindness, because it challenges 
mindless routines and promotes moral imagination ( Johnson, 1993 ). In 
other words, flexible framing is somehow the opposite of rigid framing.
By hiring a person with a different background, experience, and x, NT 
unwittingly brought in a voice capable of challenging the routines, tradi-
tions, and practices that constitute blindness. By this, it also promoted 
moral imagination in the company ( Johnson, 1993 ). A person who is 
able to view a situation from a different perspective, and apply a different 
frame, such as “we cannot do as we please,” “not all that we do is good,” 
or “we should encourage people to ask questions,” will be able to identify 
organizational wrongdoings and perhaps report on them.
Managerial Implications 
We argue that flexible framing can help avoid rigid framing. Leadership 
qualities play an equally important role. Leaders who openly invite dissent 
are more likely to challenge rigid framing and foster flexible framing.
Russo and Schoemaker (2004 ) argue that a dissent-promoting leadership 
style—one that allows disagreement and discussions—will foster more 
flexible framing. Brief et al. (2001 ) have criticized the fact that manage-
ment scholars have focused on how to ensure compliance rather than 
on how to promote dissent. Managers should instead encourage fruitful 
disagreement, in order to avoid rigid framing, both among employees 
and employers.
One way to introduce fruitful disagreement would be to disperse
authority through decentralization of decisions and power in the
organization, and thus encourage responsibility and multiple per-
spectives, and weakening conformity and rigid frames. As  Near and
Miceli (2016 ) argue, managerial responses and reactions are impor-
tant throughout the whistleblowing process. They underline the
 
 


















    
 
  
     
      
   
  
   
    
 
     
 
     
  
     
  
  
   
     
 
106 Einar Øverenget and Åse Storhaug Hole 
importance of listening to whistleblowers, investigating the cases,
and protecting the whistleblowers. Vandekerckhove et al. (2014 ) state
that there is an increasing recognition of whistleblowing as a crucial
source of management information. Managers should be licensed to
foster both “hearer courage” and “protector courage” in their cul-
tures and management styles—in other words, be able to both listen
to whistleblowers and protect them. Further, Hole, Haugen, and Ris-
berg (2019 ) argue that whistleblowing can be a management tool for
organizational learning and change. By questioning practices, values,
and the origins of the wrongdoing, managers might develop an orga-
nizational climate that promotes flexible framing. Last, by addressing
ethical dilemmas and different perceptions of the seriousness of uneth-
ical practices at the workplace, managers can help avoid rigid fram-
ing and also help employees develop their consciousness about ethical
decision-making processes ( Øverenget & Hole, 2014 ). Developing
“moral courage” among employees, which is courage to stand up and
act according to principles, requires authentic leadership ( Hannah,
Avolio, & Walumbwa, 2011 ). Authentic leadership is acting in line
with principles and values—in short, promoting openness, trust, and
accountability. A suggestion for future research is to explore in more
depth the reactions and decisions of managers in whistleblowing pro-
cesses, including the relationship among authentic leadership, moral
courage, and whistleblowing.
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 8 Chronotopic Distinctions in 
Whistleblowing Events 
X-Rays of Power and 
Sustaining Values 
Sarah Amira de la Garza 
It was a morning of high drama. Less than an hour before one of my grad 
students was to sit for his dissertation defense, we committee members 
got word that someone had anonymously called the university’s ethics 
hotline, claiming that this very dissertation had violated Internal Review 
Board (IRB) requirements for use of human subjects. That claim, I knew,
was utter nonsense and within two days would be formally debunked, but 
now my challenge was to somehow inform the student without wrecking 
his ability to defend his dissertation and also to allay the fears of another 
committee member who was especially rattled. Like me, this person had 
been encouraged to cancel the defense. But because of deadlines and 
university policies, this could have killed the young man’s chances for 
his degree, so we proceeded as scheduled. Ironically, the young man’s 
dissertation ( Clow, 2015 )—a beauty—was itself about whistleblowing.
It had evolved from his exposing some ethical problems with heavily 
funded government-sponsored research. Written in the style of creative 
nonfiction ( Gutkind, 1997 ), it recounted that whole messy experience 
and related it to existing whistleblowing literature. Now he himself was 
the target—the classic case of a whistleblower victimized for speaking 
truth to power.
Everyday statements, along with other forms of taken-for-granted 
communication, are indexical signs of the informal and routine ways that 
we indicate our awareness of power in the time and space of our rela-
tions. Whistleblowing experiences are vivid displays of conflict between 
forces of power and largely unspoken values. In this chapter, I want to 
unpack distinctions in power as reflected in some accounts of whistle-
blowing in an American university and introduce a method of inquiry I’ll 
call chronotopic distinctions. These distinctions help identify the locus 
of power and influence in the patterns of values that are upheld and 
concealed in whistleblowing events, and I illustrate this through some 
examples from the Norsk Tipping (NT) whistleblowing story.
I began my considerations for this chapter initially believing I would 
emphasize a theoretical analysis of organizational communication in my 
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by blowing the whistle on a federal research program plagued with seri-
ous ethical concerns. I had a rather tidy and predictable application of 
theories planned—critiquing groupthink ( Janis, 1973 ), sensemaking 
( Weick, 1995 ), and reflecting on the ethical tension points in whistleblow-
ing ( Jensen,1987 ). My reflection led me to realize I was relying on my 
own experience with whistleblowing in my analysis, and this reflection 
hinted at ways the juxtaposition of the two experiences might actually 
reveal deeper insights into how power and control were operating in the 
events that transpired. I turned to social theorists of literary criticism and 
social relations, to locate an epistemological basis for my analysis. I take 
liberty in my application of the notion of distinction as raised by Bour-
dieu (1986 ) to interrogate and reveal the presence of power and class 
in the everyday. In the end, I focused on a few key texts from which to 
examine the subjective, situated, and affective experience of two distinct 
whistleblowing events occurring in the same institution at two positions 
of time and space. My project was to juxtapose narration of the two 
whistleblowing events (one in 1995 and the other from 2012–2015) to 
allow for accounts of experience to reveal the organizational and cultural 
topoi operating to influence and generate responses or actions. Epistemo-
logically, it is the methodology of juxtaposing events to highlight distinc-
tion that helps us to know.
In his 1996 lecture entitled, “Physical Space, Social Space, and Habi-
tus,” Pierre Bourdieu discusses how the real is relational and that social 
agents are located in social spaces; he critiques the creation and use of 
what he calls “grand theory,” created without reference to any empirical 
reality (p. 7). His call is at the same time epistemological and methodolog-
ical, insisting that “the deepest logic of the social world can be grasped 
provided only that one plunges into the particularity of an empirical 
reality, historically located and dated” (p. 8). My reading of Bourdieu’s 
critique suggests that when such grand theories are applied in analysis,
the analysis tends to emphasize substantial or mechanical aspects of phe-
nomena, arriving at essentialist analyses that effectively tie any insights 
obtained to an abstraction. This does help us understand certain features 
of phenomena, such as Jensen’s ethical tension points ( 1987 ), which can 
be “universally” applied; however, in large part, we miss unique aspects 
of the experience because of our epistemological locus in assumed the-
oretical frameworks for organizations and events. I attempt to depart 
from what Bourdieu (1996 ) considered a largely American tendency in 
sociological research, which can amount to what he called “scholasti-
cism” ( Weininger, 2005 ), with knowledge that is deduced from exist-
ing theoretical/conceptual frameworks rather than more organically or 
rhizomatically ( Deleuze & Guattari, 1987 ) from empirical material—in 
this case, descriptions of experience. To do so, I couple a methodology of 
foregrounding empirical distinctions through narration with a method-
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( Bakhtin,1981a ) (the term borrowed from the work of Albert Einstein 
in his theory of relativity). Bakhtin offers the chronotope (Bemong & 
Borghart, 2010) as a unit of analysis that emphasizes the consideration of 
time/space, where topoi emerge because chronotopes function effectively 
as “x-rays of the forces at work in the culture system from which they 
spring” ( Bakhtin,1981b ). In this following brief illustration of a method-
ology for the study of whistleblowing (and other organizational/cultural 
experience), the distinctions visible when highlighting chronotopes guide 
us through the emergent dynamics of implicit power in the narrative 
experiences set into motion through acts of whistleblowing. Each chro-
notope offers parallel segments of time and narrative substance in the 
accounts set in distinction. 
Chronotope I 
In 1994, after ten years working as an assistant professor at three univer-
sities, I moved into an administrative position, directing a presidential ini-
tiative for my university. Meanwhile, I continued to teach at the graduate 
level.
In 2012, my student had experience as a successful master’s candidate,
graduate instructor, research associate, and his own impressive record 
of work as a research consultant and project manager for a leading East 
Coast survey-sampling organization.
Chronotope II 
In 1995, while administering the budget and programming for my posi-
tion as director of a multi-program project, I would meet regularly with
deans, provosts, faculty, and university executives in student affairs. I’d
held the job for almost a year, and throughout that year I would frequently
get suggestions from upper-level administration that I should expand the
breadth of the programs I was directing. I’d reply with a familiar university
mantra, “If I had the budget . . .,” usually to knowing chuckles and sighs
and cynical humor that bonded us in the struggle of working in a state
university. But then one executive responded by telling me that there was
no reason I should be stymied—that he’d seen my budget and I had “more
than enough money.” I thought that I, too, had seen it. But his comment led
me to reinvestigate my budget. I discovered that almost 50% of the money
intended for use by the initiative had been appropriated for the hiring of
staff for another program not affiliated with the project I directed.
In 2012, my student was employed as a research associate with a project 
that made use of his quick mind and ability to synthesize large amounts 
of information. He was driven by the desire to solve puzzles and contrib-
ute to research that led to interesting, new knowledge. He was on a fast 
track to success in his disciplinary niche, able to claim affiliation with a 
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describes it, “idle time” distracted him from focusing on the documents 
from the research project in order to do the work. Instead, because of his 
free time, he applied his curiosity and skill at quick reviewing of literature 
to more fully read the original research proposal. This led to the discov-
ery of plans in the research project to engage in activities he believed to 
violate ethics at a high level, potentially leading to questionable use of 
human subjects, questionable informed consent, and highly disturbing 
plans for use of the research ( Clow, 2015 ).
Chronotope III 
I realized there was no way that my program could properly expand 
without access to the funds I now knew belonged to it, but that had been 
concealed from me.Within my branch of the university, there was no one 
higher than my supervisor to whom I could turn. So I decided to take my 
case directly to the university president. I wrote him a confidential letter 
requesting an opportunity to meet with him to discuss concerns I had 
that threatened the success of his initiative.
My student began to panic as he realized he could not ethically continue 
with this work. But he couldn’t ethically “sit on it” either, since subjects 
in the research might be ignorant of its questionable goals. Complicating 
matters still further, his funding for graduate study depended on his work 
as a research associate, and his dissertation director led the sponsored 
project. He had no idea how to reach the federal agency that funded the 
research and less confidence that they would share his concerns, since 
the research as planned served national defense interests. Additionally,
their federal-level affiliation intimidated him, as did the capacity of his 
mentors to blackball him. He’d emphasized organizational studies in 
his graduate work; he was aware of the conditions he was facing. He 
requested a follow-up meeting with me, for more advising.
Chronotope IV 
I met with the president and told him what I had discovered, framing 
the disclosure of the misappropriated funds within my concern for the 
success of his pet program, being careful to state that I was not meeting 
with him with any vengeful intent to destroy the career of my supervisor,
a successful scholar. Our conversation was calm. He asked me to wait,
told me that he would talk to the provost, and they would determine 
what to do.
My student told me about the fears he had if he blew the whistle, and 
I advised him on ways that he could proceed to protect his status in the 
graduate program. He had decided that the only effective way to raise 
awareness of the scandal was to “go public.” But how? He decided to 
pursue media contacts. I offered to meet with him again if he needed to 




















114 Sarah Amira de la Garza 
problems navigating a strategy for completing his degree, although I was 
not on his committee.
Chronotope V 
I was called to a meeting with the provost and an executive vice president
of the university. They invited me to move my program, along with sup-
port staff and the complete budget, to another major unit of the university.
I accepted, making clear I didn’t want to be in a position where I would be
expected to lie to others. In many ways, it felt as if I had been rewarded.
My student approached his dissertation director and expressed a desire 
to change his research focus. Since the director already carried a full load 
because of his position as research P.I., losing the student as an advisee 
was no big deal. But when my student asked another faculty member to 
be his dissertation director, alluding to the issues he was facing, he ran 
into a wall. Although the professor praised his potential and said he liked 
working with him, he declined the request, saying that he didn’t want to 
upset his relationship with the professor currently directing the research 
study, especially if the student pursued the whistleblowing. 
Chronotope VI 
During my move to the new unit in the university, my supervisor came to 
my office and demanded that I tell him what I had said to the president.
Apparently, he had been notified. I said that I had told the president 
that it wasn’t possible for me to direct my program if I wasn’t allowed 
access to its full budget. I didn’t explicitly mention the misappropriation 
of funds. I also assured him, rather pointedly, that I had specifically told 
the president I was not “out to get” him. I held my gaze. He then mut-
tered something I do not recall and left in a huff.
Meanwhile, my student was desperate, aware that if he didn’t get a 
new dissertation director, he wouldn’t be able to complete his degree. He 
was also actively seeking avenues to publicize his research at a level that 
would gain the attention necessary to have an impact. In addition, he had 
begun to look for work, aware that he might have to leave and give up 
his funding. I expressed my heartfelt concern. He said he was willing to 
accept this, because he couldn’t keep quiet. I then offered to direct him 
if he were willing to write a different type of dissertation—a creative 
nonfiction account and analysis of his experience with whistleblowing,
applying organizational theory. The offer intrigued him. This consoled 
him, too, as no other professor would work with him, he was apprehen-
sive about whom he told, and most fellow graduate students now kept 
him at arm’s length. I then used my networks to find two professors who 
agreed to sit on his committee after I had described the project as some-
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Chronotope VII 
I continued my work with the program, expanding it and its staff by 
creating several new programs, and boosting its budget and my salary.
Meanwhile, my previous supervisor found fresh funds to support the 
staff he’d paid with the project budget.We evolved a workable, civil rela-
tionship, and I was even called to assist with several programs within his 
unit. The budget thing was “our secret.”A scandal had been avoided. My 
career continued on its own trajectory. For all intents and purposes, the 
events were “over,” the problem resolved.
My student struggled working full time, and he decided to relocate 
more than a thousand miles away to work in a job using skills he’d pre-
viously used before doctoral studies. In periodic conversations with me,
he expressed frustration and fatigue. He eventually succeeded in find-
ing a nationally known freelance journalist who created an online video 
that accurately presented the sordid details of the grant. It rapidly swept 
the Internet, capturing the attention of people interested in such contro-
versial research, while the university, embarrassed, intervened to control 
access to information about the project. His health suffered, and he lost 
weight, but I encouraged him to keep writing, and he did. He wrote a 
beautiful, evocative account, using his own experience and notes as the 
basis for the creative nonfiction story he told. Then, finally, came his 
formal defense of the dissertation. A new member of the research team 
for the project sat in on it after the unsuccessful attempts to prevent the 
scheduled defense with the anonymous hotline call. This individual posed 
a series of intimidating questions about the whistleblowing (and not the 
dissertation), moving the committee to call the public part of the defense 
to an end. As a committee, we advised the student to revise the formal 
document to remove any specific identifying features of the narrative to 
avoid future backlash. In time, the research study lost its funding, and 
it was publicly attributed to other bureaucratic reasons, but the timing 
of the response coincided with the online controversy about the project.
Other, similar research continues to receive funding in other units of the 
university, with more carefully neutral and socially positive framing.
Chronotopic Distinctions: The “X-Rays”
Employing what Bourdieu called the “x-ray” capability of the chrono-
tope as a unit of analysis, what immediately became apparent to me were 
the clear distinctions in power and voice that were a function not only 
of the chronotope of the whistleblowing scenes, but also of the implicit 
life experience of the primary agents as aspects of their habitus. Impor-
tantly, there emerges an awareness of the abstract glossing that occurs 
by referring to the distinction simply as experience, for in fact, what 
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evidence of acquisition of institutional and political grammars of power 
that operate in the choices that each of us made. Bourdieu stresses that 
the most adequate readings we can obtain are through an examination of 
the choices that reflect one’s social positioning, disposition, and stances 
(which he calls relational, habitus, and position taking) ( 1996 , p. 10).
From the outset, we are dealing with the phenomenon of an agent 
choosing to voice that which within the organization is otherwise hid-
den. At this level of analysis, it would be easy to focus on what hap-
pens when, or what is required  to, disrupt the assumed loyalty to actions 
held in place through adherence to organizational or group norms or 
structured functions. But it goes beyond the simple exposé of information 
or facts that is expected to remain unrevealed. Through the comparison 
of these two instances of whistleblowing by two individuals in the same 
university, but at a variety of different chronotopes, what stood out to me 
was the evidence of more than simple organizational socialization and 
experience or knowledge, but the subjugation of affect and the capacity 
to create texts that work while simultaneously disrupting. This could be 
seen as evidenced by my communicative approach in the 1995 incidents,
which I find similar to Bakhtin’s idea of heteroglossia, or phenomenon 
of being “double-voiced,” where a character expresses both his intentions 
and the “refracted” voice of the author ( 1981b , p. 324).We can recognize 
this in my capacity to express my intentions to the university president,
while making clear that I was also speaking with the voice of the acad-
emy. When we consider the parallel chronotopes of my student, his lack 
of institutional power is evident by the emphasis on affect and personal 
vulnerability.
Guattari (2009a ) expresses that power is evident when one’s expres-
sion is written—metaphorically as well as literally; words become “texts.”
This creating of texts is the ability to express things in such a way that 
their syntactic value is recognized as memetic—that which is expressed 
will be recognized as a desirable semantic whole. This requires a rather 
powerful disciplining of affect that could make the expression particular-
istic, and even risky (especially when affect would imply a view threat-
ening a subjugated experience of the organization). In other words, we 
are asking, can the whistleblower put things into words that those who 
receive the information/news are not only willing, but desiring to employ 
or repeat? Put still another way, will those who receive my whistleblow-
ing message use my language and its framing to assist in the resolution of 
the transgression motivating the whistleblowing? By comparing the vari-
ous chronotopic moments of these two events side by side, and consider-
ing that the whistleblower in the 1995 situation was the advisor to the 
whistleblower in the 2012–2015 situation, we can see a distinction between 
the relatively raw nature of the whistleblowing disclosures in 2012 and 
the highly double-voiced textual nature of the disclosure in 1995. Simi-




















Chronotopic Distinctions in Whistleblowing 117 
able to see the capacity of Peer Jacob Svenkerud (PJS) to elegantly navi-
gate events largely in part because of the power that accompanied his 
experience and position, as well as the power of having governmental 
agencies collaborating to investigate. My student’s low status and lack of 
reliable social networks of power, as well as the looming power of federal 
government agencies benefitting from the ethically questionable research,
made such cooperation unfeasible.
Second, we come to see how once articulated, the whistleblowing 
text (spoken or written) takes on a materiality that is simultaneously 
rhetorical, value-laden, and indicative of the agent’s subjective value. This 
subjective value can be argued to be partially informed by one’s formal 
structural power within a social or institutional hierarchy, but what is 
lost in such facile reasoning is the power located in an individual’s subju-
gation of any affect that would compete with the normative and appro-
priate, privileged, affective expression within the culture. At every point 
of space and time, the interactions accompanying organizational whistle-
blowing simultaneously demonstrate and reinforce existing taken-for-
granted sources of power and capacities to influence/control events. This 
is incredibly significant, since the whistleblowing ostensibly is a blatant 
challenge to ways in which power and influence have been used in cor-
rupt or illegal, unethical ways.
A chronotopic view of whistleblowing trajectories, especially when jux-
taposed with other disclosures within an organization or culture, can be 
used as a spotlight revealing the value of an individual with respect to the 
ways of not only the disclosure, but also how the syntactic text of such 
disclosure is congruent with the hierarchy of values within the culture.
These hierarchies include values of varying levels of importance that sus-
tain the organization or culture. In these hierarchies exist those values that 
are driving forces to keep the culture going—what I might call primary 
root values. These hold a high expressive value matched by actions that 
reinforce them. These are often unquestioned and the basis for influence.
We can see this in the ultimate 2011 departure from NT of PJS, as well 
as in the institutional cover-up of my whistleblowing of misappropriation 
of funds despite changing formal organizational structure. Similarly, in 
my student’s situation, despite the termination of funding for the research 
and his ultimate success completing his degree, the federal funding found 
units better able to narrate the work. And, my student’s dissertation was 
forced to omit significant details in the creative nonfiction account, ren-
dering it rather impotent for posterity. What we often fail to acknowl-
edge are those values accepted as important to espouse, as part of the 
culture’s image or brand, but that are not as powerful and do not always 
find themselves employed or enacted—what I call image values. These 
are the values that would have PJS proclaiming to reporters in 2010, “I 
had no choice; I could not live with this knowledge on my conscience”
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whistleblowing, I would argue.These values are understood as politically,
morally, or ethically significant, but ultimately, they are not as significant 
as the primary root values, although rarely (or even never) acknowledged 
as such. PJS somewhat acknowledges an awareness of this in the same 
statement, saying,“A whistle-blower can also be an asset” ( Østlendingen,
2010 ), implying the underlying prevailing belief that they are liabilities.
Image values are informally understood as not taking precedence when 
pursuing a course of action—for instance, as in many cases, the value of 
“diversity,” or commitment to gender equality in work practices. With 
the ability to see distinctions in chronotopic x-rays, the whistleblowing 
events described show us how the internalization of the values of the 
institution stand out as ultimately powerful. The value of the symbolic 
power of the tenured professor was implicitly acknowledged in the phras-
ing and framing in the 1995 case shared, as well as the 2015 muting of 
the dissertation content in order to attain the sacred Ph.D.
An additional level of values can also be identified: the unquestioned
value of preserving an image of “all’s well” or “above board,” in what could
be argued are persistent efforts to obfuscate or downplay enduring values
or practices that are powerful and determining of action, but that are con-
sidered unacceptable to articulate explicitly. These hidden root values are
in a sense a sort of shadow values. In certain instances, these might very
well function to contradict image values. For this reason, actions taken in
support of hidden root values can be duplicitous, evasive, or misleading.
In the 1995 whistleblowing scenario, the hidden root value of pre-
serving the honor of significant tenured faculty who have transgressed is 
implied through the syntactic structure of the whistleblowing messages.
In the 2012 whistleblowing scenario, because the blame for a violation 
of ethics in the conduct of research has a paper trail that leads directly 
to named (and tenured) individuals, this hidden root value was threat-
ened. This lessened the security of the as yet academically unlettered 
whistleblower. Bourdieu’s critique of grand theory analyses can push 
us to consider how the logical coherence of elements of organizational 
experience, rank, and formal power would fail to help us see that which 
is hidden or implicit. Through the simultaneous use of a methodology 
employing distinction and chronotopes, a less constrained awareness is 
possible. It is in many ways affective knowing that arises from the raw 
narratives of experience. This does not mean that we can simply throw 
out the use of grand theories; rather, we might wish to see what is not 
seen, as the over-reliance on grand theories may function to support the 
continued obfuscation of the hidden, unexpressed, and subjugated aspects 
of organizational and cultural experience. Organizations may adhere to 
business-as-usual despite any changes that whistleblowing might bring 
about. Ultimately, the attempt to keep the organizational values intact 
can overshadow the potential for increased power given to renewed ethi-
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What is at stake in whistleblowing events are often hidden hierar-
chies of significance to power relations and agency within an organi-
zation or culture. The trajectories explored through an inquiry into
chronotopes would lead us to ask how one has come to learn how to
express difficult disclosures in ways that do not unconsciously threaten
image or hidden root values. These are the ways that hegemonic
patterns of power and influence are maintained. In both my whistle-
blowing as an administrator and PJS’s accounts of whistleblowing, we
see the evidence of the discursive locus of power necessary to navigate
a whistleblowing challenge to organizational practices. The student’s
evident affective reactions betrayed him as not properly subjugated,
not necessarily trustworthy to upholding the sustaining values of the
culture; he needed an advocate to legitimate his actions when facing
the institution he challenged.
It is not readily visible in public statements the way that one’s affect 
must be subjugated in order to navigate topics that threaten the insti-
tution’s values and simultaneously arouse intense affective responses 
in the individual. When gathering accounts for an analysis that would 
employ this methodology of distinction and chronotopes, it would be 
important to gather accounts of experience that capture aspects of the 
affect present during events, much as the lengthy interviews of PJS by the 
research team (for details, see  Chapter 2 ), and the years of conversations 
with my student, as well as my own awareness of my own experience 
in the events shared. The whistleblower treads on fragile surfaces, often 
revealing through the responses and backlash to one’s disclosures those 
values that are powerful enough to demand subjugation or distortion of 
one’s subjectivity, expression, or affect. The permissibility of one’s affec-
tive, subjective, and expressed presence is in a sense converted to material 
and physical realities, through the active face of culture, and vice versa.
From this perspective, the 1995 events described demonstrate intense 
subjugation of affect. Any emotions of anger, threat, fear, or insecurity 
were not expressed in the interactions. Interactions were calculated. I 
would argue that the successful outcome of the whistleblowing was a 
sort of reward for appropriate affect in communication, while simultane-
ously holding intact the importance of image and both primary and hid-
den root values. In my student’s experience, it was this same awareness 
of the importance of subjugation of affect that operated in advising the 
student in the mildly dishonest framing of the dropping of the chair of 
his committee. It was not only the subjugation of the student’s affect, but 
also the prevention of the arousal of affect in the interaction with his pro-
fessor that was advised. His “request” could not risk honest expression 
of a rationale that would threaten the important values implicit in the 
professor’s multiple roles. And in PJS’s newspaper reflections, he hints at 
that which was subjugated in his statement: “The process has obviously 
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subjective reality and influence on our work and lives are largely behind 
closed doors; in my student’s experience, they were literally deleted from 
the formal thesis.
Similarly, although not expressed in the chronotopic accounts, it is 
important to consider how whistleblowing and the public knowledge 
of one’s whistleblowing will affect the social and operational networks 
within a culture for the individual who is known to have disclosed 
something threatening to the sustaining values of the culture. As a whis-
tleblowing event can lead to an awareness of how the sustaining values of 
the culture have been threatened, affiliation with the whistleblower can 
become symbolic of one’s affinity with these threats. As such, whistle-
blowing can increase the intensity of hegemonic responses to sanction 
the whistleblower and his allies (i.e., the use of the ritual of questioning 
in a defense to intimidate, using a hotline to sabotage, or a defensive con-
frontation in a private conversation). The implicit threats in the whistle-
blowing can strengthen allegiance to cultural or organizational goals and 
values because of the awareness of threatening narrations in the com-
municative environment, and ultimately affecting the sense of institution-
ally supported individual security for many. It is important to stress here 
that hegemony and allegiance to cultural/organizational goals and values 
are often silent, the epitome of subjugation. It is through communica-
tion (including silencing) that conditions are created for the “production 
of subjectivity”( Guattari, 2009b ). Ultimately the entire experience of a 
whistleblowing event, whether successful or not in repairing the ethical,
legal, or operational ruptures in an organization or culture, can reveal 
for us the subtle codes and literacies necessary to have power. Success 
in whistleblowing where the sustaining values are themselves oppressive 
may simply be a long-term delay in bringing to light those things that can-
not even be voiced. On the other hand, as in the case of Norway, where 
whistleblowing is increasingly found to “work” ( Skivenes & Trygstad,
2010 ), perhaps we are seeing that an open embrace and defense of shared 
values at a macro-cultural level can function to make whistleblowing 
an ally to these values, rather than a threat to sustaining values within a 
culture that are themselves evidence of deceptive norms of representation 
and actions. Even so, serious scholars of organizational discourse ought 
to embrace the opportunities that these accounts provide to study the 
subtle ways organizations persist and resist change, even when seemingly 
forced to make dramatic adjustments.
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 9 Whistleblowing 
Making a Weak Signal Stronger 
Bjørn T. Bakken and Thorvald Hærem 
Introduction 
Whistleblowing cases are high on the public agenda in Norway, as 
evidenced by the many news reports and articles in Norwegian national 
and regional news channels. In a commentary, Helle Stensbak, chief 
economist in a major Norwegian labor union (Stensbak, in Aftenposten,
10.9.2018 , p. 2), notes that the societal costs are lower when further mis-
conduct is prevented by internal whistleblowing, compared with when 
it’s exposed by external control mechanisms. But, in either case, whistle-
blowing is problematic. It’s estimated that only half of all instances of 
misconduct are reported, and in 65% of reported instances, no improve-
ments result. It’s also estimated that whistleblowing, if acted upon, might 
save Norway as a society more than one billion USD a year (Stensbak, in 
Aftenposten, 10.9. 2018 ).
But one recurring problem is that blowing the whistle can be risky.
Typically, the person accused of misconduct (often a manager) will try 
to divert the blame away from himself and instead pin it on the accuser.
He’ll do this by concealing or delaying posting the true information, and 
also by spreading lies or half-truths about the whistleblower throughout 
the organization. These tactics can be particularly effective if the cred-
ibility of the whistleblower may somehow be questioned (see Chapter 2 ).
The manager’s defensive action may be successful, given that fel-
low employees, and even the public swayed by sensationalistic media,
accept the diversion and direct their indignation at the whistleblower.
This may prove fruitful if, as just mentioned, the personal background 
of the whistleblower can be manipulated into a more catchy story—for 
example, by portraying him as a sore-headed troublemaker rather than 
a conscientious and self-sacrificing employee with the greater good in 
mind. Even if the case goes to court, the accused is seldom found guilty,
often because of a lack of incontrovertible evidence. The failure to make 
the case can happen when, for example, witnesses and experts offer con-
flicting interpretations of the facts (see, e.g., the Siemens case in  Monsen,
2008 ; the Norfund case in  Rafat, 2013 ; and the Monika case in  Schaefer,
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for the whistleblower. A whistleblower may stand no better chance if 
his accusations are investigated internally by an ombudsman. In a recent 
case in which employees reported nine instances of harassment at a large 
Norwegian hospital, only three instances were accounted credible enough 
to justify dismissing the accused manager ( Skogstrøm, Dommerud, & 
Olsen, in Aftenposten, 3.2.2019 , pp. 6–7).
Large-scale, cross-sectional surveys conducted among employees in
Norway (e.g., Trygstad & Ødegård, 2016 : the FAFO survey) point to 
worsened conditions for freedom of speech, including blowing the whistle,
in the corporate world. Today, a significantly smaller number than five 
years ago believe that blowing the whistle may improve conditions. Sadly,
the conditions for whistleblowing may be even worse in public organi-
zations, according to commentary by Knut Olav Åmås ( Åmås, in Aften-
posten, 16.10.2016 , p. 2–3). He cites an informant from the FAFO survey 
who works in the Norwegian health service and who recounts how man-
agement is determined to track down and punish employees it sees as 
“troublesome.” Consequently, fewer employees consider reporting work-
place misconduct, and those who do rightly fear retaliation (see also com-
mentary by Professor Petter Gottschalk in Agderposten, 22.8. 2018 , p. 21).
The whistleblower in this book, Peer Jacob Svenkerud (PJS) in 2007 
blew the whistle on Norsk Tipping, the government-owned company 
operating Norway’s national lottery. Our chapter reviews a theory that 
provides valuable insights into how a problematic issue can be detected 
at an early stage while a weak signal and while it’s still possible to cor-
rect it using relatively limited company resources. We discuss PJS’s
whistleblowing case in light of several streams of research: the literature 
on weak signals and strategic surprises (e.g., Ansoff, 1975 ); sensemak-
ing and divergent thinking (e.g., Weick, 1995 ); organizational and safety 
culture (e.g., Reason, 1997 ); and mindful organizing (e.g., Weick  & 
Sutcliffe, 2015 ). These research streams all have one thing in common: 
they contend that being informed is the most important basis for high-
quality decision-making and action-taking in organizations. Perhaps more 
important than the objective information elements (i.e., the data) is the 
subjective apprehension of those elements by the management. We need 
to understand the psychological processes by which (objective) data are 
transformed into (subjective) perceptions and beliefs (mental models)— 
and the aforementioned theories are enlightening in that respect. A core 
point is that the transition from data to perception and understanding is 
less than perfect, indeed usually a fault-ridden process (see, e.g., Kahne-
man, 2012 ). When it comes to PJS’s case, we identify what went wrong 
when the organization’s upper management failed to interpret correctly 
and take action on his whistleblowing, and what lessons can be learned 
to ensure proper handling of similar cases in the future.
During the course of PJS’s story, we find several times when the upper 
management received information that, had it been properly acknowl-
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signal to crisis. It starts when PJS approaches the chairman of the board 
and exposes the gross misuse of funds by his charismatic boss, the CEO 
of NT ( Riksrevisjonen, 2008 –2009). Apparently, the chairman of the 
board takes PJS’s disclosures seriously and decides to act on them. But 
when PJS offers to leave the organization for a position elsewhere, the 
chairman discourages that idea and instead asks him to stay on as NT’s 
Senior Vice President Information and External Relations. The plan is 
for PJS to remain unidentified as the whistleblower and to assist in the 
firm’s moral recovery. While this might seem a sensible move seen from 
the chairman’s side, the situation worsens a few weeks later when the 
CEO has been informed that the whistleblower is actually an employee 
in his own organization. Instead of taking the opportunity to reform his 
own ways, the CEO starts a witch hunt for the “unfaithful servant” By 
now, PJS had gone from acting with integrity and autonomy to becoming 
a hunted man in his own organization—and being unhappily complicit 
in his own cover-up.
Theory 
Whistleblowing can be understood as an employee’s attempt to make 
a “weak signal” stronger—that is, an attempt, early on, to alert the
management, the media, or a government agency to problems needing
prompt correction ( Gottschalk, 2018 ). It’s a “weak signal” because its 
purpose is more preventive than punitive. It aims to give the organization 
a chance to correct the wrong before it escalates into a full-blown crisis 
(see Near & Miceli, 1985, 1995 ,  2016 ;  Jubb, 1999 ). Many organizations 
that have experienced ethical crises have concluded that an early reaction 
to weak signals might well have prevented a catastrophe.
Since Igor Ansoff coined the idea of “weak signals” with his ground-
breaking article about strategic surprises ( Ansoff, 1975 ), we have been 
able to understand reports from the numerous crises striking organi-
zations everywhere in a different perspective. In a way reminiscent of
Murphy’s Law, no matter how ingenious the security, safety, and risk-
management systems they devise, organizations continue to be surprised 
by unexpected events that eventually lead to crises (e.g., Schoemaker & 
Day, 2009a ,  2009b ). Think, for example, of the petroleum-scarcity cri-
sis in the 1970s, or the global financial crisis in the late ’80s, or the 
subprime lending crisis after the turn of the century. Such crises occur 
frequently ( Ansoff, 1975 ), and it would be easy to ascribe our failure 
to foresee them to the world’s growing complexity. Is the problem, we 
wonder, due to the increasing interconnectedness and globalization of 
commodity, information, financial, and labor markets? Or is it perhaps 
from our failure to distinguish small signals that spell trouble from other 
signals that are just unpleasant but harmless “noise” in the background 
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Here, we argue that we should look to psychological and cultural expla-
nations for our own managerial blindness. Many systems that are designed
to manage risks and avoid unwanted surprises focus on surveillance—the
suppression and prevention of adverse “forces” that are  external to the 
organization. Might the key to avoiding many such surprises actually
lie within the organization rather than outside it? We believe that, more
often than not, it is not a lack of comprehensive, detailed information 
from numerous external sources that is the problem. Rather, it is the lack 
of (correct) interpretation, prioritization, and action by management that 
contributes to an emerging, full-blown organizational crisis (Watkins & 
Bazerman, 2003).
Ansoff (1975 ) prescribes that an organization, to protect itself from 
just such a crisis, should actively prepare for the consequences of cri-
ses (i.e., effective crisis management) as well as strive to minimize the 
probability of being stricken by crisis (i.e., effective preparedness and 
surveillance measures). The latter includes barriers (safety and security 
systems; Reason, 1997 ) to prevent minor events (e.g., accidents, failures,
and “disturbances”) from escalating into full-blown crises, as well as 
systematically gathering information to be acted upon early enough to 
avoid the most severe consequences of them.
A core point in Ansoff’s (1975 ) theory is that an organization’s response 
to a potential threat should not be dictated by the information needs 
of the “strategic planning technology.” Doing so would stifle the for-
mal planning process; it is risky to act on information that is vague and 
unclear. The solution? The organization should look for feasible courses 
of action as strategic information becomes gradually available during the 
emerging phase of a crisis. “Early in the life of a threat, when the infor-
mation is vague and its future course unclear, the responses will be corre-
spondingly unfocused, aimed at increasing the strategic flexibility of the 
firm” ( Ansoff, 1975 , p. 23). For example, if an early, vague signal hints 
that some kind of misconduct is going on (but without being specific or 
conclusive), the management could promptly investigate the matter, that 
is, seek more knowledge. Another possible response could be to review 
current practices to determine whether they actually comply with gener-
ally accepted standards for doing business. In either case, the response 
to a weak signal would be to gather more information, in order to have 
a better basis for further decision-making and action. Such strategies 
are examples of what Ansoff (1975 ) would call “internal readiness and 
awareness” strategies.
Researchers (e.g., Nesse, 2016 ) and practitioners (e.g., Eriksen, 2011 ; 
Lunde, 2014 ) often promote this proactive approach to crisis manage-
ment. An over-arching dimension of James  Reason’s (1997 ) concept of 
a safety culture is for an organization to stay informed. It’s essential to 
have a system for safety management. Within such a system, members 
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obliged by law—to report any incident, large or small, that may indi-
cate deviations from normal practice, and thereby constitute a potential 
threat to safety. The logic is that most, if not all, critical threatening 
situations start out as minuscule events, hardly noticeable except to the 
personnel directly involved. Timely, accurate reporting of local events is 
therefore necessary for management to take quick, appropriate action.
Even “near-accidents” should be reported, because such cases may con-
stitute a vital source of learning, to avoid actual accidents in the future 
( Dekker, 2012 ).
Within  Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2015 ) “mindful organizing” theory for 
managing the unexpected, we find that information gathering, analysis,
and action are important for preventing smaller disturbances from esca-
lating into full-blown crises. This perspective is also shared by  Beck and 
Plowman (2009 ), who propose, and explain, their two-step analysis: 
“Divergent thinking early in the recognition of a rare and unusual 
event encourages multiple ways of interpreting and viewing the event.
Convergence, in contrast, enables action and adaptation” (p. 909). The 
discovery and interpretation of rare events should not be reserved exclu-
sively for the top management; middle managers have an important role,
too, as they’re more likely to provide a richer interpretation of events and 
are less likely to make mistakes ( Beck & Plowman, 2009 ). Middle man-
agement’s involvement requires that they take an active part in “sense-
making,” an important skill when one is exposed to rare and unexpected 
events. “The cues that get noticed and extracted are the ones that get 
enhanced with meaning and interpretations,” says Weick (1995 , cited in 
Beck & Plowman, 2009 , p. 910). Noticing is particularly relevant with 
rare and unusual events, for which existing narratives typically fail to 
provide meaningful or satisfactory interpretations ( Beck & Plowman,
2009 ).
According to Watkins and Bazerman (2003 ; see also  Bazerman &
Watkins, 2005 ), “predictable surprises” arise out of failures by man-
agement to recognize, prioritize, or mobilize against unwanted events.
To discern in retrospect whether a disaster could have been avoided,
they contend, one has to ask the following three questions: (1) Did
the leader recognize the threat? (2) Did the leader make the proper
prioritizations? (3) Did the leader mobilize effectively? (p. 74). These
questions are akin to performing a risk assessment and then developing
a plan for contingency management. For the first question, this is usu-
ally a matter of having enough resources to scan the environment for
emerging threats. In addition, data need to be properly analyzed and
interpreted by the management. As for the second question, this is a
matter of singling out potential surprises (disasters) from other events
that follow a more normal pattern. The key here is to acknowledge
that any (unwanted) event has an associated risk, which is a product
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those unwanted events posing the highest risk. And as for the third
question, it requires taking precautionary measures that are appropri-
ate to handle the risks identified. A key point in  Bazerman and Wat-
kins’ (2005 ) argument is that a manager who does a reasonable job at
risk management—that is, has taken the necessary precautions against
unwanted and uncertain events—shouldn’t be blamed if such an event
occurs despite relevant measures taken.
While Watkins and Bazerman (2003 ) prescribe a systematic approach 
to risk management, with preparedness as a main focus, Cunha, Clegg,
and Kamoche (2006 ) offer a typology for how to handle unexpected and 
potentially harmful events once they’ve occurred.As such, their approach 
to handling surprises is closer to crisis management than preparedness.
They describe four types of surprising events, ranked by degree of surprise,
that organizations may encounter, and then prescribe the different mana-
gerial approaches that each requires.
Sometimes a surprise will occur when routines are in place but not 
followed by employees, so management must simply regain control.
Such cases (type 1) are usually predictable, and although they may occur 
regularly, they don’t occur with certainty. For sudden events (type 2),
where the issue is unexpected but the process is well known, the event 
can be a source of learning. Management’s task is then to facilitate it.
In situations in which a process changes unexpectedly, but the issue is 
known (type 3, “creeping developments”)—for example, when complex 
and interactive processes lead to unexpected situations (“normal acci-
dents,” Perrow, 1999)—the recommendation is to manage by distributing 
responsibilities and empowering the employees (see Reason, 1997 ,  2000 ).
In the most profound kind of surprise—situations in which both processes 
as well as issues are unexpected (type 4, “loss of meaning”), leading to 
completely unexpected and incomprehensible situations—the recommen-
dation is to engage in sensemaking (see Weick, 1995 ;  Barton, Sutcliffe,
Vogus, & DeWitt, 2015 ) to create a radical and fresh understanding of 
what is going on.
The Relevance to Whistleblowing 
In light of the theory presented so far, whistleblowing contains aspects, or
stages, relevant to both preparedness and risk management (Bazerman &
Watkins, 2005), as well as crisis management, including sensemaking
( Cunha et al., 2006 ).
Preparedness concerns measures taken to prevent a crisis from happening 
in the first place and includes surveillance of the environment, detec-
tion, and interpretation of anomalies ( Barton et al., 2015 ), as well as 
acting on weak signals with appropriate actions ( Ansoff, 1975 ). Because 
employees are a key source of information, it’s essential to foster a “gen-
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cooperation among employees (the sources of information), training of 
messengers, sharing of risks, and encouragement to step forward with 
critical information. That culture will include the understanding that 
the organization will reward informants, even when the information is 
negative or critical, and will also implement changes that prevent similar 
surprises in the future ( Westrum, 2004 ; see also  Dekker, 2012 ;  Man-
nion & Davies, 2015 ). In fact, Schein (2016) goes so far as to argue that 
trust, openness, and personalization make whistleblowing obsolete. But 
Hussain, Shu, Tangirala, and Ekkirala (2018 ) contend that too much 
trust and openness can lead to the opposite effect. They call this “posi-
tive organizational climate paradox”: when redundant information 
reduces the likelihood of voice (“the voice bystander effect”). In social 
psychology, the so-called bystander effect holds that when some emer-
gency, such as a crime or accident, is witnessed by a number of bystand-
ers, the likelihood of anybody intervening to help the victim(s) decreases 
as the number of bystanders increases ( Darley & Latané, 1968 ). Many 
theories purport to explain this phenomenon, but they mainly contend 
that in the presence of several potential helpers, one’s own felt responsi-
bility to help diminishes.
Crisis management, meanwhile, concerns handling the event in order 
to minimize damages, once the event has occurred, and success requires 
that a sufficient understanding of the situation has been developed. Such 
an understanding could be reached, for example, through processes of 
sensemaking ( Weick, 1995 ) and situation assessment ( Endsley, 1997 ), and 
should result in revised mental models of high quality ( Brehmer, 2009 ).
Twice a Surprise—The “Double Trouble” of Whistleblowing 
A whistleblowing case may contain two surprises that occur in sequence.
The first one is the embarrassing discovery that wrongdoing has occurred 
in the organization, and that somebody in (upper) management is to 
blame. This will likely be a surprise of type 1 or 2 in the  Cunha et al.
(2006 ) typology, because once the upper management is alerted to the 
wrongdoing, they will realize that it is in fact a breach of routine or direc-
tive, even though they might not react as if they immediately understand 
the severity of the case.
The second, more intricate surprise involves the reactions of the upper 
management to the whistleblower’s blowing the whistle. In the PJS case,
the surprise here will be that the actions taken by upper management 
don’t resolve the crisis. If there is a lack of resolution, it’s likely that the 
surprise will be of a type 3 or 4 in the typology of Cunha et al. (2006 ). If 
true, it’s likely that a new understanding is needed, and that employees 
may indeed be a vital source of information, even though the information 
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To avoid being surprised by whistleblowing events, we now turn to 
theory that promotes an organizational culture recognizing the impor-
tance of the correct interpretation and handling of weak signals. Weick 
and Sutcliffe (2015 ) offer five principles of “mindful management” that 
provide a foundation for prudent, robust management by placing the 
discovery and interpretation of small signals at the forefront of manag-
ers’ minds. These signals can address potential major disasters while they 
are still minor incidents—hardly noticeable, but presumably easy and 
straightforward to handle.
Mindful management is about paying attention to small signals indi-
cating that something is not as it should be and calling for prompt fixing.
Weick and Sutcliffe (2015 ) put it well: “As a problem begins to unfold,
weak signals are hard to detect but easy to remedy. As time passes, this 
state of affairs tends to reverse. Signals become easy to detect but hard 
to remedy” (p. 3).
In the following section, we discuss aspects of the PJS case, focusing 
on “what went wrong” and how the organization’s upper management 
might have successfully corrected it. Our discussion will apply the five 
principles of mindful management and link each principle to a problem-
atic practice that either caused the initial surprise or contributed to wors-
ening the situation once the whistle was blown.
The PJS Case 
Preoccupation With Failure: Placing the Burden on 
the Whistleblower 
The principle of “preoccupation with failure” is about management’s 
being alert to small signs indicating that undesirable events are occurring 
(or about to) in the company. Such signs, if overlooked, would then lead 
to conditions that almost inevitably metastasize.
After PJS blew the whistle on his CEO, the logical response would have 
been for the chairman of the board to take immediate and decisive action 
toward the CEO, the target of the whistleblowing. Instead, the chairman 
of the board placed the burden on PJS by insisting that he keep quiet and 
develop a Program for defending the organization.
At NT, the outcome might have been far different if internal auditing
procedures had been able to catch the illegal use of corporate funds to
pay for the CEO’s personal gardening expenses ( Riksrevisjonen, 2008 – 
2009), making PJS’s intervention unnecessary. Of course, if taken to
the extreme, being “preoccupied with failure” could lead to a ruinously
distrustful organizational climate, where everybody is suspicious, skep-
tical, and critical, alert to even the most trivial breach of commonly
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Dekker, 2012 ). On the other hand, in some industries, even the slight-
est rule or procedural violation could indeed lead to disaster, such as in
the nuclear power industry, aviation, or in space (e.g., Perrow, 2011 ).
Reluctance to Simplify: Ambiguous Legal Agreements 
In the case of PJS’s whistleblowing, the CEO had an agreement with the 
NT board to have some of his gardening needs shouldered by the com-
pany caretaker ( Riksrevisjonen, 2008 –2009).This arrangement sought to 
compensate him for some of the burdens of having a heavy schedule that 
also included a lot of traveling. But the agreement was later interpreted 
(allegedly) to imply that the CEO had the right to hire a gardening com-
pany of his own choosing—and have NT pay the hefty bill. Aside from 
that questionable practice, which borders on corruption, there is also the 
issue of tax evasion. The expenses paid by the company weren’t reported 
to the Norwegian tax authorities ( Riksrevisjonen, 2008 –2009).
The principle of “reluctance to simplify” is supposed to prevent 
unpleasant surprises caused by someone’s failure to distinguish a ques-
tionable practice from normal, accepted business practice. It would 
appear that to run their business efficiently, managers should focus on 
“key issues and indicators” ( Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015 , p. 8) and avoid 
getting too bogged down in details. But such simplification can instead 
lead to overlooking some nuances of doing business—nuances that may 
prove vital if signs of misconduct are to be discovered early and then 
promptly corrected.
Sensitivity to Operations: Operating Costs Unjustified With 
Regard to Core Business 
It appears that NT permitted some activities whose costs couldn’t be 
justified in light of its primary mission ( Riksrevisjonen, 2008 –2009).
One example was the yearly report, which had a budget for design and 
printing far greater than what was needed to communicate the opera-
tional and financial status of the organization. Furthermore, high-profile 
events and parties, like the Viking Party at the Høsbjør Hotel outside 
the city of Hamar, enjoyed budgets grossly excessive for a government-
owned nonprofit.
The principle of “sensitivity to operations” concerns knowing the core 
activities of an organization and placing them at the forefront in the day-
to-day schedule. For a commercial organization, the effort should be 
directed toward those activities directly related to generating profit. To 
that end, managerial control philosophies such as “Balanced Scorecard”
( Kaplan & Norton, 1996 ) and “Activity Based Costing (ABC)” ( Kaplan 
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the organization’s primary mission. At least, their costs should be justifi-
able in relation to their purpose and ability to generate income beyond 
their costs.
When a company appears to be using time and money on activities that 
can’t be justified by their profit-generating potential, managers need to 
notice such activities and take action, either changing them or abandon-
ing them altogether. Some typical examples: expensive advertising cam-
paigns, lobbying activities that have unmeasurable results, and expensive 
traveling that doesn’t take advantage of low fares and discounts.
Commitment to Resilience: Avoid Taking Charge to Resolve 
the Situation 
One may ask, to what degree did NT exhibit resilience after PJS blew the 
whistle? It appears that the chairman of the board initially doubted PJS 
when he first outlined the questionable practices he had discovered. Had 
the chairman behaved in a resilient manner, he would have taken PJS’s 
story and all the supporting evidence at face value instead of question-
ing it. Just after PJS’s meeting with him, the chairman tried to mitigate 
the consequences by having PJS promise secrecy instead of actively
addressing the problems, thus probably making things worse for both
PJS and his fellow employees. Consider, for example, the “witch hunt”
that the CEO launched to root out the “prince of darkness.” Appar-
ently, PJS’s colleagues weren’t ready to accept that their CEO exhibited 
questionable—and even unlawful—practices when managing their orga-
nization. Instead of posing probing questions to establish the truth, they 
remained loyal to the CEO.
The principle of “commitment to resilience” concerns the fact that no 
matter how mindful an organization may be, it occasionally will find 
itself tested by embarrassing incidents. An organization that’s able to 
withstand such tests, and regain normal operational status within a rea-
sonable time, can be said to be resilient.
The essence of resilience is .  .  . the intrinsic ability of an organiza-
tion (system) to maintain or regain a dynamically stable state, which 
allows it to continue operations after a major mishap and/or in the 
presence of a continuous stress.
(Hollnagel, 2006, cited in Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015 , p. 12) 
The hallmark of a resilient organization is not that it is free from errors 
but that errors don’t disable it ( Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015 ). 
In many ways, resilience is the opposite of the “reluctance to simplify”
principle, since an organization’s resilience is often derived from its effort 
to maintain a control system that mirrors the complexity of the issues 
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streamlining its structure (e.g., by firing or retiring older employees, while 
only hiring young, newly graduated candidates) and acknowledges that 
a broad range of skills and competencies will be needed to solve future 
issues, both simple and complex.
Deference to Expertise: Avoid External (and Internal) Attention,
Keeping Silent 
In the case of PJS, he tells us that he sought legal counsel to mitigate some 
of the burdens he experienced as a whistleblower. He needed to confide 
in someone he could trust, an expert who had experience with such prob-
lems. NT, meanwhile, failed significantly when the board initially elected 
to keep silent about the allegations. In doing so, it missed an opportunity 
to put legal and HR expertise on the issues early and thus possibly con-
tain the crisis. Furthermore, by not acknowledging the value of expertise 
in such complex matters, it also failed to learn and change its ways.
The principle of “deference to expertise” involves acknowledging that 
decisions in dynamic organizations should be “made on the front line,
and authority migrates to the people with most expertise, regardless of 
their rank” ( Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015 , p. 14). This principle suggests that 
rigid, hierarchically structured organizations face particular challenges 
when it comes to detecting and interpreting worrisome signals. When an 
issue or error isn’t addressed early on, it tends to become worse (Brehmer,
2002), and a hierarchically structured managerial system is normally 
incapable of making the necessary quick response or adjustment called 
for. This is particularly true when the problem is non-routine (Pentland,
Hærem, & Hillison, 2010) or not previously experienced ( Klein, 1998 , 
2003 ). The principle also applies to those cases when warnings, or “sig-
nals,” originate from particularly experienced personnel. Such warnings 
must be taken seriously. For example, it would be a big mistake for a 
bank to dismiss a financial expert’s opinion on the negative effects of 
mixing defaulted, high-risk loans with more moderate and low-risk loans 
when computing the bank’s total risk exposure.
Discussion 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2015 ) have studied a wide range of organizations 
that must maintain structure and function under uncertainty, where the 
potential for error and disaster can lead to catastrophe. Their main tenet 
is that mindful organizing helps organizations maintain resilience dur-
ing critical events through anticipation and containment. Anticipation 
is all about preparedness (see Watkins & Bazerman, 2003 ). It involves 
sensing events early and taking action to ward off their developing into 
undesirable events. Because not all unwanted events can be anticipated,
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unexpected events that in fact occur (crisis management; see Cunha et al.,
2006 ). Anticipation is associated with these three principles: preoccupa-
tion with failure, reluctance to simplify, and sensitivity to operations.
Containment has two principles: commitment to resilience and deference
to expertise.
We have discussed several aspects of PJS’s whistleblowing story
where the story could have been different had NT, and in particular
its board of directors, been more mindful when they were presented
with the issues that constituted PJS’s whistleblowing reports. The  pre-
occupation with failure principle helps us see that the board of direc-
tors could have acknowledged PJS’s reports of misconduct upfront;
also, that the firm’s auditing procedures should have been capable of
detecting irregular and questionable transactions in the first place.
As for reluctance to simplify, the company should have taken more
care, and been more specific and rule-oriented, when entering into
agreements of fringe benefits with the CEO. The principle of sensitiv-
ity to operations was violated given the excessive resources allocated
to activities that clearly were outside the company’s core activities.
Examples include the CEO’s gardening expenses and the compa-
ny’s extensive sponsoring of activities outside its approved strategy.
Significantly, the sponsoring strategy was later revised by the board,
with a number of limitations and restrictions implemented ( Riksre-
visjonen, 2008 –2009, p. 44).
When it became more or less apparent that PJS’s story was citing past 
events that should have been promptly handled, the principle of  commit-
ment to resilience becomes relevant. Here we learned that the company 
failed on several accounts—both in questioning compelling evidence and 
in delaying action. Even more severe, instead of solving the real problem,
a “witch hunt” was initiated by the CEO, effectively diverting attention 
from the real problem at hand. Finally, and contrary to the deference to 
expertise principle, the company’s board of directors initially didn’t take 
the necessary steps to consult experts on the problems they had been 
alerted to by PJS.
When looking at mechanisms to prevent serious issues from escalat-
ing, Reason (1997 ) takes a more distinct step toward managers being 
proactive when it comes to detecting and taking action on signals of 
wrongdoing. He suggests designing a formal information system for the 
reporting and proper processing of signals that warn of critical incidents 
in organizations. Furthermore, he suggests that the organization needs 
to be able to adapt to, and learn from, current problems. Finally, for 
this to work, good managerial leadership is essential. Managers should 
act as role models for their employees in all matters that relate to safety 
and security. For a long time, we have understood that there is a differ-
ence between how the routine is written and how it is enacted ( Pent-
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its corresponding influence on behavior, should not be underestimated 
( Pentland & Feldman, 2008 ;  D’Adderio, 2008 ).
Concluding Remarks 
Throughout this chapter we have reviewed relevant theory regarding the 
detection, interpretation, and handling of weak signals and strategic sur-
prises, and applied that theory to a case of whistleblowing.We have seen 
that a formal risk-management system (e.g., Reason, 1997 ) may prove 
especially useful in that respect; so, too, a safety-minded organizational 
culture (e.g., Westrum, 2004 ), specifically, mindful organizing ( Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2015 ) 
Recommendations include taking precautions and preventive measures 
(e.g., Watkins & Bazerman, 2003 ) as well as having a capacity to per-
form crisis management ( Cunha et al., 2006 ; see also  Klein, 1998 ,  2003 , 
2013 ), which may include sensemaking ( Weick, 1995 ), situation aware-
ness ( Endsley, 1997 ), and modification and even (re-)creating of mental 
models ( Brehmer, 2009 ). Without a culture or even a formal system to 
aid in interpreting and handling weak signals, whistleblowing cases will 
continue to pose a threat to management rather than an opportunity to 
curb mismanagement and create a new future for the organization.
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 10 Blowing the Whistle Is Laden 
With Risk 
Joseph McGlynn 
Blowing the whistle is fraught with risks.They can be known or unknown,
visible or invisible, certain or uncertain.When Peer Jacob Svenkerud (PJS) 
exposed the financial misdeeds of the CEO at Norsk Tipping (NT), he 
faced potential slander, shaming, and intimidation. And indeed he experi-
enced all three. They took their toll on him physically and emotionally— 
even financially. But, as with any whistleblower, his story illustrates how 
risk judgments reflect his values and priorities, and how his perceptions 
of risk likelihood and magnitude influenced his response to organiza-
tional wrongdoing. Prospect theory ( Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 ) posits 
that losses loom larger than gains when people make judgments of risk 
with uncertain outcomes. For PJS, the risk of being untrue to himself, as 
well as to others, finally outweighed his fears of retaliation.
PJS took on the risk of exposing organizational wrongdoing while 
working for an organization whose very existence, ironically, is grounded 
in risk. NT is a government-owned company, started in 1948, that offers 
lotteries, sports, and games of chance that prove enticing to Norwegians,
with all profits supposedly channeled back to the country’s sports and cul-
ture sectors. So NT seeks to encourage people to take on reasonable risks,
both for themselves and for the greater good. PJS’s own risk calculation 
concerned whether to alert the world to unethical behavior by NT’s CEO.
Once he acted on that decision, he encountered retaliation at both the 
personal and professional level. In subsequent interviews, PJS describes 
feeling isolated and unsupported by colleagues at NT. He even faced los-
ing his job as well as suffering other financial and social repercussions.
Why would anyone hazard such risk? In PJS’s case, it was perhaps to 
avoid an even greater risk: the risk of inaction. If he chose to ignore the 
wrongdoing, he risked losing an opportunity to discover, maybe even 
to define his true character—his deepest values and priorities—both to 
himself and to others. It was truly a watershed for him, a coming-of-age 
moment.
In the pages ahead, I describe some key concepts and dimensions of 
risk theories, highlight those elements of risk most relevant to whistle-



























140 Joseph McGlynn 
to blow the whistle, identifying the practical, logistical, and emotional 
factors that influenced his risk judgments and experience.
Risk Perceptions and Judgments 
We humans, through our choices and actions, have a unique ability both 
to create and minimize risk in our lives ( Slovic, 1987 ). Two questions 
guide our decisions about risk-taking: What is the likelihood of a bad 
result happening, and how bad a result might it be ( Fischoff, Slovic,
Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978 )? These two considerations reflect 
decision processes of risk as analysis and risk as feelings ( Slovic, Finu-
cane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004 ). The former approaches risk decisions 
very analytically, with logic, deliberation, and reasoning ( Slovic & Peters,
2006 ). The latter approaches them suprarationally, relying on experience,
intuition, and instinct.We are always estimating both the probability and 
the magnitude of any risk ( Sztompka, 1999 ).
All risk decisions involve three things: options, outcomes, and uncer-
tainty ( Fischoff et al., 1978 ). The quality and characteristics of these 
inputs are influenced by social norms, context, and the language used 
to describe them. For whistleblowers, risk inputs include their options 
(blow the whistle vs. remain silent), outcomes (e.g., retaliation, successful 
cessation of wrongdoing), and uncertainty (how likely, and how great,
is the retaliation they may face). Although risk can be quantified, the 
perception of it is influenced by emotions. To conceptualize risk, it’s 
necessary to identify the emotions that motivate risk-taking. Affective 
responses have a substantial influence on risk decisions. Higher positive 
affect increases perceptions of benefits and decreases perceptions of risk 
( Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000 ).
Language choices and the message frames used to describe a threat 
also influence risk judgments and perceptions ( Tversky & Kahneman,
1981 ). The framing of events prompts different affective and cognitive 
reactions to risks ( Cho, 2012 ). Language choices reflect the beliefs of the 
speaker, as a speaker’s choice of message frames communicates a particu-
lar vantage point and shape the meaning of an event ( Fairhurst, 2005 ).
Language choices can influence perceptions of risk severity ( McGlone,
Bell, Zaitchik, & McGlynn, 2013 ) and attributions of risk responsibility 
( McGlynn & McGlone, 2018 ).
Prospect Theory 
Most risk judgments involve our factoring in both our potential losses 
and our potential gains (Kahneman, 2012)—that is, our costs and ben-
efits ( Fischoff et al., 1978 ). According to prospect theory ( Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979 ), when we evaluate our risks, any potential losses tend to 
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risk-tolerant, or even risk-seeking. But when assessing the risks associ-
ated with our potential gains, we tend to be risk-averse because we want 
to avoid losing those gains. To avoid a possible perceived loss, people are 
more willing to take risks, and they show a higher tolerance for support-
ing risky behavior. Perceptions of gains and losses influence whistleblow-
ers’ risk judgments and decision to blow the whistle.
Emotions influence risk perceptions ( Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & Mac-
Gregor, 2002 ). Emotions of anger and fear play key roles in whether to blow
the whistle (Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003). Fear increases risk 
aversion, while anger increases risk-seeking ( Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & 
Fischoff, 2003 ;  Lerner & Keltner, 2000 ). Control and uncertainty are key
drivers of emotional reactions to risk ( Lerner et al., 2003 ,  Lerner & Kelt-
ner, 2000 ). As whistleblowers debate the risks of blowing the whistle, they
must acknowledge the hazard of uncertainty as they navigate the unknown
risks, costs, and benefits of their possible actions.
For risks with known probabilities of outcomes, such as casinos, the 
weather (well, sometimes), or even the games sponsored by NT, logic and 
statistical thinking suffice for reasonable risk decisions ( Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011 ). But for risk judgments with unknown outcomes, like 
whistleblowing, intuition and emotional responses are needed for effective 
risk judgments. Although emotional responses to risk influence judgments 
( Finucane et al., 200 0), so does the whistleblowers’ perception of the abil-
ity of their actions to create change and successfully stop the wrongdoing.
The Extended Parallel Process Model 
The Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) of risk perception ( Witte,
1994 ,  Witte & Allen, 2000 ) proposes that whether we engage in risk 
depends on our perceptions of both the threat itself (How severe is it? 
How personally susceptible are we?) and also our perception of our abil-
ity to change the situation (self-efficacy, response efficacy). If we perceive 
risk to be low, we’re unlikely to try to enact changes. However, when we 
perceive threats to be high, we then consider our ability to create change 
through our actions. Specifically, we consider our own self-efficacy, our 
ability to successfully create change, and  response efficacy, our percep-
tion of how effective our available responses will be.
Many whistleblowers feel powerless to affect change in their situa-
tion ( Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008 ). In such cases, self-efficacy and 
response efficacy remain low. So instead of acting, these whistleblowers 
would choose simply to try to minimize their concern about the threat.
For PJS, his decision to blow the whistle reflects his perception of both 
high threat severity and high confidence in his ability to create change 
through his actions. Without that confidence, he would have felt power-
less. The risks that whistleblowers tolerate reflect how they perceive and 
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Whistleblowing and Risk 
Whistleblowing increases professional, personal, and reputation risks 
for whistleblowers. Whistleblowers report high levels of stress, anxiety,
depression, and feelings of isolation ( Miceli & Near, 1992 ;  Rothschild &
Miethe, 1999 ). Exposing organizational wrongdoing frequently presents 
“dire consequences to whistleblowers, to their careers, and to their per-
sonal lives as a result of their actions” (Johnson, 2003, p. 74). At its
core, whistleblowing is an act of resistance ( Rothschild & Miethe, 1999 ).
Because whistleblowers seek to create change ( Near & Miceli, 1995 ), it 
can make them threatening to organizations.
Context and personality differences also influence whether a potential
whistleblower chooses to speak out. For example, people with a strong
sense of public service are more apt to risk blowing the whistle ( Brewer &
Selden, 1998 ;  Perry & Wise, 1990 ).Whistleblowers are also more likely to
act when they feel affected personally (Near & Miceli, 1985). Perceptions
of the overall goodness or badness of an event strongly influence risk behav-
iors ( Slovic et al., 2002 ). Whistleblowers are also much more likely to act
when the wrongdoing is both consistent and recurring (Miceli et. al, 2008).
People who choose to blow the whistle put themselves in dangerous 
positions, frequently suffering organizational and individual repercus-
sions ( Rehg, Miceli, Near, & Van Scotter, 2008 ). Perceptions of retaliation 
influence whistleblower behavior ( Miceli et al., 2008 ). Whistleblowers feel 
isolation and often endure hardship from people both within and outside 
the organization ( McGlynn & Richardson, 2014 ). Previous research on 
whistleblowing and risk focuses largely on the risks of exposing organi-
zational wrongdoing. However, each whistleblowing case is unique, since 
context and industry factors individualize them ( Richardson & McG-
lynn, 2011 ).
In the case of PJS, we learn that the risks facing prospective whistle-
blowers extend beyond possible retaliation. They can also come with 
choosing not to speak up.
Risk in the Case of PJS 
Whistleblowers, such as PJS, must weigh the risks of blowing the whis-
tle against the risks of remaining silent and possibly being complicit in 
the organizational wrongdoing. Some people remain silent out of self-
defense, thinking it lets them separate themselves from the wrongdoing.
They basically attempt to shut down their thinking and feeling processes.
PJS, more honest with himself, couldn’t do that. In his narrative (Chapter 
1), he asks himself five questions, weighing the practical and emotional 
consequences of speaking out: 
Would blowing the whistle mean giving up a comfortable and pres-
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choice now, given that I was working for a governmentally owned 
operation that had a monopoly on a tremendously profitable mar-
ket? Was the only option to finally face myself and live with the con-
sequences? Moreover, was a failure to face myself the real reason for 
the internal disorder that had shadowed me for years? 
Here, he specifes with remarkable clarity the risks he confronts. These 
questions describe multiple types of risk, including personal risks (“giv-
ing up a comfortable and prestigious life”), professional risks (“Would 
I be able to get another job?”), and emotional risks (“Was a failure to 
face myself the real reason for internal disorder that had shadowed 
me for years?”). He also describes the double-edged nature of the risk 
(“Did I even have a choice now?”) and the mounting urgency to make 
his choice (“Was the only option to fnally face myself and live with the 
consequences?”). 
PJS’s story illustrates various types of risk encountered by whistleblow-
ers. His experience describes professional, financial, and social risks. PJS 
also describes risks to his own sense of self. His story portrays two risks,
battling each other head-on. If he blows the whistle, he makes himself 
vulnerable from a professional and financial situation. But if he chooses 
to accept the wrongdoing and allow NT to continue flouting its national 
trust, he risks loss of all self-respect. These emotional, affective deci-
sion inputs frequently motivate actions ( Slovic et al., 2006 ). Emotional 
responses to risk stimuli reflect the overall feeling of goodness or badness 
in choosing one’s course of action ( Finucane et al., 2000 ). PJS poignantly 
confesses: 
You come to a point internally where you really have to take some 
tough decisions for yourself. And this was one of the decisive points 
of my professional life, in terms that—I had thought of the whole 
summer. What I did really defined me as a person—can I continue 
like this or can I do what I know, as a certainty, is the right thing to 
do? And that’s—shall I practice what I preach? . . . I concluded this is 
all about my character and what I do now.
For PJS, the threat of losing his self-approval, his dignity, fnally out-
weighed professional and fnancial risks—to his job, to his farm, to his 
family. 
PJS’s decision to blow the whistle was motivated in part by his desire 
to make the invisible visible, to reveal to himself his potential or ideal 
self. He wishes, also, to avoid the negative feeling of unfulfillment, of 
potential wasted. He felt “as if a shadow were following me—a feeling of 
general unhappiness about where my life had taken me.” This emotional 
context is critical to understanding the process of PJS’s risk decision. He 
states the multi-dimensional nature of his risk decision when he says, elo-
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carry, but must face.”The emotional discontent, or negative affect ( Slovic &
Peters, 2006 ), that PJS felt for his current place in life, created a desire to 
avoid that outcome and to take a risk on creating a better outcome for 
himself. As he describes it, “But my unsettledness pressed on me, urging 
me to make some sort of radical life-change.” This beautifully illustrates 
prospect theory’s tenet that potential negative outcomes motivate risk-
seeking behavior ( Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 ).
PJS further describes the role of risk magnitude when evaluating the 
consequence of risk decisions: “What happens to the decision-making 
process in a company when critical voices are suppressed, when there is 
a feudal company culture that people quietly follow because the risk of 
speaking out seems too complicated and too consequential.” Similarly, he 
later asks, “Was I a part of something that was unhealthy, and that, if it 
became public, would be a disaster?” Here, PJS acknowledges the risk of 
becoming complicit in the wrongdoing, not to mention its potential mag-
nitude, expressing the duality of risk that whistleblowers face when they 
feel personally dirtied by the wrongdoing if they choose not to speak out.
Uncertainty motivates risk decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).
A key factor to PJS’s decision to blow the whistle was a sense of the 
speed and velocity to the magnitude and existence of the organizational 
wrongdoing. He says: “I felt out of place, in the wrong place. My efforts 
seemed to lead nowhere. Pressure mounted as the outside media and 
other stakeholders kept on digging into possible ‘company secrets.’ I was 
there, defending them with rapidly increasing discomfort.” In that last 
comment, he’s acknowledging that perceptions of risk increase as the 
threat moves closer. These comments indicate his need, and readiness, to 
reduce the uncertainty and to make his decision, as does this one: “With 
more certainty, it started to become clear to me that my self-confidence 
and ability to walk with my head held high in all kinds of situations had 
become easier.” He was “beyond the point of pretending. I was a man 
who knew too much, and I had reached a point where non-action was no 
longer an ethical option.”
Isolation and Duality of Support 
Even when successful at stopping the wrongdoing, whistleblowers often 
face risks of criticism and long-term social isolation from co-workers.
And it can be disquietly inconsistent—a combination of private support 
but public alienation ( McGlynn & Richardson, 2014 ). PJS illustrates the 
mixed signals here: “The new chair of the board and the interim CEO 
knew about my role and both of them expressed support, assuring me 
‘You did the right thing’ and ‘We will protect you.’ But those assurances 
failed to blot out my acute sense of isolation, nor did my guilt go away.”
During researcher interviews, PJS says he felt vindicated by an indepen-
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was that internally, the new permanent CEO never said that the whistle-
blower did the right thing.” Whistleblowers are in positions where they 
need more support than they ever needed before, but more often than 
not they are ignored in public by the same people who support them 
privately.
PJS describes the difficulty of seeking and receiving support from col-
leagues, saying: “I had hoped that the new permanent CEO would say 
something in the nature of giving me support when I came to work.
Well, I got a call from his secretary at quarter to 8 in the morning, say-
ing that you need to come to NT now because the CEO wants to have 
a meeting.  .  .  .” PJS talks specifically about the sense of isolation that 
whistleblowers risk: “I saw it as a big problem because I didn’t get any 
local support. And, I think that I knew at that point in time that my 
time was over in NT.” Here, PJS illustrates how the sense of isolation felt 
by whistleblowers ostracizes them from colleagues and threatens their 
former sense of self that was inseparable from their profession or their 
organization.
Whistleblowers may receive praise in private but may also be shunned 
in public by the same people ( McGlynn & Richardson, 2014 ). PJS offers 
a poignant description of the types and quality of support he received for 
exposing the wrongdoing at NT: 
I had telephone calls nonstop and a lot of supportive telephone calls.
And letters and other things as well which made me feel good. But,
very few from the company itself, very few if any. Well, from my 
close allies there, I had supportive comments, but it was very silent 
from the HR and the CEO. They never called. They didn’t call me in 
the afternoon to see how I was doing. I had a feeling that they really 
didn’t care, and that they cared more about the people who were 
angry. I think they probably did.
In his account, PJS describes feeling that the people upset by his expos-
ing of the issues at hand received greater attention and support from the 
CEO, even though he was the one who assumed the risk to call it out. PJS 
further articulates the duality of support received: 
A month and a half earlier, he [the CEO] had said I was his greatest 
supporter, I did a good job, etc. Now, I felt I was a liability for him 
and for the company. This followed a pattern that I had read about.
If you do blow the whistle, you have truly become a liability, no 
matter what you do.
He recalls a friend—a corruption expert—predicting just this isola-
tion and lack of support. Here was that frightening prediction: “Imagine 
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meeting a supertanker. That is how you will feel from now on. It will be 
you against everyone else!”Admitting that the isolation and lack of sup-
port had deleterious and engulfing effects on his morale, PJS says that 
“that feeling of being completely by yourself is sometimes—very over-
whelming. And it just swamps you and overwhelms you.”
Social Stigma 
Whistleblowers often describe the lasting stigma left by their decision 
to blow the whistle ( Richardson & McGlynn, 2011 ). PJS acknowledges 
fearing just that fate: “My story would undoubtedly follow me for the 
rest of my life. Who would dare to trust a whistleblower?”And again: “I 
felt that my situation in NT became increasingly vulnerable, in that if I 
suddenly one day was without a job, who would hire a person that had 
been—that could be connected to such a scandal?” Even friends and co-
workers tend to distance themselves from people who report unethical 
behavior. PJS says: 
It follows you throughout your life, I am convinced of. And I am 
convinced of, in listening to other people’s stories, that it does not 
bring very much good to your professional career because there will 
always be skeptics out there that will look at your history and per-
taining that you will bring your past into the present and perhaps do 
the same thing again and that you constitute a risk.
Ironically, in choosing to engage in risk to expose the wrongdoing, PJS 
actually became a risk to the organization. He acknowledges the com-
mon negative fate of whistleblowers, saying “you’re also infuenced by 
all the stories that you hear about the fate of whistleblowers, that they 
variously become squeezed out of the organization eventually. It follows 
them throughout their lives.” 
He describes himself as a sort of pariah, unwanted by either side, and 
fearing that the effects will linger forward. Talking about the difficulty of 
finding suitable employment, he states: “But that is something that other 
whistleblowers communicate as being one of the major problems in get-
ting rehired, for example. Would you want the person like this on board 
your company, that is perhaps your hidden enemy?” PJS worries that 
people see him as someone looking to hurt co-workers at every opportu-
nity, saying that others may think of him as “a person where you never 
know where you stand and that will always be behind you with a hidden 
weapon, ready to stab you when you least expect it.”
PJS later expounds on the unfortunate reaction from his co-workers in 
a situation in which he felt that they were working for the same side: “For 
me, it was a very sad ending to something I honestly thought we could 
have solved. But I probably was too naïve in terms of thinking that that 
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Outcomes 
PJS’s experience exposing wrongdoing by the CEO at NT echoes many of
the negative outcomes reported in the whistleblowing literature ( Near & 
Miceli, 1995 ;  Rothschild & Miethe, 1999 ). “Everything I had heard about 
blowing the whistle seemed to come true,” he says.
But, thankfully, the effects were not exclusively negative. As he 
embarked on a process of self-discovery throughout his ordeal, PJS also 
experienced significant personal growth, and with it, a gratifying sense 
of rebirth: 
On the other side though, in terms of personal development, some-
thing radical happened during that whole period of time. I had 
become very clear about who I was and what I wanted to do. I had 
been very conscientious about my own value platform and that was 
not a platform that you could exercise whenever you chose. I had 
to exercise it every day, both at home and at work. So, I think I’ve 
become a much better human being and a much better leader just 
having gone through that process.
In this account, PJS describes the clarity he received from choosing to 
engage in the risk to blow the whistle. He discusses the personal devel-
opment and radical change he experienced as the results of risk deci-
sion, citing his growth as a person, a leader, and a citizen. Reminding us 
of the driving motivation behind his actions, PJS sums it up this way: 
“I decided to do this because I thought if I did not, I would not be true 
to myself.” 
Conclusion 
This analysis sought to apply risk theory and research to reveal key influ-
ences experienced by PJS in the whistleblowing process, to lend insight 
into the psychological mechanisms that motivated PJS’s whistleblowing 
disclosure, and to describe risk factors that complicated his actions. He 
ultimately decided it was too big of a risk not to blow the whistle. For not 
to act was to acquiesce to the gnawing feeling of regret: it had been “as if 
a shadow were following me,”“of failing to accomplish anything mean-
ingful” ( Chapter 1 ). Blowing the whistle reflected his openness to risk in 
the face of potential lost opportunity ( Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 ). For 
PJS, the lost opportunity associated with inaction in the face of wrongdo-
ing posed a greater risk than any retribution or shaming.
Blowing the whistle is inherently risky, with unpredictable outcomes.
On the one hand, exposing organizational wrongdoing is bound to incur
retaliation, including threats, slander, and reputation costs ( Bhal  &
Dadhich, 2011 ). It’s an all-too-common experience for whistleblowers











   
     
   
  
   
   
   
   
     
    
  
   
 
     
    
   
  
  
   
     
 
     
  
      
    
   
  
  
   
 
     
 
148 Joseph McGlynn 
also risks to not blowing the whistle. By keeping quiet about suspected
or acknowledged wrongdoing is to feel complicit in it and to feel the
guilt that comes with discovering one’s cowardice and compromised
values.
PJS’s example describes social, organizational, and identity dynam-
ics that influence whistleblower risk judgments and behaviors. When 
assessing whistleblowing risk, people consider the likelihood of negative 
outcomes and the magnitude of costs of those outcomes occurring.Whis-
tleblowers often acknowledge the possibility of retaliation and negative 
outcomes but sometimes decide they must act. In the case of PJS and NT,
sometimes the safest course is to take a risk.
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 11 Hero or “Prince of Darkness”? 
Locating Peer Jacob Svenkerud 
in an Attributions-Based 
Typology of Whistleblowers 
Brian K. Richardson 
Did stakeholders consider whistleblower Peer Jacob Svenkerud (PJS) a 
“hero” or a “prince of darkness”? The answer depends on which stake-
holder you ask. Stakeholders include “any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objec-
tives” ( Freeman, 1984 , p. 46). One of their primary functions, then, is to 
grant (or withdraw) social legitimacy to the focal organization. Because 
whistleblowers’ accusations threaten organizations’ legitimacy, they’re 
often met with management retaliation. But if whistleblowers can garner 
stakeholder support, their chances of ending wrongdoing and preserving 
their positions are enhanced ( Sawyer, Johnson, & Holub, 2010 ). The 
PJS account offers us an opportunity to examine, in detail, stakeholder 
involvement in a high-profile whistleblowing case.The academic literature 
proves reductionistic in addressing how stakeholders view whistleblow-
ers. Rather than differentiating between them, most scholarship and 
media accounts cast them as heroes, the proverbial “David” taking on 
the corrupt “Goliath.” This ignores the reality that stakeholders might 
have very different perceptions of whistleblowers based on the attribu-
tions they make about them.
This chapter develops a more sophisticated approach to understanding 
how stakeholders, particularly those outside the organization, might cat-
egorize whistleblowers. After a brief literature review addressing motives 
and attribution theory, I propose a whistleblower typology followed by 
several theoretical propositions about how select stakeholders might per-
ceive a whistleblower. I then propose PJS’s location in the typology before 
using case details to assess the typology and associated propositions.
Whistleblower: Definitions and Typology 
Whistleblowers are commonly hailed as “heroes” and “saints” by some 
groups, namely the media, the general public, and victims of corporate 
malfeasance, while derided as “snitches,” “rats,” or “traitors” by the 
accused and those stakeholders who are dependent upon the focal orga-


























   
 
 
152 Brian K. Richardson 
certainly true of PJS, who found himself labeled the “prince of darkness,”
“man in black,” “weak,” and a “backstabber” by members of Norsk 
Tippingʼs (NT) leadership team but praised for his forthrightness by 
external auditors. Still, we actually know little about why stakeholders 
apply such labels to whistleblowers ( Heumann, Friedes, Redlawsk, Cas-
sak, & Kesari, 2015 ).
In developing a model describing types of whistleblowers, I rely on litera-
ture examining (1) the relationship between whistleblower definitions and
motives, (2) how stakeholders make sense of whistleblowers, (3) whistle-
blower attributes of credibility and legitimacy, and (4) attribution theory.
Whistleblowers’ Motives 
Some scholars contend that an individual who reports wrongdoing must
have pure or altruistic motives to properly qualify as a “whistleblower.” For
example, Grant (2002 ) argues that those who personally gain from their
reports—for example, through promotions or revenge against others— 
aren’t genuine whistleblowers. Conversely, many scholars acknowledge
that, though some individuals who blow the whistle do so for selfish rea-
sons, they are still whistleblowers ( Jubb, 1999 ;  Miceli & Near, 1997 ). They
contend that whistleblowers may be motivated by personal interests such
as seeking a promotion or settling personal scores ( Loyens, 2013 ), but as
long as wrongdoing is being revealed, their motivations are immaterial
( O’Sullivan & Ngau, 2014 ). As Bouville succinctly put it, a whistleblower
“making the right decision for the wrong reasons is still making the right
decision” ( 2008 , p. 583). I myself agree. Anyone who reports wrongdoing
to those who may be able to effect action ( Near & Miceli, 1985 ) mer-
its the title “whistleblower.” This is not to suggest, though, that motives
are unimportant; indeed, they can influence stakeholders’ perceptions of
whistleblowers, which can in turn influence whistleblowers’ eventual fate.
Stakeholders and Whistleblowing Cases 
Scholars are increasingly noting the potential influence stakeholders 
can bear on whistleblowing cases. In fact, Sawyer et al. (2010 ) contend 
that “whistleblowers usually lose” (p. 93) when stakeholders don’t get 
involved in their cases. Existing research, while limited, suggests stake-
holders make judgments about whistleblowers that could influence 
whether they support or retaliate against them. Teo and Caspersz (2011 ),
for example, found that employees of a small financial services organiza-
tion said they’d have a hard time trusting a whistleblower because they 
likened the activity to betrayal and backstabbing; further, they themselves 
wouldn’t want to be labeled a “whistleblower” for fear of ostracism.
Heumann et al. (2015 ) found that the general public holds widely dispa-
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whistleblowers as protectors of the public, 20% thought whistleblowers 
“held a grudge,” and 15% believed they are “out to ‘gain personally’”
(p. 11). Stakeholders presumably make similar inferences about whistle-
blowers’ motivations. Other research indicates stakeholders get involved 
in whistleblowing cases by actually becoming whistleblowers themselves 
( Johnson, Sellnow, Seeger, Barrett, & Hasbargen, 2004 ), or can retali-
ate against or ally with whistleblowers ( Richardson & McGlynn, 2011 ; 
Sawyer et al., 2010 ).
Different kinds of stakeholders might become involved in whistleblow-
ing cases. These include the mass media, regulatory agencies, the general 
public, and bystanders.All these stakeholders possess power and resources 
to aid or inhibit whistleblowers ( Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997 ). The 
mass media, including local and national news outlets with online and 
traditional platforms, can add legitimacy to whistleblowers’ reports or 
raise questions about their credibility ( Johnson et al., 2004 ). Regulatory 
agencies are able to offer support to a whistleblower so that real change 
can be brought to a context in which wrongdoing is occurring. Sawyer et al.
(2010 ) identified auditors, ombudsmen, and securities commissions as
important regulatory targets for whistleblowers’ allegations. The general 
public, too, now has a platform for offering support or detracting from 
a whistleblower’s claims ( Park & Jan, 2017 ). Finally, bystanders include 
innocent employees of the organization where wrongdoing is occurring 
and management of other organizations in the same industry.While these 
groups aren’t directly involved in the whistleblowing case and possess no 
mandate to address the allegations, whistleblowers could seek their sup-
port, thereby enhancing their credibility and legitimacy. Next, I review 
attribution theory which suggests stakeholders’ judgments of whistle-
blowers will be affected by their perceptions of whistleblowers’ motives.
Attribution Theory 
Jones, Spraakman, and Sànchez-Rodríguez (2014 ) believe that whistle-
blowing always involves some self-interest. I agree but would add that as 
the nature of that interest becomes known by stakeholders, they will judge 
the whistleblower accordingly. Attribution theory contends that people 
make interpretations about the causes of events that in turn affect their 
perceptions and responses ( Weiner, 1980 ). Initial judgments are affected 
by three dimensions: controllability, stability, and, related to this study,
locus.“Locus” refers to locus of control—that is, whether a behavior was 
under an individual’s volition or induced by external forces. Some whis-
tleblowers were involved in the unethical behavior they report, suggest-
ing internal control. Meanwhile, other whistleblowers were witnesses to 
wrongdoing caused by other individuals or groups. Kelsey, Kearney, Plax,
Allen, and Ritter (2004 ) found people ascribe internal attribution to neg-
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as “dishonest” or “unethical” people even if they later blew the whistle 
on this activity. Thus, it’s reasonable to expect most stakeholders to be 
critical of whistleblowers who were engaged in the very wrongdoing they 
are now exposing.
Another factor related to attribution is motivation, or the perceived
reason why someone engaged in a particular behavior.The decision to blow
the whistle can be motivated by either selfish or altruistic reasons.Altruistic
motivations are characterized as purely voluntary and are also not inspired
by the potential of rewards or to avoiding punishment, or being beneficial
to others ( Leeds, 1963 ). Conversely, selfish motives stem from individuals
personally benefitting from their actions ( Quigley, Gaes, & Tedeschi, 1989 ).
Weinstein, DeHaan, and Ryan (2010 ) found that when people make altru-
istic attributions about others’ helping behaviors, they are more thankful
and perceive the helper “as more generous, admirable, and as exhibiting
a larger number of positive and a smaller number of negative personality
characteristics” (p. 428). Conversely, we would expect that when stakehold-
ers attribute others’ behaviors to selfish reasons, they view them negatively.
Research indicates the public is less supportive of whistleblowers motivated
by self-interest than by altruism ( Heumann et al., 2015 ).
My proposed typology is developed along two dimensions that I believe 
are critical in stakeholders’ attributions of whistleblowers’ reports. First,
stakeholders take note of whether the whistleblower participated in or 
merely observed the alleged wrongdoing. The typology’s second dimen-
sion involves whether the whistleblower’s motives are altruistic or selfish.
Selfish reasons for blowing the whistle include seeking fame, revenge,
and financial reward ( Miceli & Near, 1997 ). Miceli and Near believe that 
stakeholders may disapprove when someone materially benefits from 
reporting wrongdoing.
The Typology 
In this section, I present the four types of whistleblowers. I call them 
the confessor, the jilted lover, the saint, and the opportunist. For each, I 
offer theoretical propositions related to stakeholders’ perceptions of their 
credibility and legitimacy.





The Confessor The Saint 
The Jilted Lover The Opportunist 
Figure 11.1 Typology of Whistleblowers 
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The Confessor (guilty + altruistic). The “Confessor” is the whistleblower
who participated in wrongdoing and is now reporting it for altruistic, soul-
cleansing reasons, in effect confessing their prior transgressions. Miceli
and Near (1997 ) acknowledge wrongdoers may be motivated to blow the
whistle on their own actions if their conscience is bothering them.This lat-
ter reason, as well as the person using the wrongdoing to promote a larger
cause, represents altruistic reasons for a wrongdoer to turn whistleblower.
The Jilted Lover (guilty + selfish). This whistleblower type, like the 
Confessor, engaged in wrongdoing but is motivated to report it for selfish 
reasons, such as revenge, chest-beating, or material gain.
The Opportunist (innocent + selfish).“Opportunists” are whistleblow-
ers who observed wrongdoing and reported it for selfish, or opportu-
nistic, reasons. Heumann, Friedes, Cassak, Wright, and Joshi (2013 ) use 
the term “avenger” to refer to whistleblowers whose motives are largely 
revenge or retributive.While this is certainly true of whistleblowers in the 
opportunist type, not all of them aim to hurt other individuals. Some will 
use their whistleblowing for material benefit.
The Saint (innocent observer + altruistic). “Saints” are whistleblowers 
who have observed wrongdoing and are reporting it for altruistic reasons.
The Saint resembles Heumann et al.’s (2013 ) “altruist”—the whistle-
blower who “sees an evil, objects fearlessly, and fights valiantly within,
and even beyond, the organization for the sake of justice and remedy”
(p. 40). He or she “is the conscience of the organization, standing, per-
sonally and directly to gain nothing from the proven truth of the claims 
made” (p. 40).
Propositions 
I now discuss two resources critical to whistleblowers’ effectiveness that 
will be presented as part of theoretical propositions.
Credibility. Credibility is one of the most regularly cited factors for 
explaining whistleblowing effectiveness ( Guthrie, Norman, & Rose,
2012 ), as it enhances the possibility that it will influence top manage-
ment to correct wrongdoing ( Near & Miceli, 1985 ,  1995 ). The scholars 
contend that stakeholders’ perceptions of credibility are tied to whistle-
blowers’ motives, whether they are focused on helping others or serving 
their own interests; whistleblowers possessing altruistic motives are more 
likely to achieve desired changes, whereas those perceived as possess-
ing selfish motives may have their claims disregarded altogether. Johnson 
et al. (2004 ) suggest whistleblowers often use the mass media to bring 
attention to their claims; whistleblowers perceived as high in credibil-
ity are more likely to have the media treat their reports as serious and 
worthwhile. Sawyer et al. (2010 ) suggest management retaliation against 
whistleblowers is employed to undercut their credibility, which in turn 
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Legitimacy. Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and defini-
tions” ( Suchman, 1995 , p. 77). Stakeholders can confer legitimacy upon 
organizations and individuals; however, they can also take away this 
resource which is associated with organizational survival and personal 
influence ( Sawyer et al., 2010 ). Sawyer et al. suggest whistleblowers are 
stakeholders of their organizations. But without legitimacy conferred 
by more powerful stakeholders, they often lack power to end wrongdo-
ing. Whistleblowers who acquire the support of powerful stakeholders,
such as the Department of Justice, increase their chances of success. Fur-
ther, the whistleblower’s legitimacy possesses a negative correlation with 
the organization’s legitimacy—that is, as the whistleblower’s legitimacy 
increases, the organization’s decreases. Thus, accused organizations often 
use retaliation to reduce a whistleblower’s perceived legitimacy ( Sawyer 
et al., 2010 ). I contend legitimacy is a critical resource for whistleblow-
ers, at least partly determining their ability to get key audiences to listen 
to their claims.
Since research finds that individuals, including whistleblowers, who 
are motivated by altruism will be held in higher regard than their selfish 
counterparts (Heumann et al., 2013; Weinstein et al., 2010 ), we expect 
altruistic and innocent whistleblowers to generate more positive percep-
tions about their actions than their selfish, guilty counterparts. It follows 
that the Saint and the Confessor will have the most altruistic attribu-
tions bestowed upon them, as they are acting to help the situation. Since 
Saints aren’t tainted by participation in the unethical behavior, they will 
be perceived as more legitimate than Confessors. Conversely, we would 
expect when stakeholders attribute others’ behaviors to selfish reasons,
they see them negatively, suggesting the Opportunist and Jilted Lover are 
found low in legitimacy. Since the Jilted Lover is tainted by participation 
in wrongdoing, he or she would be viewed as less legitimate than the 
Opportunist. Thus: 
Proposition 1: Stakeholder groups will perceive the Saint as the most 
legitimate whistleblower, followed by the Confessor, the Oppor-
tunist, and the Jilted Lover.
Credibility. Stewart (1980 ) recognized the importance of credibility when 
she argued that whistleblowers “are more likely to be heard and believed 
if they appear to lose from their act” (p. 95). With regard to the news 
media, Liebes and Blum-Kulka (2004 ) contend that those whistleblowers 
most eager to tell their stories are less trustworthy and the information 
they report is tainted, suggesting that whistleblowers who report for self-
ish reasons are viewed as less credible. Johnson et al. (2004 ) contend that 
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pigeon, then credibility is questioned and the message has less impact” 
(p. 356). In light of this literature, I offer the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Stakeholder groups will perceive the Saint as the most 
credible whistleblower, followed by the Confessor, the Opportun-
ist, and the Jilted Lover.
Retaliation. Alleged wrongdoers and others in an organization often 
employ retaliatory measures against whistleblowers ( Richardson & 
McGlynn, 2011 ;  Rothschild & Miethe, 1999 ). Retaliation is used to 
lower the whistleblower’s perceived credibility and legitimacy ( Sawyer 
et al., 2010 ). For example, Richardson and McGlynn (2011 ) found that 
organizations use tactics such as isolation, labeling, and interpersonal 
conflict to discredit whistleblowers. I anticipate that the more credible 
and legitimate a whistleblower is perceived to be, the more retaliation 
they will encounter. Thus, I propose the following: 
Proposition 3: The Saint, followed by the Confessor, the Opportun-
ist, and the Jilted Lover, will receive the maximum retaliation.
Properly testing these theoretical propositions will require comparative 
cases beyond that of PJS’s. Still, the rich data related to his case, provided 
by interviews, internal documents, and media stories, offer an opportu-
nity for preliminary assessment of the typology. In other words, the PJS 
case is useful for an initial assessment of the typology and its associated 
propositions. I now locate PJS within the typology. 
Locating PJS Within the Typology 
PJS appears to represent the “Saint” type of whistleblower. According 
to the interview data, he reported wrongdoing for altruistic reasons. For 
example, when discussing his growing confidence that blowing the whis-
tle was necessary, he said: 
If Norsk Tipping said that we were responsible, we had to show it.
It’s time for it. I think basically I thought, ‘if I leave now and do not 
stick up what I have preached, or what I have communicated to the 
company and to the surroundings, that would be unfair to whom I 
wanted to be.”
Identity statements, such as “. . . whom I wanted to be,” are cues for 
altruistic motives as they refect the whistleblower speaking out as a 
result of his internal values. It further appears that PJS was largely an 
innocent bystander to unethical behavior, though he does confess to ben-
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mentions having attended a gaming conference in South Africa at which 
a client of NT “paid all the bills. All the alcohol, all the dinners, round-
ing up tens of thousands of crowns in costs and we never questioned it. 
I was in on it.” Involvement in wrongdoing would shift PJS’s categori-
zation to a Confessor, one who was involved in wrongdoing but is not 
reporting it for altruistic reasons. Despite this admission to at least some 
participation in various excessive spending, I would still categorize PJS as 
a Saint whistleblower. There is no evidence that stakeholders knew of his 
participation in this particular event nor was it an egregious violation of 
ethical protocol. Even as his identity as whistleblower became public, he 
was never accused of beneftting from wrongdoing by his fellow adminis-
trators. PJS’s case reveals an important aspect of the proposed typology: 
stakeholders perceived PJS as an innocent bystander and thus he was 
treated as one. Perception was reality. 
PJS’s anonymity, particularly early in the case, reveals a possible limita-
tion of the typology. For much of the case, stakeholders didn’t know who 
had blown the whistle at NT, so they were unable to make judgments 
about the whistleblower’s motives. The present model does not account 
for anonymity. Based upon existing literature, stakeholders will ques-
tion the motives of anonymous whistleblowers or assign motives that are 
inaccurate ( Elliston, 1982 ). Indeed, PJS recognized that his anonymity 
allowed the CEO to develop an unflattering narrative about “the whistle-
blower.” PJS said: 
And that was a big handicap of being anonymous and being in the 
role that I was. The CEO and others were able to establish a picture 
of a person that just wanted him out, that was a hidden enemy that 
ran behind him with a knife, ready to stab him in the back. It took 
several years before I could say anything. I was completely helpless 
in that aspect.
While it appears the proposed typology might be limited to open whistle-
blowers, stakeholders can and do make attributions of anonymous ones. 
But these attributions may be inaccurate. Further, if sympathetic stake-
holders don’t know the identity of a whistleblower, the most support 
they can provide is indirect. Thus, whether a whistleblower is known or 
anonymous should be added as a dimension to the model. 
While the data don’t allow a direct comparison between PJS and other 
whistleblowers, he appeared to possess high credibility and legitimacy 
with those stakeholders who knew his identity. As a Saint whistleblower,
this is expected; he isn’t tarnished by either participation in wrongdoing 
or blowing the whistle for selfish reasons.When PJS revealed his identity 
as the whistleblower to the auditors, they followed his lead as they inves-
tigated the company. They even praised him as “the whistleblower” in 
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PJS’s veracity. The media also treated PJS with reverence in their account 
that publicly outed him as the whistleblower. His perception of the story 
was that “everything was correct.” In addition, he viewed other external 
stakeholders, such as members of the Norwegian Athletic Association 
(NAA) and communications consultants, as supporting his efforts: 
A senior executive of the Norwegian Athletic Association was very 
supportive, and very vocal about what he thought was wrong. . . . I 
also had some consultants that I used that were experts on communi-
cations. And they were, of course, very supportive because they said,
‘You’re doing the right thing. There is absolutely no question about 
it. You just need to stick to it.’ 
External stakeholders treated PJS as a credible, legitimate source. While 
we lack direct evidence confrming their support for him, I believe his 
lack of involvement in unethical behavior and his altruistic motivations 
facilitated it. Based upon the propositions described earlier, he received 
more support than he would have had he been one of the other types 
of whistleblowers because of lowered perceptions of his credibility and 
legitimacy. 
Finally, the model proposes that a Saint whistleblower typically faces 
greater retaliation than the other types in an attempt to reduce their cred-
ibility and legitimacy. Recall what happened when PJS was called to a 
meeting with other NT executives shortly after the news media outed 
him. There, he was put on the carpet, questioned about his authority,
and criticized by several of his colleagues. For roughly a year and a half,
from January 2010 to July 2011, NT’s new permanent CEO consis-
tently sent him unsolicited and mixed messages about his role within 
the firm. PJS exited it when he determined that his prior status in the 
company would never be regained. I am left wondering if this is the fate 
of many Saint whistleblowers. Saints are pure; they didn’t participate in 
wrongdoing, and they blew the whistle for honorable reasons. An incom-
ing CEO will assemble a new executive team, and while they may not 
have engaged in unethical behavior themselves, they may not trust the 
Saint whistleblower when they attempt to navigate the gray spaces of 
the organizational bureaucracy. After all, “it is normally assumed that 
the whistleblower will re-offend, that is, once a whistleblower, always a 
whistleblower” ( Sawyer et al., 2010 , p. 98).
Conclusion 
Whistleblowing doesn’t occur in a vacuum ( Gundlach, Douglas, & 
Martinko, 2003 ;  Vadera, Aguilera, & Caza, 2009 ). Individuals con-
templating whether to blow the whistle may be influenced by various 
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et al., 2003 ), support from top management ( Vadera et al., 2009 ), or 
peer-group pressure ( Ash, 2016 ). Once they blow the whistle, if they’re 
lucky they’ll enjoy social support offered by co-workers or peers ( McG-
lynn & Richardson, 2014 ). Thus, scholars have identified how elements 
internal to the organization influence whistleblowing. My purpose here 
was to contribute to the emerging research investigating how external
groups impact whistleblowing decisions and outcomes ( Heumann et al.,
2015 ;  Sawyer et al., 2010 ). The PJS-NT case offers, in rich detail, the 
opportunity to explore relationships among elements of whistleblowing 
often overlooked in research, including whistleblower motives, (external) 
stakeholder involvement, and anonymity.
It’s reasonable to wonder whether PJS would have become a whistle-
blower without the influence of key stakeholders. Indeed, stakeholder 
involvement was present throughout his whistleblowing process. Early 
on, representatives of the NAA raised concerns with him about how NT 
utilized its financial resources. Similarly, a prominent journalist ques-
tioned the relationship between the CEOs of NT and one of the com-
pany’s primary vendors. It’s possible these stakeholders reinforced PJS’s 
concerns about NT’s business practices, emboldening him to speak out.
As the case progressed, he received critical social support for his cause 
from several stakeholders, including a senior executive of the NAA.
However, because of his anonymity, it’s unclear whether he could have 
garnered more stakeholder support, which might have altered the trajec-
tory of the case. Another stakeholder, the news media, eventually outed 
PJS as the whistleblower but did so evenhandedly. It was apparent jour-
nalists perceived PJS as a credible whistleblower arguably because of his 
lack of involvement in wrongdoing and his altruistic reasons for blowing 
the whistle. Unfortunately, this outing likely led to PJS’s pressured exit 
from the organization.
The PJS case raises questions about why external stakeholders become 
involved in whistleblowing cases. At present, much of the whistleblow-
ing literature either ignores the presence and influence of external stake-
holders or fails to explain why and how these stakeholders may become 
involved in these cases. To address this gap in our understanding of 
whistleblowing, I used the PJS case as an impetus to develop a typol-
ogy of whistleblowers based on their culpability (or innocence) in the 
wrongdoing and their motives (altruistic or selfish) for blowing the whis-
tle (altruistic or selfish). I then located PJS within the typology to assess 
it and relevant propositions, which revealed that stakeholder  perceptions
about whistleblower motives and culpability are key; stakeholders either 
were unaware of PJS’s minimal involvement in the lavish vendor celebra-
tion or didn’t think it rose to the level of unethical behavior. The case fur-
ther reveals the importance of whether a whistleblower is anonymous or 
known. PJS received minimal direct support from key stakeholders during 
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should be added to the model as an important dimension. While com-
parative data were not available, PJS seemed to fit the profile of the Saint 
whistleblower. He appeared to be viewed as credible and legitimate by 
external stakeholders. Unfortunately, though, he appeared too “pure” for 
NT’s new CEO, who  may have questioned PJS’s loyalty had he remained 
with the firm. This suspicion likely led to PJS’s exit from the company. As 
it relates to the model, the Saint whistleblower (PJS) experienced severe 
retaliation for his reports of wrongdoing.
The exploration of the PJS case within the proposed typology offers 
promise for research into whistleblowing processes; still, further inquiries 
are required to determine support for the model and the propositions I’ve 
advanced. For example, researchers could conduct experiments assessing 
how stakeholders perceive whistleblowers based upon their innocence/ 
culpability and whether they possessed altruistic/selfish motives for blow-
ing the whistle. Interpretive scholars could closely examine case studies to 
determine if additional dimensions, such as communication channels, are 
relevant to how stakeholders perceive whistleblowers. Until such research 
is executed, we are relying on a “one size fits all” approach for under-
standing how stakeholders perceive whistleblowers that may have limited 
usefulness and functionality. After all, without the involvement and sup-
port of key stakeholders, PJS may never have become a whistleblower.
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Stakeholder 
Crisis, Issues, and the Stakeholder Voice 
Audra Diers-Lawson 
The company was suffering from my presence, given what had happened.
‘You have done a very good job,’ he [the new permanent CEO] said, ‘but 
it’s time to go. Your mission is accomplished.’ . .  . I was puzzled. I was 
in shock. A month and a half earlier, he had said I was his greatest sup-
porter . . . Now, I was a liability for the company—not just for him, but 
for the company. This followed a pattern that I had read about. If you 
do blow the whistle, you have truly become a liability, no matter what 
you do. 
—Peer Jacob Svenkerud 
Throughout this book, we have dipped in and out of the riveting experi-
ence of Peer Jacob Svenkerud (PJS) as a whistleblower at NT. Yet, for me 
the foregoing passage is perhaps the most moving of all, as it encapsulates 
the profound sadness and utter loneliness of his protracted ordeal. In 
exposing NTs transgression, he triggered a major crisis. He also fomented 
much-needed reforms there. But, ironically, he also became, in the eyes 
of many, the very personification of the NT scandal, even though he was 
not at fault. His experience bears our close attention. In crisis commu-
nication, we typically hear narratives of recovery and renewal, or we 
hear from internal and external stakeholders about their surprise and 
dismay at some scandal, or we hear about what the organization did well 
and could have done better, or we hear about the external stakeholders 
affected by the crisis. Yet, we seldom are afforded a glimpse into the 
employee’s momentous decision whether to stay silent or blow the whis-
tle, and what happens to them in the aftermath of speaking out ( Chen & 
Lai, 2014 ;  Edwards, Lawrence, & Ashkanasy, 2016 ;  Heide & Simonsson,
2015 ).
This underscores a point that Frandsen and Johansen (2016 ) made: cri-
ses are especially challenging to analyze because they represent the inter-
section of many stakeholder voices and perspectives on an organization 
and situation. My purpose here is to explore whistleblowing from a crisis 
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duality of experience—as both initiator and casualty of the crisis—reveals 
new insights into our understanding of crises and crisis communication.
PJS’s experience broadens our understanding of the complexity of crises 
in general, as well as the unique components of those crises triggered by 
whistleblowing. It helps us to better understand that the relationships 
among crisis issues, stakeholders, and the organization are indeed multi-
layered and fluid.
For example, in a case like this, the question of blame attribution is both 
easy and hard to answer. It’s easy because we have a well-substantiated 
transgression—a situation in which the organization has clearly done 
something wrong ( Diers-Lawson, 2017a ). Yet, because it has also been 
triggered by a whistleblower, other stakeholders—both within and out-
side the company—may view him not as a hero but as a villain or at least 
a problem. This makes blame attribution less a question of the facts of 
a situation than a question of perception and competing interests. Thus,
PJS’s account of his experience as a whistleblower provides a telling
example of competing stakeholder interests in the crisis context.
To better understand the NT case and the challenges of sorting out 
competing stakeholder interests in crises, I frame whistleblowing within 
the crisis context, discuss a stakeholder relationship-management approach 
to understanding whistleblowing, and discuss PJS’s experience through-
out to help unpack the difficulties in managing whistleblowing from a 
crisis perspective.
Whistleblowing in the Crisis Context 
From the first formal study of crises and crisis communication in the 
mid-20th century to the turn of the 21st century, a crisis was generally 
thought of as a “low probability, high-impact event that threatens the 
viability of the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of cause,
effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must 
be made quickly” ( Pearson & Clair, 1998 , p. 60). This definition of cri-
sis was subsequently supported by the body of research that emerged 
throughout the past 40 years. Over time, both practitioners and academ-
ics further recognized that crises are also increasingly ill-structured and 
complex ( Mitroff, Alpaslan, & Green, 2004 ), particularly in an increas-
ingly global and connected world.
But, thanks to the greater volume of research, diversity of theoretical 
perspectives, and internationalization in crisis communication over the 
past 15 years or so, how we define a crisis has also evolved ( Diers-Lawson,
2017a ). Instead of thinking of crises as low-probability and high-impact 
events with ambiguous causes and outcomes, we now typically think of 
them as “untimely but predictable events that have actual or potential 
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organization” ( Heath & Millar, 2004 , p. 2). This means that while  Pear-
son and Clair’s (1998 ) definition of “crisis” describes  some types of crisis,
what we generally understand to be a crisis requires a more sophisticated 
understanding of the connection among risk, triggers, and stakeholder 
impact. As such, the precipitating events for crises can actually range 
considerably—from circumstances entirely beyond an organization’s
control, to the careless mistakes of individuals within an organization,
to systematic breakdowns or inefficiencies, and to many circumstances 
in between ( Argenti, 2002 ;  King, 2002 ;  Pearson & Clair, 1998 ;  Reilly,
1987 ). A modern understanding of “crisis” provides a strong conceptual 
underpinning for understanding the NT case, helping us to understand 
that while many crises are predictable and avoidable, the evolution of 
those crises and their impact on different stakeholders remain damaging 
for both the organization and the stakeholders.
The NT case also helps to demonstrate three characteristics of crises 
that are consistent no matter what events precipitate them.
First, crises are inherently public in nature ( Moore, 2004 ). The NT 
scandal proved impossible to contain. As some facts of financial mis-
management began to emerge and then as information about the whistle-
blowing also emerged, it was played out incessantly—in the local press,
the local community, and even in the broader national community. Addi-
tionally, given the company’s prestigious standing in its hometown and 
the potential implications of it, there was little respite for the company— 
or for PJS himself.
Second, while crises happen to or because of an organization, its mem-
bers do not exist in isolation. Crises affect lots of people—not just those 
within the organization but also those in the community, country, and 
region(s) in which it operates. This means that crisis management and 
crisis communication should always be focused on the people and groups 
with an interest in the organization and its activities, namely, its stake-
holders ( Freeman, 1999 ). The NT crisis was clearly divisive for PJS, NT,
and the local community, not to mention a network of organizations 
affected by the situation. In PJS’s narrative, this is why we see the often-
times contradictory praise, condemnation, and questioning of his actions: 
each stakeholder involved was viewing the crisis and his or her actions 
from the perspective of their own interests.
Third, the core stake at risk in a crisis is the relationship between an 
organization and its stakeholder(s). If these relationships fail, the out-
comes of that failure can range from reputational damage to the whole-
sale failure of the organization and/or its mission. By the same token,
if these relationships are ultimately strengthened, then an organization 
can prosper despite the crisis—or perhaps even because of it. Herein lies 
one of the inherent contradictions of a whistleblowing crisis.Where PJS’s 
integrity and self-sacrifice as a whistleblower were celebrated by many 















   
Norsk Tipping’s Loneliest Stakeholder 167 
“dark knight” and represented a liability for NT, both because many 
colleagues now feared him and because he was a constant reminder of 
the company’s misdeeds. One could assume NT believed it would be 
more difficult for the company to reconstruct its reputation so long as he 
remained an employee.
Yet, despite his often tumultuous journey, Peer is also able to step out-
side of himself as a whistleblower to analyze his situation with its various 
organizational challenges, and to reflect on the decision-making process 
that brought him to finally speak up. In their analysis of processes like 
his, Chen and Lai (2014 ) found that the choice to blow the whistle rep-
resented a relatively rational ethical decision-making framework where 
the whistleblower balanced the moral exigencies of the situation against 
the potential harms and social pressures he might face after exposing the
wrongdoing. These findings are consistent with numerous studies examin-
ing the employee perspective on whistleblowing. They have found that 
organizational and contextual factors shape employee perceptions and 
emotions and will ultimately predict either whistleblowing or silence in 
the face of transgressions ( Edwards et al., 2016 ;  Grimm, Choo, Hor-
vath, & Nitta, 2016 ;  Liu, Liao, & Wei, 2015 ;  Mesmer-Magnus & Viswes-
varan, 2005 ). In PJS’s case, we see the internal conflict play out between 
the categorical imperative he felt—to be a socially responsible citizen and 
employee—and the unspoken expectations that went with being a good 
team member, or loyalist. His ultimate advocacy meant that his own 
understanding of “loyal” was not the same as how others at NT defined 
it. These conflicting value systems inevitably took their toll on his abil-
ity to manage his professional and interpersonal relationships within the 
organization. He felt trapped—and indeed was.
This case also provides an important and often ignored narrative about 
transgressions in organizations—the emotional journey that employees 
take through the crisis, no matter whether they are whistleblowers or 
simply onlookers trying to make sense of the unfolding events. In cri-
sis communication, we often focus exclusively on external stakeholders,
ignoring the employee voices and perspectives that are vital to manag-
ing issues and crises alike ( Heide & Simonsson, 2015 ;  Mazzei, Kim, & 
Dell’Oro, 2012 ;  Mazzei & Ravazzani, 2014 ). As such, the question of 
how an organization might best manage a crisis may be better under-
stood in the context of whistleblowing, as it lets us evaluate the quality 
of relationships between organizations and their many different kinds of 
stakeholders during and after a crisis goes public.
Whistleblowing and Stakeholder Relationship Management 
If we are to talk about whistleblowing within a stakeholder framework, then 
it’s important to better understand the nature of the voices and perspec-
tives that stakeholders can represent.At the simplest level,“stakeholders”
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are those groups or individuals who can affect or be affected by an orga-
nization ( Freeman, 1994 ). But as straightforward as this definition seems,
the degree to which stakeholder voices and perspectives are actually inte-
grated with organizational objectives and behaviors will depend on the 
nature of the relationship among them. Much of the foundational work 
in stakeholder theory in organizational communication ( Connolly, Con-
lon, & Deutsch, 1980 ;  Frooman, 1999 ;  Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999 ; 
Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997 ;  Rowley, 1997 ) identifies the  dimensions 
of interorganizational relationships as characterized by five factors.
First, relational valence describes the relative affect—positive to
negative—that’s felt between an organization and a stakeholder ( Atkins &
Lowe, 1994 ). Not surprisingly, for whistleblowers, that relationship can 
be highly adversarial. For example, PJS’s experience of finding himself 
characterized as a “dark knight,” plus the replacement CEO’s apparent 
campaign not only to root out the anonymous whistleblower but also 
the ongoing efforts to push him out of NT once the organization was 
in a post-crisis recovery mode, all prove the negativity—the negative
valence—that whistleblowers can face as stakeholders.
The second factor is the history of interaction between organizations 
and particular stakeholders that allows for structures and rituals of inter-
action to emerge ( Harris, 1994 ;  Jennings, Artz, Gillin, & Christodou-
loy, 2000 ;  Scott & Lane, 2000 ;  Trice & Beyer, 1993 ). To illustrate the 
employee history at NT, PJS characterized the organizational culture as 
being subdued: any employees who asked too many questions “could 
face consequences.” His predecessor was removed, Peer says, because he 
had questioned the company’s approach too much.
The third factor focuses on an organization’s assessment of a stake-
holder group’s  legitimacy—that is, its recognizability, reputation, and/or 
expertise relevant to the organization’s core work ( Haley, 1996 ;  Such-
man, 1995 ). For example, NT’s go-along, get-along culture seemed to 
be supported by other stakeholders such as unions. PJS described the 
union members as “loyal soldiers” who never challenged management.
This suggests that dissenting views, voices, and interests at NT had been 
effectively delegitimized.
Fourth, the power that a stakeholder has, or doesn’t have, to influ-
ence the organization or its success will affect their relationship with the 
organization ( Heath, 1994 ;  Mitchell et al., 1997 ). Recall PJS describing 
his early days of acculturation in the organization. It became clear to 
him that even though he and a number of external stakeholders would 
have welcomed changes both to the sponsorship programs and to NT’s 
approach to gaming, their perspectives weren’t valued by the company,
so their influence was limited, and early opportunities to avoid the larger 
crises to follow weren’t taken.
Fifth is the urgency of a stakeholder’s interest in the organization.
“Urgency” refers to the extent to which a stakeholder’s interest or
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a particular time ( Connolly et al., 1980 ;  Mitchell et al., 1997 ;  Scott & 
Lane, 2000 ). In PJS’s case, once he was outed by a Norwegian financial 
newspaper, NT’s new CEO had to engage the employees directly about 
that news. Unfortunately, where the CEO had previously supported PJS’s 
role as a whistleblower, PJS interpreted his actions in that they were now 
framed to the employees in terms of the “complications” they would 
cause NT instead of as a prime opportunity for them all to learn and 
improve. This important departure in the CEO’s narrative and sensemak-
ing about the crisis from PJS’s point of view marked a change in the 
nature of their relationship based on the urgency of addressing PJS’s role 
as both an employee and as the whistleblower.
Complexity Within Organizational Environments 
One of the best lessons we can learn from PJS’s experience is just how 
complex, challenging, and changeable crises will seem once we consider 
the environments in which organizations operate. Both organizations and 
organizational actors are subject to many pressures because they serve 
multiple stakeholders ( Connolly et al., 1980 ;  Frooman, 1999 ). These
stakeholders range widely. They can include groups such as employees,
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But, complicating matters still further, even these interactions between 
organizations and stakeholders happen not in isolation but rather in a 
web of relationships ( Rowley, 1997 ). In fact, Fombrun (1982 ) suggests 
that we should think of an organization’s environment as a series of over-
lapping networks that help to explain why organizations act, or do not 
act, and even how they perform. Furthermore, Heath (1994 ) argues that 
what an organization is and does is really just an outcome of managing 
all of the interests of all the stakeholders it values. Thus, a prime purpose 
of communication is to help an organization and its stakeholders enact 
and manage their relationships ( Heath, 1994 ).
But as PJS’s experience demonstrates, stakeholders not only demand 
different forms of engagement but also have vastly different expectations 
as well. So where  Frandsen and Johansen (2016 ) describe crises as the 
intersection of different voices and perspectives, we should probably be 
thinking of crises as cases in which organizations have failed to meet at 
least one important stakeholder expectation. Sometimes crises will arise 
because of competitive stakeholder interests. In the case of NT, one of 
its core purposes was to serve the public interest by funding charities,
sports, and public works across Norway. The company made much of its 
vaunted “social responsibility.” Yet, this could be at odds with some of 
the very activities it conducted. For example, gaming funded a lot of the 
good work that NT sought to do. However, PJS flagged the challenge of 
managing gaming against the risks of encouraging gambling addiction— 
a perfect example of potentially contradictory stakeholder interests.
It wasn’t enough to use the proceeds from gaming to support socially 
responsible ends; NT also needed to be socially responsible when earning 
those proceeds. Earning some of it from gambling addicts whose addic-
tion the company itself helped create raised all kinds of moral questions 
sure to bother at least some stakeholders.
Stakeholder Relationship Management Model 
If we think about the nature of organizational crises, with all their com-
peting voices and interests, plus the sometimes contradictory environ-
ment in which organizations operate, then the importance of managing 
stakeholder relationships is a key part of what it means for organizations 
to be stewards of stakeholder interests. We might think about the inter-
play among organizations, their stakeholders, and the many issues rel-
evant to them as a tricky “love triangle” where the continuing challenge 
is to build, maintain, or repair relationships with different stakehold-
ers. Yet, unlike interpersonal relationships, stakeholder relationships are 
necessarily based on perceived vested interests between the organization 
and its stakeholder(s). Moreover, as Heath (2002 ) argues, to be ethical,
the relationship should be mutually beneficial. This criterion provides 
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Organization 
StakeholderIssue 
Figure 12.2 The Stakeholder Relationship Management Model 
social obligations, especially for any organization whose value proposi-
tion centers on social value. Thus, the stakeholder relationship manage-
ment model (Figure 12.2) provides a heuristic for better understanding 
the intersection of voices connected to the emergence, management, and 
recovery from crises ( Diers-Lawson, 2017b ;  Diers, 2012 ).
The Stakeholder Relationship Management (SRM) Model gives us a 
way to organize previous research uncovering the various things that 
are apt to influence how organizations are evaluated ( Diers, 2012 )— 
such things as attitudes ( Claes, Rust, & Dekimpe, 2010 ), public pressure 
from interested stakeholders in the face of crises ( Piotrowski & Guy-
ette, 2010 ;  Uccello, 2009 ), and engagement with stakeholders ( Hong,
Yang, & Rim, 2010 ). For stakeholders, issues can involve anything from 
the quality of the organization’s products or services to related topics 
that the stakeholders care about, such as health care or the environment.
Issues are a lot like the baggage that comes with any relationship. They 
represent both risks and opportunities. Stakeholder judgments about an 
organization can concern not only whether they like its products, ser-
vices, policies, customer service, and so on, but also how they evaluate 
its performance with respect to other issues that also matter to them. In 
the PJS case, no matter whether he was discussing the first CEO’s seem-
ingly extravagant expenditures on fishing junkets, its disproportionate 
financial support of the local community compared with the rest of Nor-
way, or the ethics of responsible gaming, the question about what the 
company stood for was directly connected to his understanding of social 
responsibility. Likewise, once he blew the whistle and involved external 
stakeholders in the case, many of them came to similar conclusions. This 





















172 Audra Diers-Lawson 
We can more directly unpack the violations of expectations and rela-
tionship problems by examining the three core relationships threatened 
by the crisis.
Relationship Between the Organization and Key Issues 
Stakeholders will make judgments about any connection between the 
organization and any issue(s) connected to the crisis. For example, one of 
the primary judgments is blame or responsibility attribution, which has 
emerged from the research on attribution theory ( Weiner, 1985 ,  2006 ).
Blame attribution evaluates how much control stakeholders believe an 
organization has over some issue.The more responsibility that stakehold-
ers attribute to the organization, the more they’ll expect of it with regard 
to that issue. Blame attribution is one of the most important predictors of 
stakeholder attitudes about an organization after a crisis, and it’s become 
a core concept in situational crisis communication theory ( Coombs,
2007 ;  Coombs & Holladay, 2004 ;  Jeong, 2008 ;  Schwarz, 2008 ). But it’s 
also applied in other related crisis communication research, connecting 
to such factors as corporate social responsibility, crisis history, and ethics 
( Kim, 2013 ;  Ping, Ishaq, & Li, 2015 ).
Yet, core as it is, in the context of whistleblowing, blame attribution is 
complex. In NT’s case, of course, there was a blatant material crisis—the 
cronyism and financial problems emerging from PJS’s whistleblowing.
But throughout the interviews with him, despite those organizational 
transgressions, we find considerable blame directed away from NT itself.
For example, some of it was directed at PJS himself throughout the cri-
sis, both internally and externally. Early on, a major concern, internally,
was that the whistleblower would make NT look “foolish” if the situ-
ation weren’t handled summarily, in “very brute fashion.” And then, as 
the crisis emerged, the first CEO described the whistleblower externally 
as a “hidden enemy running after me with a rusty knife.” But even in the 
post-crisis recovery phase, it seemed PJS was viewed as having betrayed 
his leadership team, ultimately making himself a liability to the company.
Beyond that, his alleged ineffectiveness as a communications director was 
also cited as a reason that the crisis emerged, not only internally but also 
by the media: “I was criticized by the media for not taking command in 
the communication of this [the situation],” PJS recalls.
Yet another challenge to our evaluation of the relationship between NT 
and the crisis involves potential missed opportunities to make changes 
that would have mitigated PJS’s need to blow the whistle in the first place.
NT had enjoyed a sterling reputation for years. But as the whistleblowing 
case emerged, external stakeholder judgments about the company’s  posi-
tive intention, concern, and commitment to social responsibility could 
begin to be questioned, which indicted the authenticity of its intention 
in serving the public interest ( Huang, 2008 ). Positive intention is often 
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connected with hygiene-motivation theory ( Lacey, Kennett-Hensel, & 
Manolis, 2014 ), which suggests that if stakeholders believe that an orga-
nization’s intentions are positive with respect to social responsibility, then 
it benefits the organization’s reputation. But if they believe the organiza-
tion’s interest in an issue is inauthentic, it doesn’t matter how good the 
organization otherwise behaves, for it’s unlikely to positively influence 
the organization’s reputation. PJS discussed this concept throughout the 
interviews in terms of his own interest in social responsibility, the missed 
opportunities to change stakeholder perceptions after the commissioned 
brand survey in Norway, the evolution of his outing as the whistleblower,
and the former CEO’s criticism of him.
Finally, clear association also matters in influencing stakeholders’ per-
ceptions of the connection between the organization and any issue con-
nected to the crisis. If they believe there is a logical connection between 
an issue and the organization’s core business or mission, then the orga-
nization’s interest in that issue is more compelling to them and can thus 
change their judgment about the organization, particularly after a cri-
sis emerges ( Claeys & Cauberghe, 2015 ;  Coombs & Holladay, 2015 ; 
De Bruycker & Walgrave, 2014 ;  Kernisky, 1997 ;  Knight & Greenberg,
2002 ). And this is where PJS’s position at NT became a liability after the 
crisis, at least in the eyes of his new CEO. So long as PJS was associated 
with the organization, it seemed the CEO believed he inhibited the com-
pany’s overcoming the scandal and moving beyond it. Internally, if PJS 
remained, he would not only be the “dark knight,” but also his loyalty 
would be constantly questioned. Externally, one could assume the CEO 
to believe that PJS would be a reminder of the problems that NT wanted 
to move past.
The Relationship Between the Stakeholder and Issues 
From a risk- or crisis-management perspective, the more intensely stake-
holders feel connected to issues, the more likely those issues will trigger 
stakeholders to act. Yet, in crisis communication research, this relation-
ship is only beginning to emerge as an important predictor. This is why 
PJS’s experience with whistleblowing provides a more sophisticated 
understanding of how stakeholders relate to the issues affecting them 
and the organization.
Stakeholders’ emotional involvement with issues is crucial to under-
stand. At their heart, crises are incredibly emotional for internal and 
external stakeholders alike, with a lot of emotionally charged commu-
nication, but regrettably there’s scant research examining the emotional 
experiences, trauma, and labor connected to crises ( van der Meer & Ver-
hoeven, 2014 ). Fortunately, we’re beginning to see an increasing recogni-
tion of the impact that emotion plays in the outcomes of crises. In NT’s 
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emotional journey that PJS took over several years. Too often, we only 
consider the immediate public nature of crises without considering all 
that led up to them or the fallout from them for critical stakeholders.
Through PJS’s story, we can understand the culture of “stability” at 
NT. “Turnover was virtually non-existing,” he recalls. “People came and 
they stayed throughout their lives.” In such a settled, complacent envi-
ronment, PJS was almost instantly an outlier. As he started work and 
brought with him new ideas and well-meaning criticisms of the status 
quo, he was already set up for shunning—the precursor to his being 
labeled the “man in black or Prince of Darkness.” Even then, though, he 
also found occasional support within the company and was encouraged 
to stay on. Also, he discusses the intersection of his own personal values,
conflicts, and stress management. So his emotional involvement as a duti-
ful employee and then as a whistleblower made his personal connection 
to the misconduct issues even more important. For organizations, this is 
an important lesson: stakeholders, whether internal or external, who feel 
strong emotional connections with the issues are more likely to make sac-
rifices and less likely to be easily “managed” with either accommodative 
or defensive responses to the crisis ( Diers-Lawson, 2017b ;  Diers-Lawson &
Pang, 2016 ). Yet, in the context of whistleblowing, the bullying, pressure,
and loss of social support that PJS experienced suggest that the emo-
tional connection between the whistleblower and the issues he’s exposing 
require a unique strength in order for him to endure the extraordinary 
opprobrium he awakens as the company “Judas” and pariah.
His reactions to the situation influenced judgments related to their 
perceived susceptibility, severity of the issue, beliefs, demographics, and 
perceived efficacy regarding the issue ( Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker,
1988 ). Such judgments influence stakeholder reactions not only to the 
situation but also to the organization. In his narrative, PJS recalls worry-
ing about “becoming a very unpopular person right away” and describes 
a building sense of fear and lack of efficacy early on that temporarily 
silenced him. One fear was that his recommendations would be rejected 
out of hand because of NT’s chummy, and almost incestuous, connec-
tion with the local community. Another fear arose from the first CEO’s 
approach to using him to solve problems. PJS feared that he would lose 
his ability to be an advocate in the company if he lost favor with the 
CEO. But as NT’s mismanagement issues began to emerge internally, PJS 
seemed to feel both an indirect pressure as well as some empowerment to 
act because of a growing sense of dissatisfaction from his colleagues. He 
recalls “an increasing number of people” who talked to him, suggesting 
that “something’s got to happen.”
These evolving feelings that he and some of his colleagues experienced 
reflect the changeable nature of the relationships among stakeholders,
issues, and the organization. From the internal perspective, PJS’s ini-
tial conflict between the moral imperative to act and his very practical 
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concerns about his minimal support and social isolation began to give 
way as he received increasing confidential admissions from some col-
leagues regarding their concerns about the inefficacy and questionable 
ethics of particular programs. Increasingly, it seemed, he felt the need to 
take action to preserve NT’s high-minded mission. This was exactly the 
kind of rational-ethical decision-making that, Chen and Lai (2014 ) say,
prompts potential whistleblowers to take action. In this way, the value 
that PJS and his colleagues placed on the organization’s survival changed 
the perceived susceptibility, severity, and inefficacy of problems they all 
had known about for some time. In part, this was also in anticipation 
of how the relationship among the financial issues, NT, and other stake-
holders would change if or when external stakeholders learned what was 
happening inside the company.
To this point, I have discussed the relationship between the stakehold-
ers and issues primarily from an internal point of view. But this con-
cern about how other stakeholders would react to the “realities” NT was 
facing also reveals the importance of the many different voices’ existing 
attitudes, social norms, and perceived situational control as a predictor 
for action ( Ajzen, 2005 ). For any stakeholder, whether inside or outside 
an organization, the perceptions of uncertainty related to the issue and 
the organization’s actions regarding the issue not only affect stakehold-
ers’ emotional reactions to crises but also their attitudes and actions 
toward the organization in crisis ( Jin, Liu, Anagondahalli, & Austin,
2014 ;  McDonald & Cokley, 2013 ;  Mou & Lin, 2014 ). PJS’s narrative 
provides insight into a number of different stakeholder perceptions, con-
cerns, and existing attitudes about NT and its social obligations. When 
PJS described the disproportionate resources accorded the company’s 
local community compared with those communities farther away, and 
the disproportionate support for the local hockey team sponsorship com-
pared with its agreement with the Norwegian Hockey Association, and 
the overall “loose operations everywhere . . . that detract from the money 
and efficiency of the organization and . . . its larger goals,” it suggested 
that NT’s reputation with other stakeholders was vulnerable.
In fact, despite the internal desire for stability and a dominant narra-
tive emphasizing the company’s strength, once different stakeholder per-
spectives were considered, those views would ultimately trigger the crisis 
for NT. Had the company been more open to different viewpoints, it 
might have averted its crisis. For example, the research PJS contracted on 
gaming as well as the annual report that directly discussed the challenge 
of balancing the social risks of gaming against the social benefit of the 
revenue it produced were early indicators that stakeholders had to have 
had mixed evaluations of NT’s social performance. Yet, the sharp differ-
ence between the internal and external reception that PJS received for 
being the editor of the annual report revealed a lot about the company’s 
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and its approach to meeting its mission. From an issues-management per-
spective, each of these moments of reflection, research, or conversation 
revealed an opportunity for NT to change and thus avoid its meltdown.
Yet, when we understand how the internal stakeholders such as the first 
CEO, other employees, and unions were resistant to action or change, we 
can better understand how early warning signs and different stakeholder 
voices are often not recognized until crises are triggered. By examining 
the relationship between the stakeholder and the issue, we can also better 
appreciate how PJS’s experiences provide a real-life example of the ten-
sions that push a whistleblower to act, especially when he understands 
it will not be in his own personal interests and is likely to come at some 
costs, to do so.
The Relationship Between Organizations and Stakeholders 
PJS’s experience also shows us that after a crisis, stakeholders—especially
whistleblowers—can find that the crisis has intensified changes in their 
attitudes about the organization and their own relationship to it. In the 
context of crisis communication, stakeholders’ attitudes toward organi-
zations, especially those in crisis, have been well studied in crisis com-
munication research ( Diers, 2012 ). Often treated as an outcome of a 
crisis, these judgments have been assessed across multiple fields of study,
from communication and marketing to industry-specific studies in such 
different areas as health care and tourism. One of the critical concepts 
predicting the quality of the relationship between the organization and 
its stakeholders is the organization’s reputation ( Benoit, 1995 ;  Carroll,
2009 ). Thus, there is considerable work in public relations, and crisis 
communication more directly, that explores topics such as the impact of 
a favorable pre-crisis reputation in protecting an organization’s reputa-
tion during and after a crisis ( Claeys & Cauberghe, 2015 ), the role of the 
media and other external groups in influencing an organization’s reputa-
tion during crises ( Einwiller, Carroll, & Korn, 2010 ), and the growing 
influence of social media on an organization’s reputation in the context 
of crises ( Brown & Billings, 2013 ;  Ott & Theunissen, 2015 ;  Utz, Schultz, &
Glocka, 2013 ), to name just a few ways that reputation is connected with 
stakeholder evaluations of organizations.
Yet, one of the reasons why the first CEO and other board members 
and employees within NT resisted PJS’s recommendations was that the 
company had long enjoyed a sterling reputation for the work that it 
did and for the cosseted environment it offered its employees. This case 
can demonstrate that an extended positive reputation can, just by itself,
create the vulnerability of complacency for organizations in which the 
decision-makers believe they can act with impunity. Certainly, as I have 
already discussed, such complacency paired with repeated transgressions 
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reputation can itself also create a risk to an organization. Coombs and 
Holladay (2015 ) explain that stakeholder expectations of any organiza-
tion consistently viewed as “socially responsible” tend to be high, so if it 
violates stakeholders’ trust, the violation of the company’s core identity 
can create even more risk to the company. As PJS explains, it’s vital for a 
company to actually practice what it preaches.
The SRM model argues that one of the reasons for NT to pay better 
attention to the social responsibility of its practices to earn money, not 
just distribute it, was that the crisis itself can threaten the socially respon-
sible value proposition for an organization by fundamentally changing 
stakeholders’ perceived knowledge of the organization. In short, crises 
can call into question what stakeholders believe they know to be “true”
about an organization ( Diers, 2012 ). PJS discusses the importance of 
social responsibility and ethical behavior extensively when talking about 
multiple bottom lines for many organizations, saying that a good repu-
tation increases an organization’s value, and this is what helps to guide 
stakeholder perceptions of whether the company is fundamentally trust-
worthy ( Freberg & Palenchar, 2013 ).
In part, evaluations of the relationship between the organization and 
its stakeholders are made based on stakeholder judgments about whether 
or not the organization’s and stakeholders’ own values are congruent 
( Koerber, 2014 ).What became clear throughout PJS’s experience was the 
disconnect between the values that most of NT’s external stakeholders 
expected the company to embody and the internal value judgments guid-
ing its actions. For example, when PJS’s annual report came out candidly 
discussing NT’s need to balance its different levels of obligations (e.g.,
with gaming promotion vs. gambling addiction), he recalls that “I got so 
much crap from the others in the CEO meeting . . . and, of course, the 
external feedback on the annual report was good. I mean even the Minis-
ter (of cultural affairs within Norway) told me that . . . but it was not very 
well-received internally.” But even as knowledge of the crisis broadened 
and his work as a whistleblower became more public, this disconnect 
between the broader community reaction to his actions compared with 
that of the local community and NT revealed a stark difference between 
the values of the internal and local stakeholders compared with PJS’s 
values and seemingly those of the broader Norwegian community. This 
lack of value alignment underscores the different self-interests of NT and 
many of its internal stakeholders, not to mention the local community 
that had benefitted from the company’s largesse over the years, compared 
with PJS’s social-responsibility focus, which he shared with the govern-
ment and the larger national community.
At its heart, then, we can better understand what a crisis is for an 
organization: it is a discrepancy in the expectations of an organization’s 
behaviors and those of its stakeholders who are most able to affect it.
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the organization and its stakeholders. This is what makes whistleblowers 
such challenging and lonely stakeholders—they have the power to fun-
damentally affect an organization and even its surrounding community 
so long as their actions are aligned with a larger community’s values. But 
what PJS’s case at NT also suggests is that whistleblowing would not be 
so necessary if an organization viewed itself in relation to its stakeholders 
and the issues that affect both of them.
This case demonstrates the tragedy of missed opportunities for organiza-
tions to manage their issues. The problems that NT faced were certainly
precipitated by the first CEO’s handling of financial issues, but they were
reinforced by a broader culture that rejected questioning voices, innova-
tion, and risk assessment while valuing abject obeisance to the CEO and
board’s decision-making. These conditions make any organization, but
most especially those defining themselves as socially responsible, ripe for
crisis because they forget that the organization’s well-being is based on its
ability to manage many voices and interests as well as its social obligations.
References 
Ajzen, I. (2005). Explaining intentions and behavior: Attitudes, personality, and 
behavior (Vol. 2). Berkshire, UK: McGraw-Hill Education.
Argenti, P. (2002). Crisis communication: Lessons from 9/11. Harvard Business 
Review, 103–109.
Atkins, M., & Lowe, J. (1994). Stakeholders and the strategy formation process 
in small and medium enterprises. International Small Business Journal, 12(3),
12–25.
Benoit, W. L. (1995). Sears’ repair of its auto service image: Image restoration 
discourse in the corporate sector. Communication Studies, 46(1–2), 89–105.
Brown, N. A., & Billings, A. C. (2013). Sports fans as crisis communicators on 
social media websites. Public Relations Review, 39(1), 74–81.
Carroll, C. (2009). Defying a reputational crisis—Cadbury’s salmonella scare: 
Why are customers willing to forgive and forget? Corporate Reputation 
Review, 12(1), 64–82.
Chen, C. P., & Lai, C. T. (2014). To blow or not to blow the whistle: The effects 
of potential harm, social pressure and organisational commitment on whistle-
blowing intention and behaviour. Business Ethics: A European Review, 23(3),
327–342.
Claes, F., Rust, R. T., & Dekimpe, M. G. (2010). The effect of consumer satis-
faction on consumer spending growth. Journal of Marketing Research, 47(1),
28–35. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.47.1.28 . 
Claeys, A.-S., & Cauberghe, V. (2015). The role of a favorable pre-crisis reputa-
tion in protecting organizations during crises. Public Relations Review, 41(1),
64–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.10.013 . 
Connolly, T., Conlon, E. J., & Deutsch, S. J. (1980). Organizational effectiveness: 
A multiple-constituency approach. Academy of Management Journal, 5(2),
211–217.
    
     
   
  
  
   
  
    
 
  
   
    
 
   
    
 
 
    
   
   
  
  






     
   
   





     
 
   
   
Norsk Tipping’s Loneliest Stakeholder 179 
Coombs, W. T. (2007). Attribution theory as a guide for post-crisis communica-
tion research. Public Relations Review, 33(2), 135–139.
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2004). Reasoned action in crisis communica-
tion: An attribution theory-based approach to crisis management. In D. P. Mil-
lar & R. L. Heath (Eds.), Responding to crisis: A rhetorical approach to crisis 
communication (pp. 95–115). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2015). CSR as crisis risk: Expanding how we 
conceptualize the relationship. Corporate Communications: An International 
Journal, 20(2), 144–162. https://doi.org/10.1108/CCIJ-10-2013-0078 . 
De Bruycker, I., & Walgrave, S. (2014). How a new issue becomes an owned 
issue. Media coverage and the financial crisis in Belgium (2008–2009). Inter-
national Journal of Public Opinion Research, 26(1), 86–97.
Diers-Lawson, A. (2017a). Crisis communication oxford research encyclopedia 
of communication. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://communi 
cation.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acre 
fore-9780190228613-e-397 . doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.013.397 
Diers-Lawson, A. (2017b). Will they like us when they’re angry? Antecedents 
and indicators of strong emotional reactions to crises among stakeholders. In 
S. M. Croucher, B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, & P. Wilson (Eds.), Conflict,
mediated message, and group dynamics (pp. 81–136). Lanham, MD: Lexing-
ton Books.
Diers-Lawson, A., & Pang, A. (2016). Did BP atone for its transgressions?
Expanding theory on ‘ethical apology’ in crisis communication. Journal of
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 24(3), 148–161.
Diers, A. R. (2012). Reconstructing stakeholder relationships using ‘corporate 
social responsibility’ as a response strategy to cases of corporate irresponsibil-
ity: The case of the 2010 BP spill in the Gulf of Mexico. In R. Tench,W. Sun, & 
B. Jones (Eds.),Corporate social irresponsibility: A challenging concept (Vol. 4,
pp. 177–206). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Edwards, M. S., Lawrence, S. A., & Ashkanasy, N. M. (2016). How perceptions 
and emotions shaped employee silence in the case of “Dr. Death” at Bundaberg 
Hospital. In  Emotions and organizational governance (pp. 341–379). Bingley,
UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Einwiller, S. A., Carroll, C. E., & Korn, K. (2010). Under what conditions do the 
news influence corporate reputation? The roles of media dependency and need 
for orientation. Corporate Reputation Review, 12(4), 299–315.
Fombrun, C. J. (1982). Strategies for network research in organizations.Academy 
of Management Review, 7, 280–291.
Frandsen, F., & Johansen, W. (2016). Organizational crisis communication: A 
multivocal approach. London: Sage.
Freberg, K., & Palenchar, M. J. (2013). Convergence of digital negotiation and 
risk challenges: Strategic implications of social media for risk and crisis com-
munications. In  Social media and strategic communications (pp. 83–100). New 
York: Palgrave.
Freeman, R. E. (1994). Ethical theory and business. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Freeman, R. E. (1999). Divergent stakeholder theory. Academy of Management 
Review, 24(2), 233–239.
   
   





   
 
     
   
  
   






   
    
  
  
   
   
      
   
  
   
  
     
   
 
 
   
   
    
  
  
   
 
  
    
 
     
180 Audra Diers-Lawson 
Frooman, J. (1999). Stakeholder influence strategies. Academy of Management 
Journal, 24(2), 191–205.
Grimm,V., Choo, L., Horvath, G., & Nitta, K. (2016).Whistleblowing and diffu-
sion of responsibility: An experimental investigation. Annual Conference 2016 
(Augsburg): Demographic Change 145781, Verein für Socialpolitik/German 
Economic Association . 
Haley, E. (1996). Exploring the construct of organization as source: Consumers’ 
understandings of organizational sponsorship of advocacy advertising. Journal 
of Advertising, 25, 19–36.
Harris, S. G. (1994). Organizational cultures and individual sensemaking: A 
schema-based perspective.Organizational Science, 5, 309–321.
Heath, R. L. (1994). Management of corporate communication: From interper-
sonal contacts to external affairs. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Heath, R. L. (2002). Issues management: Its past, present, and future. Journal of 
Public Affairs, 2(2), 209–214.
Heath, R. L., & Millar, D. P. (2004). A rhetorical approach to crisis communica-
tion: Management, communication processes, and strategic responses. In D. P.
Millar & R. L. Heath (Eds.), Responding to crisis: A rhetorical approach to 
crisis communication (pp. 1–18). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Heide, M., & Simonsson, C. (2015). Struggling with internal crisis communica-
tion: A balancing act between paradoxical tensions. Public Relations Inquiry, 
4(2), 223–255. https://doi.org/10.1177/2046147X15570108 . 
Henriques, I., & Sadorsky, P. (1999). The relationship between environmental 
commitment and managerial perceptions of stakeholder importance. Academy 
of Management Journal, 42(1), 87–99.
Hong, S., Yang, S., & Rim, H. (2010). The influence of corporate social respon-
sibility and customer—company identification on publics’ dialogic communi-
cation intentions. Public Relations Review, 36(2), 196–198. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.pubrev.2009.10.005 . 
Huang, Y. (2008). Trust and relational commitment in corporate crises: The 
effects of crisis communicative strategy and form of crisis response. Journal of 
Public Relations Research, 20, 297–327.
Jennings, D. F., Artz, K., Gillin, L. M., & Christodouloy, C. (2000). Determi-
nants of trust in global strategic alliances: Amrad and the Australian biomedial 
industry. Competitiveness Review, 10(1), 25–44.
Jeong, S. (2008).Attributions in crisis communication: A test of attribution model 
and situational crisis communication theory. Paper presented at the National 
Communication Association, San Diego, CA.
Jin, Y., Liu, B. F., Anagondahalli, D., & Austin, L. (2014). Scale development for 
measuring publics’ emotions in organizational crises. Public Relations Review, 
40(3), 509–518. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2014.04.007 . 
Kernisky, D. A. (1997). Proactive crisis management and ethical discourse: Dow 
Chemical’s issues management bulletins 1979–1990. Journal of Business Eth-
ics, 16(8), 843–853.
Kim, S. (2013). Corporate ability or virtue? Relative effectiveness of prior cor-
porate associations in times of crisis. International Journal of Strategic Com-
munication, 7(4), 241–256. https://doi.org/10.1080/1553118X.2013.824886 . 
King, G. I. (2002). Crisis management and team effectiveness: A closer examina-
tion. Journal of Business Ethics, 41, 235–249.
 
     
 
  
   
  
 
     
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
   
   
 
     
  
     
   
     
   
    
 
     
   
  
    
 
      
    
   
 
  
   
   
     
   
  
  
     
 
Norsk Tipping’s Loneliest Stakeholder 181 
Knight, G., & Greenberg, J. (2002). Promotionalism and subpolitics: Nike and its 
labor critics.Management Communication Quarterly, 15(4), 541–570.
Koerber, D. (2014). Crisis communication response and political communities: 
The unusual case of Toronto mayor Rob Ford. Canadian Journal of Commu-
nication, 39(3).
Lacey, R., Kennett-Hensel, P. A., & Manolis, C. (2014). Is corporate social 
responsibility a motivator or hygiene factor? Insights into its bivalent nature.
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 42(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/ 
s11747-014-0390-9 . 
Liu, S.-M., Liao, J.-Q., & Wei, H. (2015). Authentic leadership and whistleblow-
ing: Mediating roles of psychological safety and personal identification. Jour-
nal of Business Ethics, 131(1), 107–119.
Mazzei, A., & Ravazzani, S. (2014). Internal crisis communication strategies to 
protect trust relationships: A study of Italian companies. International Journal of 
Business Communication, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/2329488414525447 . 
Mazzei, A., Kim, J.-N., & Dell’Oro, C. (2012). Strategic value of employee rela-
tionships and communicative actions: Overcoming corporate crisis with qual-
ity internal communication. International Journal of Strategic Communication, 
6(1), 31–44.
McDonald, L. M., & Cokley, J. (2013). Prepare for anger, look for love: A ready 
reckoner for crisis scenario planners. PRism, 10(1), 1–11.
Mesmer-Magnus, J. R., & Viswesvaran, C. (2005). Whistleblowing in organiza-
tions: An examination of correlates of whistleblowing intentions, actions, and 
retaliation. Journal of Business Ethics, 62(3), 277–297.
Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997). Toward a theory of stake-
holder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what 
really counts. Academy of Management Review, 22(4), 852–886.
Mitroff, I., Alpaslan, M. C., & Green, S. E. (2004). Crises as ill-structured messes.
International Studies Review, 6(1), 165–182.
Moore, S. (2004). Disaster’s future: The prospects for corporate crisis manage-
ment and communication. Business Horizons, 47(1), 29–36.
Mou, Y., & Lin, C. A. (2014). Communicating food safety via the social media: 
The role of knowledge and emotions on risk perception and prevention. Science 
Communication,36(5), 593–616.https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547014549480 . 
Ott, L., & Theunissen, P. (2015). Reputations at risk: Engagement during social 
media crises.Public Relations Review, 41(1), 97–102. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
pubrev.2014.10.015 . 
Pearson, C. M., & Clair, J. A. (1998). Reframing crisis management. Academy of 
Management Review, 23(1), 58–76.
Ping, Q., Ishaq, M., & Li, C. (2015). Product harm crisis, attribution of blame 
and decision making: An insight from the past. Journal of Applied Environ-
mental and Biological Sciences, 5(5), 35–44.
Piotrowski, C., & Guyette, R. W. (2010). Toyota recall crisis: Public attitudes on 
leadership and ethics.Organizational Development Journal, 28(2), 89–97.
Reilly, A. (1987). Are organisations ready for a crisis?  Columbia Journal of World 
Business, 79–87.
Rosenstock, I. M., Strecher, V. J., & Becker, M. H. (1988). Social learning theory 
and the health belief model. Health Education and Behavior, 15(2), 175–183.
https://doi.org/10.1177/109019818801500203 . 
  
     
  
 
     
   
     
  
    
    
 
 
     
 
     
   
      
  
     
   
  
 
182 Audra Diers-Lawson 
Rowley, T. J. (1997). Moving beyond dyadic ties: A network theory of stake-
holder influences. Academy of Management Review, 22(4), 887–910.
Schwarz, A. (2008). Covariation-based causal attributions during organizational 
crises: Suggestions for extending Situational Crisis Communication Theory
(SCCT). International Journal of Strategic Communication, 2(1), 31–53.
Scott, S. G., & Lane, V. R. (2000). A stakeholder approach to organizational 
identity. Academy of Management Review, 25(1), 43–65.
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approach.
Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571–610.
Trice, H. M., & Beyer, J. M. (1993). The cultures of work organizations. Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Uccello, C. (2009). Social interest and social responsibility in contemporary cor-
porate environments. Journal of Individual Psychology, 65(4), 412–419.
Utz, S., Schultz, F., & Glocka, S. (2013). Crisis communication online: How 
medium, crisis type and emotions affected public reactions in the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear disaster. Public Relations Review, 39(1), 40–46.
van der Meer, T. G., & Verhoeven, J. W. (2014). Emotional crisis communica-
tion. Public Relations Review, 40(3), 526–536. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
pubrev.2014.03.004 . 
Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emo-
tion. Psychological Review, 92(4), 548.
Weiner, B. (2006). Social motivation, justice, and the moral emotions: An attribu-




How to Encourage Employees 























 13 The Influence of Psychological 
Contracts on Decision-Making 
in Whistleblowing Processes 
Åse Storhaug Hole and Therese E. Sverdrup 
Introduction 
Recent decades of research have considerably broadened our under-
standing of whistleblowing. To date, most of the focus has been on the 
whistleblowers themselves: what makes them report, what and how they 
report, and what happens to them after they’ve blown the whistle ( Lewis,
Brown, & Moberly, 2014 ). But we think it no less important to focus 
on non-reporting behavior because most employees stand by in silence 
( Olsen, 2014 ). They may do so out of fear of retaliation, lack of trust in 
managers or other recipients of the concerns, a belief that nothing can or 
will be done about the problems, uncertainty about the seriousness and 
evidence of the wrongdoing, or a sense that others simply don’t see the 
problem as they do ( Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004 ). Another 
possible explanation for non-reporting, as we’re about to demonstrate,
may lie with close relationships between employee and employer, or 
between colleagues, reinforced by unwritten expectations about mutual 
loyalty. This chapter is about the effect of psychological contracts on 
whistleblowing.
The particular whistleblowing incident we are studying here occurred 
in a small Norwegian town, where close relationships are common, and 
colleagues are more tightly connected and dependent on one another 
than is usual in a larger society. As described by Peer Jacob Svenkerud 
(PJS), the whistleblower in this story, unwritten expectations permeated 
his company Norsk Tipping (NT). Employees enjoyed an interesting,
well-paid job in one of the most prestigious firms in the region. Through 
the whistleblower’s story, we learn about some of these unwritten expec-
tations. For example, if media raised critical questions about NT, PJS was 
expected to defend its image and redirect the reporters’ attention. Also,
questionable practices were passed over at the weekly top-executive meet-
ings. And employees seemed expected to promote NT’s popular image of 
being a joyous workplace.
Expectations like these led to the following question in the introduction 
of the whistleblower’s story in  Chapter 1 : “What happens to the decision-
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Psychological Contracts 
The psychological contract is a concept that addresses unwritten expec-
tations. It refers to the employees’ perceptions about the reciprocal rela-
tionship with their employer ( Rousseau, 1989 ). Mutual obligations are the 
essence of any employment contract, of course, as they define the rela-
tionship between employee and employer. Obligations, or beliefs, are
what the employee expects to receive in return for loyalty, work effort,
and commitment. The employer, meanwhile, has expectations of employ-
ees in return for wages and good working conditions. These expectations 
come from either implicit or explicit promises of future exchange or reci-
procity, and constitute the psychological contracts between employer and 
employee—and between colleagues, too.
Research into psychological contracts, and especially their violation,
shows that unwritten agreements and expectations between employers 
and employees greatly impact organizational behavior ( Rousseau, 1989 ; 
Robinson & Rousseau, 1994 ). Psychological contracts are individual and 
perceptual and can be transactional, relational, and ideological. Trans-
actional contracts are short term and characterized by less involvement 
of the parties. Relational contracts are long term and characterized by 
mutual loyalty and trust ( Rousseau, 1995 ). Ideological contracts are 
value based and involve working for a higher cause or ideology ( Thomp-
son & Bunderson, 2003 ).
Fear of violating one or more of these contracts might well prohibit, or at
least inhibit, whistleblowing.When unethical behavior occurs at the work-
place, close relationships and strong mutual psychological contracts might
hinder the reporting of wrongdoing, especially if the contracts are tight and
mean a lot to the parties, as we find in the present case. Supervisors and
colleagues alike react negatively toward the whistleblower because they
consider whistleblowing a breach of a psychological contract, a violation
of the unwritten expectations and beliefs about mutual agreements.
But here’s a classic dilemma: What do you do if a close friend or col-
league has engaged in issues that you consider unethical? And what if 
the wrongdoer is your own supervisor? By the same token, how does the 
wrongdoer react toward the whistleblower when he is a close colleague? 
Psychological contracts can cloud the judgments and reactions of all 
parties—the observers, the whistleblower, the wrongdoer, and the recipi-
ents of the concerns. Psychological contract theory may help our under-
standing of the outcomes of several stages of the whistleblowing process.
Our aim in this chapter is to show how psychological contract theory 
can explain the steps taken in the whistleblowing process—the fraught 
decision to blow the whistle, the receiver of the concern, and the reactions 
to the whistleblower. In the following section, we discuss the concept of 
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The Concept of Whistleblowing 
A standard definition of whistleblowing is “the disclosure by organi-
zation members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate 
practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations 
that may be able to effect action” ( Near & Miceli, 1985 , p. 4). Note that 
this definition excludes persons outside the organization. According to 
Miceli, Dreyfus, & Near (2014 ), it’s important to distinguish between 
whistleblowing behavior and other, external forms of disclosing of orga-
nizational wrongdoing. They call the latter “bell-ringing,” which means 
the reporting of organizational wrongdoing by outsiders.
To distinguish normal reporting from whistleblowing, Skivenes and 
Trygstad (2014 ) introduced the classification of  weak and strong whistle-
blowing, where weak whistleblowing involves reporting to your near-
est manager, whereas strong whistleblowing refers to cases in which 
the employee then continues to report via other channels after see-
ing no improvement. Miethe (1999 ) argued that a broad definition of 
whistleblowing is important to encourage reporting of all kinds of con-
cerns. Miceli and Near (2013 ) argued that although there are similari-
ties between organizational voice behavior (i.e., constructive challenge 
to the status quo with the intent of improving the situation rather than 
merely criticizing) and whistleblowing, there are also differences. Matters 
that trigger voice and whistleblowing are not the same, because whistle-
blowing is a reaction to wrongdoing, while voice includes all kinds of 
concerns. Whereas voice often involves “friendly suggestions,” whistle-
blowing questions managers’ authority and ethical judgments.
Whistleblowing is generally viewed positively as a prosocial behav-
ior ( Miceli, Near, Rehg, & Van Scotter, 2012 ;  Miceli, Near, & Dworkin,
2008 ;  Dozier & Miceli, 1985 ). People who blow the whistle are doing so 
in an attempt to correct wrongdoing. Prosocial behavior can include both 
selfish (egoistic) and unselfish (altruistic) motives on the part of the actor 
( Dozier & Miceli, 1985 ). It is important to note, however, that while the 
motives of the whistleblower can be egoistic, he or she might help address 
important issues for the organization.
Our discussion in this chapter includes only whistleblowers who are
former or present members of an organization. Another important dis-
tinction is that the recipient must be someone who’s in a position to
correct the wrongdoing. We consider all kinds of reporting of wrong-
doing to be important and therefore prefer the broad definition of the
concept.
The Whistleblowing Process 
Whistleblowing is a complex process consisting of several stages, start-
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whether to blow the whistle, either through internal or external channels.
Further stages of the process are the receiving of the concern, including 
the decisions and reactions of the recipient. Still later stages of the pro-
cess account for if, and in what ways, the problems are resolved ( Near & 
Miceli, 1995 ). Finally, in an ideal situation, the process is evaluated and 
steps are taken to learn how to treat similar situations, problems, and 
concerns ( NOU, 2018 :6) (Figure 13.1).
The outcomes of each step in a whistleblowing process depend on 
both individual and situational factors concerning the issue at stake—for 
example, the power and position of the whistleblower, the wrongdoer,
and the recipient of the concern ( Near & Miceli, 1995 ). Our focus here 
is to study the influence of the psychological contracts at several stages 
of the process through the lens of psychological contract theory.We pro-
pose that violation of psychological contracts, or fear of it, has influenced 
the development of this whistleblowing process at the six first stages in 
Figure 13.1 . 
Whistleblowing effectiveness may be defined as “the extent to which 
the questionable or wrongful practice (or omission) is terminated at least 
partly because of whistleblowing and within a reasonable time frame”
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whistleblowing process will influence the development of the total pro-
cess and the whistleblowing effectiveness.
In the following section, we address the concept of the psychological 
contract and discuss different versions of it, which will lay the founda-
tion for applying that perspective to the whistleblowing process in the 
present case.
Psychological Contract Theory 
A psychological contract contains the individual’s perceptions about 
the reciprocal relationship with their employer ( Rousseau & Tijori-
wala, 1998 ). In a psychological contract, the employer and employee are 
engaged in a contractual relationship in which both parties feel they owe 
each other something. This “something” can refer to training, promotion,
recognition, trust, fair pay, and a good working environment. An impor-
tant part of the contract is that in exchange for good work the employee 
will expect something in return, such as further training or a promotion.
Thus, a psychological contract implies that there is a reciprocal relation-
ship between the parties. The premise is that without the promise of a 
future exchange, neither party has incentives to contribute much of any-
thing to the other, which may result in a strain or termination of the 
relationship ( Robinson & Rousseau, 1994 ).
Most research on psychological contracts has focused on the con-
sequences of contract breaches and has found connections to many
work-related outcomes—for example, job satisfaction, organizational
commitment, turnover intention, in-role performance, and organizational 
citizenship behavior ( Zhao, Wayne, Glibkowski, & Bravo, 2007 ). Also,
a stream of research has been carried out on outcomes of psychological 
contract breach that can be labeled negative behavior ( Turnley & Feld-
man, 1999 ). Specifically, these studies suggest that when employees expe-
rience a psychological contract breach, they engage in counter-productive 
work behavior and strike back at the employer in various ways, such as 
via abuse, production deviance, sabotage, theft, and withdrawal ( Bor-
dia, Restubog, & Tang, 2008 ;  Restubog, Bordia, & Tang, 2007 ;  Jensen,
Opland, & Ryan, 2010 ). Thus, the consequences of breaching a psycho-
logical contract are substantial, meaning that handling breaches and know-
ing the content of the psychological contract (what exactly was breached) 
are important to prevent these negative consequences.
Research on the substance of the psychological contract shows that 
there are several different types that we enumerate here ( Rousseau, 1990 ).
A transactional contract is composed of specific, short-term obligations 
entailing limited involvement of the parties, as for a seasoned worker,
who exchanges money for work (tit-for-tat). A  relational contract entails 
broad, open-ended, long-term obligations and is based on mutual trust and 
loyalty ( Morrison & Robinson, 1997 ; 229)—for example, the permanent 
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worker who exchanges lifetime work for loyalty to the company.Accord-
ing to Rousseau (2004 ), employees with a relational contract tend to 
put more effort into their job, help colleagues, and support changes in 
the organization. A  value-based or ideological contract involves work-
ing for a higher cause or ideology and fulfilling expectations toward an 
overarching goal of the organization ( Thompson & Bunderson, 2003 ).
Employees with such a contract have been shown to exert more extra-
role behavior ( Vantilborgh et al., 2014 )—for example, a worker who is 
willing to work harder not only for money, but for a higher cause as well,
such as working for a medical company that helps save lives, or a fertil-
izer company that helps feed the world.Normative contracts occur when 
several people agree on terms in their individual psychological contracts 
( Rousseau, 1995 ). When co-workers agree among themselves on the 
terms of their individual psychological contract with the employer, the 
agreement becomes a normative contract. Normative contracts are prod-
ucts of social integration, discussion, and interpretation, creating similar-
ity in the way people see their organization and their relationship to it.
A horizontal contract occurs among colleagues ( Seeck & Parzefall, 2008 ; 
Sverdrup, 2012 ;  Sverdrup & Schei, 2015 ). The exchanges and obligations 
are mostly concerned with the task that they work on—making an effort,
delivering good quality—and with their mutual relationship, recognition,
friendship, and generosity ( Sverdrup, 2012 ). Contracts among colleagues 
can be evaluated not only through the content of the exchange, but also 
by the feature of constriction (tight vs. loose). That is, in some cases col-
leagues develop tight psychological contracts, meaning that you can trust 
that the other person will deliver to your expectations and be able to 
explicitly state those expectations ( Sverdrup, 2014 ). Loose psychological 
contracts, by definition, have more breaches and more implicit expecta-
tions among colleagues. Thus, the content (task vs. relational) and type 
(tight vs. loose) of psychological contract have some implications for how 
colleagues act toward one another.
These different types of contracts hint at the relationships that are 
involved when whistleblowing occurs within the organization.
Research Linking Whistleblowing and Psychological 
Contract Theory 
The relationship between psychological contracts and whistleblowing 
can be understood in two all-encompassing ways. On the one hand,
violations of psychological contracts might lead an employee to blow 
the whistle because of a perception of harm and unfair treatment that 
amounts to a violation ( Turnley & Feldman, 1999 ). This is supported 
by Gundlach, Martinko, and Douglas (2008 ), who show that anger and 
disappointment after psychological contract breaches can result in whis-
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argued that disrupting loyalty within psychological contracts can moti-
vate one to blow the whistle.
On the other hand, a strong psychological contract, where both par-
ties feel they owe each other loyalty, may inhibit whistleblowing. That is,
close relationships can make it difficult both to recognize the wrongdoing 
and to report it ( Miceli et al., 2008 ). For instance, the content of a psy-
chological contract may be such that by blowing the whistle one violates 
the psychological contract of loyalty. This could also be the case with 
peers reporting. Yet, research on whistleblowing has focused primarily 
on reporting the wrongdoing of superiors rather than the wrongdoing of 
peers.Trevino and Victor (1992 ) studied peers reporting as a specific kind 
of whistleblowing behavior. Reporting a peer’s wrongdoing to higher 
authorities may be more difficult than reporting a superior because of 
group norms against reporting peers’ misconduct ( Greenberger, Miceli, &
Cohen, 1987 ) and because of stronger identification and empathy with 
peers ( Randall & Gibson, 1991 ). Thus, a tight psychological contract
among peers about not reporting one another’s wrongdoing—we’re all in 
this together—may lead to less whistleblowing.
Lewis (2011 ) suggested that whistleblowing should be regarded as an 
act of loyalty. Companies should develop psychological contracts that 
promote a culture of trust and openness. Such contracts might support 
and promote whistleblowing. Gundlach et al. (2008) stated that new 
understanding of the whistleblowing process could be gained by applying 
the psychological contract perspective and suggested that future research 
should examine the connection between the psychological contract and 
whistleblowing,
We hope that our analysis of this particular whistleblowing process
can clarify the link between whistleblowing and the psychological con-
tract. In the following section, we analyze some critical incidents of
PJS’s whistleblowing story, where we demonstrate how the psychologi-
cal contract perspective sheds light on the decision-making of the cen-
tral actors.
Analyzing the Whistleblowing Process Through 
the Psychological Contract Perspective 
In the following discussion of PJS’s narrative, we analyze the critical inci-
dents following his observation of questionable practices. We trace his 
whistleblowing process in three steps: (1) blowing the whistle, (2) choos-
ing to go public, and (3) choosing to resign. By applying the psychologi-
cal contract perspective, we can better understand the dilemmas that a 
whistleblower faces when choosing to blow the whistle and dealing with 
the blowback. We use the narratives of PJS to show how psychological 
contracts with central actors such as the CEO, colleagues, and the chair-
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also reference newspaper articles, the audit report, and NT’s own annual 
reports to supplement the data from the narrative.
Blowing the Whistle 
In the situation leading up to PJS’s blowing the whistle to the COB, we 
find that the psychological contract played out both vertically and hori-
zontally. PJS sensed what was expected through his hiring process and 
the first meetings. NT was one of the most attractive and prestigious 
companies in the region and had since 1948 been a vital source of fund-
ing for amateur Norwegian sports activities ( Annual Report, 2017 ). The 
annual reports consistently state that the company’s goals are to make 
people happy, give their dreams a chance every day, and support good 
social causes. Thus, by working at NT, employees enjoy a feeling of con-
tributing to society. This is a value-based contract, where one works for 
a higher cause or ideology, and fulfills expectations toward an overarch-
ing goal of the organization ( Thompson & Bunderson, 2003 ). Hence,
NT employees probably anticipate an ideological contract with the com-
pany. As PJS expressed it: “[NT] had a very good reputation. Everybody 
wanted to work here. I was flattered to have gotten the job. The turnover 
was virtually non-existent. People came and they stayed there throughout 
their lives.”
One advantage of an ideological psychological contract is the feeling of 
loyalty it imparts toward the company’s culture and its mission, making 
it difficult for people to think that anything can go wrong in a company 
with such a long and proud tradition. Hence, employees at NT had sound 
reasons for being in good faith when working in a company with idealis-
tic values and visions. The fact that NT was state owned and a non-profit 
also strengthened the impression of it as value based.
When PJS started to work as the Senior Vice President Information 
and External Relations, he tells us that he soon began to worry about 
issues such as the huge budgets, the lack of a transparent budget process,
and also the lack of corporate strategies concerning corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). These worries jolted him enough that he might 
have interpreted them as constituting an ideological contract breach,
which may have initially triggered thoughts of reporting or whistleblow-
ing ( Gundlach et al., 2008 ). Countering that impulse, though, was his 
strong relational contract of being loyal to the company and the CEO,
which also carried with it the condition that you don’t question corpo-
rate policies and procedures. As PJS put it, “an internal understanding 
was that if you asked too many questions, it will have a consequence.”
Further, the company’s employee benefits were excellent, thus leading to 
strong transactional contracts.Again, as PJS put it: “You should really be 
glad that you’re getting an opportunity to work here and that you have 
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the benefits that people have.” So here was his dilemma: Should he act 
on the violation of the ideological contract and report the irregularities,
or should he honor his strong relational and transactional contract and 
stay silent? 
A boat trip with a friend was a tipping point for his decision. That 
friend was also a respected colleague, so his friendship resembled a tight 
and relational horizontal contract. This seems to have reinforced PJS’s 
choice to blow the whistle. When doing so, he presented a list of irregu-
larities to the COB, who both promised to protect him and encouraged 
him to remain in the company. In PJS’s words, the COB said, “Work as 
you normally do, and trust me when I say that I will protect you.” This 
promise shows how a psychological contract between the two men devel-
oped. But later, during the process of blowing the whistle to the board,
PJS says he felt that his expectations of getting the COB’s support were 
violated: “He kept his word about keeping it quiet, but he was never a 
visible supporter. He never called me to see how I was doing.” PJS clearly 
expected visible support and care, and the COB violated that expecta-
tion. This shows how the psychological contract often is implicit, and if it 
is not mutual, it can have a strong influence on the feelings of the parties 
involved.
Although one of PJS’s mentors had warned him that the COB and oth-
ers on the board probably would try to downplay the case, they chose to 
violate their promises (the psychological contract) in a rank way. During 
the follow-up meeting, the COB asked if the whistleblower was satis-
fied with how management planned to handle the irregularities. They did 
not mention that they appreciated his openness and the fact that he had 
reported the wrongdoing. All they said was: “We’ll come back to you. Is 
that good enough for you? Are you satisfied?”
Some colleagues of PJS had expressed concerns and raised critical 
questions themselves, but not openly. Instead, according to PJS, they had 
encouraged him to blow the whistle for them: “You have to do it!” Per-
haps he had reason to believe that at least some of them would then give 
him visible support and stand by him, but no, he felt himself left standing 
alone, and nobody ever openly pledged to stand shoulder to shoulder 
with him. PJS might have viewed this as disloyalty, a breach of a psycho-
logical contract. But, to be fair to them, raising critical questions could 
mean violating a vertical contract of loyalty to the CEO and perhaps 
could cost them benefits, job safety, and well-being at the workplace (as 
outlined earlier).
PJS at last decided to blow the whistle, finally expecting that he would 
get at least some support. But, as already mentioned, he got none, at least 
not openly. Whistleblowing research shows that whistleblowers often 
experience collapsing support from managers and co-workers, and many 
of them feel lonely and isolated at the workplace. Many also suffer from 
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Miceli, Near, & Van Scotter, 2008 ). Lack of support can be perceived as 
a breach of a relational contract among colleagues.
Choosing to Go Public 
PJS remained in the company, still as an anonymous whistleblower, but 
felt lonely and guilty: “No one knew who had turned so many people’s 
lives upside down.”A new permanent CEO was hired in the fall of 2008,
and, shortly after, a new COB replaced the one with whom PJS had 
negotiated the agreement. The audit general worked in the company for 
almost two years, which put a great strain on NT employees. The new 
leadership team had to focus on moving forward and getting business 
back to normal.
A dramatic turn of the whistleblowing process occurred in Janu-
ary 2010 when one of the biggest financial newspapers called PJS and 
informed him that they knew he was the whistleblower. PJS then insisted 
on coming forward, but the new permanent CEO hesitated and did not 
want him to do so. PJS probably saw this lack of support as a violation of 
a psychological contract and reacted with anger and frustration.
Similar reactions after a psychological contract violation are described 
in the literature ( Sverdrup, 2012 ; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994;  Gund-
lach et al., 2008 ). In a meeting with all the company’s managers, the top 
management’s concern was how to repair NT’s reputation and the future 
role of the whistleblower; little was said to support or praise PJS for cou-
rageously coming forward and reporting wrongdoing. Hence, because 
PJS at first was assured of support from the new CEO but then later was 
questioned about his future with the company, it looked to him like a 
strong contract breach. The rest of the managers chose to stand by the 
new CEO in silence, not supporting PJS. Nobody reassured him that he 
had done the right thing. As PJS says, “And that meeting was—as I see 
it—the start of my exit.”
The tight psychological contract described by Sverdrup (2014 ) dem-
onstrates how people might feel obligated to fulfill expectations to one 
another, as in “If I do something for you, you will do something for me.”
PJS states: “In a small city .  .  . everyone knows everyone. People that 
are recruited into higher positions are often part of the same network.”
Working with the same suppliers and companies in the business network 
for many years also created close ties: “We had some suppliers that we 
had had for years. It was a very personal relationship. They were friends.”
The narrative also describes close ties to the unions. We interpret this as 
strong horizontal contracts among the employees and possibly among 
the various external stakeholders, which explains why the whistleblow-
ing was such a strain on so many people and relationships. Power dis-
tance matters in whistleblowing cases. Close relations make the process 
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Summing up, the psychological contract breach between PJS and the 
new permanent CEO led to anger and frustration for PJS. The tight psy-
chological contracts between the managers and external stakeholders 
prevented support for the actions taken by PJS and thus represented a 
breach of horizontal contracts.
Choosing to Resign 
In the aftermath, when PJS’s identity became known, many people shunned 
him. Although some colleagues had earlier supported him and encour-
aged him to voice concerns which they had themselves, they were silent 
in the aftermath. One colleague also expressed frustration. PJS’s double 
role—blowing the whistle and remaining in the organization while keep-
ing a secret—created frustration and anger among some colleagues in 
the top leadership group. As one of them said: “One thing might be that 
I do not agree with your assumptions and why you did what you did,
but I certainly don’t agree with you keeping this secret for this long.”
Colleagues had expected information, and by keeping the case a secret,
PJS may have violated a psychological contract with them. PJS had also 
expected more support from external stakeholders, such as the Ministry 
of Culture, but they remained silent. The new permanent CEO and COB 
had promised their support, but gradually PJS realized that his time at 
the company was over: “They never called to ask how I was doing and 
seemed to care more about the people who were angry.”
We have no data from the other parties in the process, but we have 
reason to believe that some of the leaders might have felt a breach of a 
psychological contract upon hearing that PJS had been hiding as a whis-
tleblower. Tight psychological contracts had over time developed among 
the members of the top leadership group. This demonstrates how the 
psychological contract as a perspective allows for an understanding of 
both sides of the contract.
In the aftermath, the COB and others in top management were con-
cerned with restoring NT’s image and focused on normalizing the orga-
nization. The notes and objections in the audit reports had to be handled 
and corrected. Hence, the well-being of the whistleblower got less atten-
tion. For the whistleblower, this might be interpreted as a psychological 
contract breach.
Discussion 
By applying the psychological contract perspective, we hope to have shed 
light on the complexity of a whistleblowing process with respect to the 
different parties involved, the dilemmas raised, and the reason the process 
unfolded as it did. Our analysis shows how psychological contracts both 
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(ideological, relational, transactional), between the group and the orga-
nization (normative), and between individuals (horizontal—tight/loose) 
and whether or not these contracts were fulfilled or breached, can serve 
as one possible explanation of why the whistleblowing process proceeded 
as it did.We argue that all categories of contracts came into play through-
out the whistleblowing process. Sverdrup (2012 ,  2014 ) found that hori-
zontal contracts, and especially tight and relational contracts among 
colleagues in teams, influenced trust, collaborations, and friendship.
These relations are important to people, and naturally one might fear 
violating the contracts. Examples from the narrative demonstrate that 
there probably existed both transactional and relational contracts among 
members of the top-executive team and among board members. Fear of 
losing friendships, together with close relationships in business networks,
might have made colleagues hesitant to report; it might even have tempo-
rarily made them ethically blind, as discussed by Øverenget & Storhaug 
Hole in Chapter 7 . Unwritten agreements and expectations concerning 
mutual loyalty and trust among individuals on the board, in the lead-
ership group, in the Ministry of Culture, and among colleagues within 
NT, seem to have influenced both the development of the whistleblowing 
process and its outcomes. Throughout the process, we get the impression 
of a subdued company culture where people did not voice concerns or 
express opinions openly.
Correcting the wrongdoing in a reasonable amount of time constitutes 
whistleblowing effectiveness ( Near & Miceli, 1995 ;  Trygstad, 2017 ). In 
NT’s case, the whistleblowing process lasted for many years. True, the 
wrongdoing was eventually corrected, but not within a reasonable time,
and the seemingly interminable process put a heavy strain on everyone 
involved.
When blowing the whistle, PJS violated normative psychological con-
tracts established in the company and the top leadership group: the
unwritten expectations of supporting one another and keeping silent
about company affairs. Though the Auditor General ultimately docu-
mented irregularities, PJS nonetheless seemed to get little support from 
co-workers (Auditor General, 2008/2009). Despite documented evidence 
of wrongdoing, it seems like they didn’t dare support the whistleblower 
openly. They might have feared that by supporting the whistleblower,
they too would violate normative psychological contracts and run the 
risk of reprisals themselves, such as social ostracism and loss of ben-
efits and friendship. PJS’s perception of lack of support is common in 
whistleblower cases ( Rehg et al., 2008 ). Retaliation need not be open 
to be effective. There are other, more subtle ways of punishing the
whistleblower—silence, freezing out, wage intimations, and holding back
information ( Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005 ;  Bjørkelo, Einarsen,
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Concluding Remarks 
Our analysis of this whistleblowing case shows that psychological con-
tracts came into play, influencing several critical stages of the process.
The way psychological contracts among people in business networks 
influence decision-making processes and outcomes needs further inves-
tigation. Based on our analysis of critical incidents in this narrative, and 
with support of earlier research into psychological contracts, we find 
that violation, or fear of violation, of both horizontal and vertical con-
tracts influenced outcomes of this whistleblowing process. Psychologi-
cal contracts might hinder employees and leaders from stepping forward 
and reporting, affecting both their willingness to report as well as their 
perception of the seriousness of the wrongdoing. Further, psychologi-
cal contracts influence both decision-making processes and managerial 
responses to whistleblowing throughout the process, and we argue that 
this strongly affected the whistleblowing in this case.
The outcomes of a whistleblowing process depend significantly on
managerial responses and the organizational climate ( Trygstad & Øde-
gaard, 2016 ;  Trygstad, Ødegaard, & Svarstad, 2018 ;  Near & Miceli,
2016 ).According to  Lewis et al. (2014 ), research on managerial responses 
to whistleblowing is still in its infancy, but there is a growing interest in 
them. Vandekerckhove, Brown, and Tsahuridu (2014) argue that manag-
ers must both listen to and support the whistleblower. If managers are 
one of the parties in a whistleblowing case, as here, more conflicts tend 
to arise, the process lasts longer, and some cases remain unsolved ( Trygs-
tad, 2017 ). In our analysis, we find that managerial responses negatively 
influenced the development of the case. We suggest that psychological 
contract theory helps explain these research results and why the whistle-
blowing effectiveness was affected negatively.
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 14 Culture Eats Control for 
Breakfast 
The Difficulty of Designing 
Management Systems for 
Whistleblowing 
June Borge Doornich 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of several large white-collar scandals in the late 1990s,
such as at Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, judicial frameworks worldwide 
have been strengthened to promote and protect employees exposing 
improprieties at their workplace. In many countries, the judicial frame-
work forces companies to implement a management control system that 
both eases the threshold for blowing the whistle and protects the whis-
tleblower afterward. Researchers like myself are now busy studying the 
actual effectiveness of just such systems.
A management control system (MCS) includes “those systems, rules,
practices, values and other activities management put in place” to guide 
employees’ behavior and actions ( Malmi & Brown, 2008 , p.  290;
Simons, 1995 ). Basically, an MCS is a package of five types of control— 
administrative controls, planning, cybernetic controls, reward and com-
pensation, and cultural controls. With whistleblowing, researchers have 
focused on administrative and cultural controls and how they enhance 
the effectiveness of the MCS for promoting and protecting whistleblow-
ing ( Callahan, Dworkin, Fort, & Schipani, 2002 ;  Farooqi, Abid, &
Ahmed, 2017 ;  Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2009 ).
Whereas administrative controls attempt to specify and monitor 
employees’ behavior and actions through formal organizational struc-
tures and systems, policies, and regulations, cultural controls endeavor to 
guide employees’ behavior and actions through informal norms, values,
and belief structures. But scholars investigating the MCS for whistleblow-
ing have found conflicting results on the effectiveness of such controls.
While some scholarship has shown that administrative control mecha-
nisms really do improve employees’ acceptance of whistleblowing—and 
also their sense of protection when reporting on workplace misconduct 
( Bowden & Smythe, 2009 ;  Lee & Fargher, 2013 ;  Miceli et al., 2009 )— 
others have shown that the culture of the company may severely under-
mine administrative controls and actually limit the threshold for both 

















   




202 June Borge Doornich 
control mechanisms alone may not be enough to promote and protect 
whistleblowing. In fact, the culture of the company may, ironically, have 
a still stronger control function—one that undermines the judicial inten-
tion here.
Although previous studies report on how company culture influences 
whistleblowing, their methodological approaches are mainly descriptive 
( Matthiesen, Bjørkelo, & Nielsen, 2008 ;  Trygstad, 2017 ;  Trygstad & 
Ødegård, 2016 ). Other studies rely on quantitative analysis ( Callahan 
et al., 2002 ;  Near & Miceli, 1986 ;  Patel, 2003 ;  Rehg, Miceli, Near, & 
Van Scotter, 2008 ). While both qualitative and quantitative studies are 
useful, nonetheless they do not completely demonstrate how a company’s 
culture can impact whistleblowing over time.
My purpose in this chapter is to explore the effects of culture on whis-
tleblowing.This analysis is based partly on the interviews that relate what 
Peer Jacob Svenkerud (PJS) experienced as a whistleblower in Norsk Tip-
ping (NT). But it’s also based on my own professional observations of 
strong, embedded cultures’ use of administrative controls, while focusing 
on PJS’s case from a Norwegian cultural perspective.
In what follows, I offer an overview of the management control system 
as a package of both administrative and cultural controls, discuss current 
research literature on the effectiveness of those controls for whistleblow-
ing, and then draw on both the NT case and my own observations of 
particularities of the Norwegian culture. I end with some remarks about 
the contributions of this chapter.
Management Control Systems as a Package 
A management control system (MCS) is a set of mechanisms designed 
to guide employees’ behavior toward certain organizational objectives 
( Abernethy & Chua, 1996 ). Because it involves a panoply of both formal 
and informal systems that need to overlap to be effective, the MCS is best 
viewed as a package that is “structured around how control is exercised 
and, as such it broadly maps the tools, systems, and practices manag-
ers have available to formally and informally direct employee behavior” 
( Malmi & Brown, 2008 , p. 295). Accordingly, the MCS package consists 
of five main control categories as illustrated in Table 14.1 .
In the mid-section of the framework, the three control types of
planning— (1) cybernetic, (2) reward, and (3) compensation—are tightly 
linked in a temporal order from left to right. Planning focuses on both 
short-term tactical actions and long-term planning, with defined goals 
for employees to aim for daily.Cybernetic controls are both financial and 
non-financial measures that guide behavior by setting high standards for 
performance and targeted short-term and long-term goals. Reward and 
compensation seek to motivate goal congruence between the financial/ 























































































































































































































































    
 
    
 
 







   
 




         
204 June Borge Doornich 
less relevant here, as I believe they have minor influence on the MCS’s 
effectiveness for promoting and protecting the whistleblower.
Administrative controls are at the bottom of the framework and set the 
structure for the middle section of controls. They seek to direct employ-
ees’ behavior through the way individuals and groups are arranged in the 
organization (organization structure), through where the responsibility 
and accountability are placed (governance structure), and through speci-
fying what behavior and actions are, or are not, to be performed ( poli-
cies and procedures) ( Macintosh & Daft, 1987 ;  Malmi & Brown, 2008 ; 
Simons, 1987 ). Organization structure refers to how departments and 
individuals are arranged in the organization with certain connected rela-
tionships, the intention being to “reduce the variability of behavior and,
in turn, increase its predictability” (Flamholtz, 1983 , p. 158).Governance 
structure refers to the formal structures of authority and accountability 
as well as the communication and coordination between departments 
and individuals—both vertically and horizontally ( Abernethy & Chua,
1996 ). Policies and procedures are those techniques that specify and con-
strain behavior and processes, such as standard operating procedures,
rules, guidelines, and best practices ( Ouchi, 1979 ).
With respect to whistleblowing, the governance structure ideally clari-
fies the formal lines of responsibility for receiving and handling reports 
on misconduct. Ideally, they specify the authority on how to proceed with 
both individuals and groups who report on the whistleblower. Formal 
policies as ethical codes of conduct are formulated to eliminate the risk 
of wrongdoing in the first place and to promote and protect individuals 
should they decide to report. The procedures and policies should detail 
how a whistleblower proceeds to report on misconduct and clarify how 
he or she is protected. Those procedures and policies should be easily 
available and enable anonymous reporting.
Organization structure is the “taken-for-granted values, underlying 
assumptions, expectations, collective memories, and definitions pres-
ent in an organization. It represents ‘how things are done around here’” 
( Cameron & Quinn, 20 11, p. 9). The management-control literature 
presumes that an organization’s culture can be controlled by guiding,
and regulating, employees’ behavior through shared norms, values, and 
belief structures (Flamholtz, Das, & Tsui, 1985). Malmi and Brown 
(2008 ) include three forms of cultural control in their MCS framework: 
value-based, symbol-based, and clan control. Here is their formula-
tion: Value-based controls embrace “the explicit set of organizational 
definitions that senior managers communicate formally and reinforce 
systematically to provide basic values, purpose, and direction of the orga-
nization” (Simons, 1995 , p. 34). Organizational values are the moral,
ethical, and professional attributes that form employees’ character and 
become a guide for judging what is right or wrong in their behavior and 
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behave consistently with both company and societal values. Values oper-
ate as a control mechanism by stating the ideal premises for employees’ 
behavior and actions that have all employees singing from the same sheet 
of music.When the company’s stated values and operating values are dis-
connected, and when the employees’ and company’s values are also sep-
arated, behavior and actions become dysfunctional and unpredictable.
With respect to whistleblowing, values can be very effective as a control 
mechanism for promoting and protecting employees who report mis-
conduct. Values such as loyalty, transparency, and trust that are strongly 
embedded in a company culture may eliminate wrongdoing in the first 
place — or at least encourage employees to report it when they find it.
Continuing with Malmi and Browns’ (2008 ) model, symbol-based 
controls are conscious visual expressions by the company that are inte-
grated at the workplace to influence certain forms of communication,
collaboration, and relations among employees ( Schein, 1991 ). Such
symbolic control mechanisms involve, among other things, the way the 
workspace is designed (e.g., open office landscape vs. closed doors), the 
dress code expected of the employees or specific groups of them (for-
mal vs. informal), and the language used by them (professional, serious,
or unrestrained). I believe that such control mechanisms have minimal 
impact on promoting or protecting whistleblowing, although they may 
symbolize—and even enhance—the general openness and transparency 
of the company.
“Clans,” as the final form of cultural control, refers to employee or 
management cultures fostered within the company through a socializa-
tion process that “instils in them a set of skills and values” that is con-
trolled through “the ceremonies and rituals of the clan” (Ouchi, 1979 ; 
Malmi & Brown, 2008 , p.  295). Malmi and Brown (2008 ) associate 
clans with subgroups within the company that foster a tribal affiliation 
by a particular group of employees. The clan is rooted in a consensus of 
collaboration and reciprocity of trust among its participants. Expected 
behaviors and actions are based on commitments and traditions, fostered 
over the years, that create an atmosphere in which participants bond, car-
ing for one another’s welfare and resisting outside pressures.
But clan cultures can also have potential disadvantages (Cameron &
Quinn, 1999). Employees can be hesitant to ever be thought wrong;
also, clan cultures may lead to a bad corporate environment and poor
performance. In relation to whistleblowing, clan cultures can foster a
negative culture, with members of the clan engaging in unacceptable
workplace behavior that goes under the radar because the reciprocity of
the members ensures their hiding one another’s wrongdoings. Clans can
also make it difficult for non-members to report misconduct, knowing
they’d be viewed as turncoats ( Karaca, 2013 ).When wrongdoings occur
within a clan, monitoring is often done, if done at all, through informal





















206 June Borge Doornich 
control in mind, we turn now to the specific example of whistleblowing 
in Norway.
Lack of Administrative Control Mechanisms 
for Whistleblowing 
In Norway, whistleblowing was enshrined in law in 2007 through the 
Working Environment Act (WEA), which required companies to create a 
management system that facilitates and protects whistleblowers by pro-
hibiting retaliation. Specifically, it required a formal governance struc-
ture for handling whistleblowing within the company and for employees 
reporting misconduct. To complement the formal reporting system, the 
law also expected companies to create ethical codes of conduct, infor-
mal dialogues, and education on risks of misconduct, so as to increase 
employees’ consciousness of what constitutes wrong and right behavior 
and actions ( Eriksen, 2014 ).
Establishing these administrative control mechanisms helps ensure that 
wrongdoing is exposed promptly, letting management act quickly to min-
imize its costs and consequences ( Chung et al., 2004 ;  Lee & Fargher,
2013 ). Companies with a strong corporate governance and good ethical 
codes of conduct are likelier to promote and protect whistleblowing and 
lower the threshold for blowing the whistle ( Bowden & Smythe, 2009 ; 
Lee & Fargher, 2013 ;  Miceli et al., 2009 ); they also experience fewer 
incidents of misconduct ( Somers, 2001 ).
At NT, unfortunately, at the time, there were no administrative con-
trol systems in place for promoting and protecting whistleblowing. Bear 
in mind, though, that PJS’s whistleblowing occurred before the WEA 
went into effect. When he first decided to speak up, he approached the 
chairman of the board, believing that the two of them shared a mutual 
obligation. But PJS had to follow his instincts on how to proceed by 
flying blind, as there was no defined governance structure that clarified 
the formal lines of responsibility for reports on company misconduct.
Nor were there formal policies and procedures in place for promoting 
and protecting whistleblowing. The chairman who was approached by 
PJS was similarly disadvantaged. He lacked formal guidelines for how to 
handle the situation.
In this context of uncertainty, PJS had a second meeting with the chair-
man that included the vice chair. PJS shared the hard copy of gardening 
receipts, which were so incriminating—making it clear to both that some-
thing needed to be done. The chair instructed PJS to continue on with 
business as usual and remain in secret as the whistleblower, as the Senior 
Vice President Information and External Relations, while they investi-
gated the matter. PJS recalls the chairman saying,“Just pretend that noth-
ing happened. Work as you normally do and trust me when I say that I 
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Effect of Culture on Administrative Controls 
Although the WEA requires an effective MCS for whistleblowing that 
prohibits retaliation, whistleblowers in Norwegian companies often
experience it. A 2008 study revealed that in 16% of all whistleblowing 
cases, the whistleblower met with retaliation ( Matthiesen, Bjørkelo, & 
Nielsen, 2008 ). A follow-up study in 2017 showed a worsening trend: in 
25% of all cases the whistleblower met with retaliation ( Trygstad, 2017 ).
These studies document that blowing the whistle carries real risks. The 
degree of retaliation turns out to correlate with the severity of the condi-
tions reported: the more severe the claims, the more punitive the retali-
ation ( Matthiesen et al., 2008 ;  Near & Miceli, 1986 ). Whistleblowers 
often are stamped as disloyal and troublemakers—often even pressured 
to leave the company ( Matthiesen et al., 2008 ;  Near & Miceli, 1986 ; 
Rehg et al., 2008 ;  Trygstad, 2017 ;  Trygstad & Ødegård, 2016 ).
PJS experienced retaliation when he first reported the misconduct, and 
it only became stronger over time. When the misconduct was eventually 
exposed in the media, he was pressured to leave the company. In two 
distinct meetings, the new permanent CEO seemed to pressure him. In 
the first meeting, PJS recalls the CEO expressing: “You have done a very 
good job, he said—Your mission is accomplished. I said, what do you 
mean my mission is accomplished? He said well, you have done what 
you had to do. And now it’s time to move on.” In the second meeting,
the CEO became even more aggressive: “I want you to come up with a 
specific date. If you do not do that, I will make sure that I will reorganize 
your department so that you will no longer be in charge of the communi-
cations department, I just want you to know that!”
After the law was strengthened in 2007, the number of reports on 
misconduct in Norwegian workplaces significantly increased, and the 
scope of criminal conviction also increased ( Transparency International 
Norge, 2018 ). In 2014, that same law was revisited with the aim of 
providing even better insight into how it could be facilitated in compa-
nies and how whistleblowing could be protected by the employer, and 
what consequences whistleblowing should have for the person or orga-
nization that is reported on. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
appointed a committee to investigate these questions, and their findings 
were published in the report “ ONR 2018:6 —Whistleblowing—Values 
and Protection” ( Official Norwegian Reports, 2018 ). Their report drew 
three main conclusions. First, many employees still experience formal 
and informal restriction in their right to blow the whistle. Second, there 
is a lack of both an internal system to protect the whistleblower and 
procedures for how to take prompt actions to investigate the alleged 
wrongdoing. Third, there is a need for greater awareness and changes 
in attitude toward reporting misconduct in Norway’s workplaces. The 
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Taken together, the report from the ONR and the research literature 
agree that administrative control mechanisms are insufficient to promote 
and protect whistleblowing ( Krawiec, 2003 ;  Pascoe & Welsh, 2011 ). Rec-
ommendations have included a need for greater awareness and changes 
in attitudes ( ONR, 2018:6 ), good ethical codes of conduct ( Bowden & 
Smythe, 2009 ;  Lee & Fargher, 2013 ;  Miceli et al., 2009 ), and informal 
dialogues and education on the risks of misconduct ( Eriksen, 2014 ). Ide-
ally, cultural controls will foster a common-clan environment rooted in 
a consensus about appropriate behavior and actions, with shared values 
serving as an ethical platform that is strengthened via communication,
collaboration, and relations through certain organizational symbols to 
create a good working environment, goal achievement, and enhanced 
performance. With all this, however, corporate culture might still under-
mine administrative controls.
From my own observations, it seems that corporate culture in Norway,
stuck in its old ways, can ensure that there is actually continuing resis-
tance to change, despite administrative controls. New juridical frame-
works get implemented within hardened governance and organizational 
structures, with policies and procedures often being changed only to meet 
the minimum requirements of the laws. In addition, any new policies and 
procedures are often met with resistance from the employees, who feel 
over controlled. Their resistance lessens over time, no doubt, as these felt-
intrusions become embedded as routines. But even then, the improved 
administrative controls might prove to be only a dormant control system,
implemented primarily for the sake of appearances. It might roil the com-
pany should it need to make the system actually operative, were someone 
to blow the whistle.
So here’s the point: governance and organizational structures, poli-
cies, and procedures can often become ineffective and superficial when 
they aren’t embedded in the fundamental culture of the company. As the 
Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors put it: “effective internal whistle-
blowing arrangements are an important part of a healthy corporate cul-
ture. But it is also crucial to have the right organizational culture which 
encourages people to speak out without fear” ( 2014 , p. 7).
Clan Culture’s Effect on Whistleblowing 
Studies that have investigated the effectiveness of cultural control show 
that various value-based control mechanisms are important to rein-
force promoting and protecting whistleblowing. For both of those pur-
poses, Callahan et al. (2002 ) found that cultural control should include 
accountability, reliance, and aspiration. Some years later, Farooqi, Abid,
and Ahmed (2017 ) contended that clarity, consistency, and transparency 
should be integrated in cultural control. The same researchers further 
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communicated throughout the company ( 2017 ). Several other studies 
have shown that when values are unclear, it raises ambiguity as to expec-
tations of appropriate behavior and actions. When employees are left 
to themselves to judge what is right or wrong, the risk for misconduct 
increases (Bird & Waters, 1989;  Kaptein, 1998 ; Balder & Tyler, 2005).
Value clarity creates a platform that guides employees in their attitudes 
and actions.
But clarity of values isn’t enough. Those values need to be embedded,
ensuring congruence between stated values and the daily practice of both 
employees and management ( Farooqi et al., 2017 ). Management of the 
company must behave in congruence with expected values, since employ-
ees normally follow their leaders. Kaptein (1998 ) showed that unethical 
behavior by employees often occurred when management engaged in it 
themselves.
In the case of NT, the misconduct occurred at the management level,
building a practice of continuous misconduct with values that reflected 
something completely different from promoting and protecting whistle-
blowing. A good ethical platform with values such as loyalty, transpar-
ency, and trust, in my opinion, wasn’t present in the company; its culture 
seemed to be affected by self-interest and friend services with economic 
benefits.
Studies have shown that a transparent culture will make employees feel 
obliged to blow the whistle on misconduct ( Farooqi et al., 2017 ;  Kaptein,
1998 ). It will also help ensure that employees correct one another’s behav-
ior, thus lowering the risk of misconduct in the first place ( Farooqi et al.,
2017 ;  Kaptein, 1998 ). Moral dilemmas and unethical behavior should be 
discussed among employees to clarify what is misbehavior in situations 
common to their workplace. At NT, the management seemed to ensure 
minimum transparency in order to hide their laxity. An example recalled 
by PJS is related to the budgeting process. A close ally of the CEO, one 
of the department heads, asked for 150 million Norwegian kroner in the 
budget and encountered no challenge as to where the money would be 
spent: “He didn’t even need to press on the budget. I remember in budget 
meetings, he says—‘Well, I need 150 million kroner for this.’”And when 
we asked—‘How did you come up with that figure? He just put his figure 
to his mouth and—‘well thats what it feels like.’” PJS also recalled that 
the budget of the CEO himself wasn’t discussed either: “He (the first 
CEO) said—‘Well, I have budget this and that’s what I need.’”
Misconduct often is perpetrated by whole groups of employees, both 
reflecting and further fostering a clan culture that has its own set of val-
ues and expectations as to what’s acceptable ( Farooqi et al., 2017 ;  Punch,
2009 ).Wrongdoings by a clan are often shielded and thus never exposed,
as values among the clan members are based on collaboration and reci-
procity, where everyone is expected to support the other “family-members”
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developed at the management level. The clan was run by the company’s 
strong threesome: the CEO, the vice CEO, and one of the department 
heads.According to PJS,“It was something that they had skillfully crafted 
for years and that was part of—an important element of the company 
culture.” The situation at NT illustrates how a clan culture can distort a 
company’s ethical values, creating an effect directly opposite from what 
is desired of the management control system framework with respect to 
using the clan as a control mechanism.
Over time, the NT clan strengthened as its members got ever more 
deeply involved with questionable actions and the members became more 
dependent on one another’s loyalty not to report it, especially as the 
severity increased. The questionable behaviour could continue as a “nor-
mal” practice, with employees outside the clan unable to challenge it out 
of fear of the likely consequences: “Everyone knew what was going on 
and they were very critical to a variety of activities that were going on.”
“I was somewhat puzzled to learn that people knew but no one said any-
thing.” PJS describes this is as a very subdued culture in which questions 
were neither raised nor tolerated: “And, if you asked questions it was a 
common understanding that it could have a consequence.”With the fear 
of retaliation, the clan could control the threshold for other employees 
contemplating blowing the whistle on them.
From my point of view, in Norway we speak about a phenomenon 
called “the boys club” ( gutteklubben grei), where skilled men with a good 
sense for business always find a way to satisfy both themselves and fellow 
members of the club—by hiring obliging people in powerful positions,
granting bidding rounds, and extending other significant business favors.
They are found both internally in companies and also externally. At the 
national level, they include men from economically important sectors and 
companies; and at local levels, they can be found within smaller societ-
ies and local business sectors. The “boys club” at NT is a good example 
of this phenomenon, where a strong group of men inside the company 
governed all decisions and actions made, along with powerful men from 
external parties, ranging from local entrepreneurs to politicians with a 
central national position.
The questionable behavior by part of the management was occasionally
challenged by the employees, but it seemed to be so strongly embedded 
in management practice that it had become the norm. Even when mem-
bers of the management team occasionally tried to confront the CEO 
about some practices, they were ignored or disregarded. One instance,
as recalled by PJS, was when a high-ranking manager talked to the CEO 
and vice CEO about the lawn mowing: “you know we cannot continue 
on doing this.” He was basically told to shut up. “This is not something 
that you should concern yourself with. This is something that the Board 
has approved. Don’t ask any more questions.” This illustrates the power 
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will be labeled as “difficult” and “bothersome.” The clan thus exercises 
authority over other employees that goes well beyond their formal role 
and responsibility. It can be so embedded in the daily practice that people 
don’t even think to challenge its members, since their behavior is taken 
for granted. What seems to be visible in the NT case is that no members 
of the clan feared that their misconduct would be exposed and reported.
They assumed that new members of the company, through the socializa-
tion process, would accept the practices as “business as usual.”
Conclusion 
Pascoe and Welsh (2011 ) show the important relationship between 
national law and strong corporate governance structures containing 
explicit policies and procedures to both promote and protect whistle-
blowing, but that remains insufficient. Peter Drucker coined the phrase 
“culture eats strategy for breakfast.” One could just as easily say “Cul-
ture eats control for breakfast.” In the context of whistleblowing, while 
administrative control is important, I believe that culture is even more 
crucial. A company’s culture must support administrative controls; oth-
erwise they are likely to be undermined.
Companies need to implement value-based control mechanisms that 
foster clarity in expected ethical conduct, and consistency in expectations 
and practice.This will help ensure transparency, with an open dialog about 
what constitutes right and wrong actions. In effect, it’s a broader “clan-
based” control mechanism, espousing good ethical values and ensuring 
that employees have a “we-ness” feeling based on collaboration, loyalty,
and reciprocity of trust.
While administrative control mechanisms are certainly important, they 
don’t ensure that the corporate culture mirrors them. A good ethical cul-
ture will ensure that misconduct does not happen in the first place, or, if
it does, it’s promptly reported. To hold the moral compass steady, a high-
minded corporate culture for promoting and protecting whistleblowing is
essential. Samuelson and Gentile (2005 ) put it well: “whistleblowing isn’t a
desirable end; it is a last resort.When we reach that stage, it means we have
failed, both as organizations and as people” ( Samuelson & Gentile, 2005 ).
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 15 Whistleblowing as a Means 
of (Re)Constituting an 
Organization 
William Rothel Smith III, Jeffrey W. Treem,
and Joshua B. Barbour 
Scholarly studies of an organization often focus on one or more of its 
outcomes—such things as its survival, failure, performance, or produc-
tion. The larger aim, nearly always, is to identify the specific resources,
attributes, or conditions most likely to produce a successful outcome in 
any similar organization—or, for that matter, what it takes to avoid a bad 
outcome. So, for example, one might analyze the crisis at Norsk Tipping 
(NT) in terms of what had been lacking there, raising questions such as 
“What checks or oversight of financial expenditures might have limited 
the CEO’s authority?” Such questions imply that, whatever the organiza-
tional context, crises—bad outcomes—can be prevented if only the right 
conditions are in place ahead of time. Whistleblowing, in this view, is a 
product of failed organizational structures that facilitated wrongdoing 
or stymied their correction. Whistleblowing, in short, is an action taken 
to address an organization gone wrong—a reaction to an already broken 
communication process.
Alternatively, one can view whistleblowing as a voiced protest against 
current norms of organizing in an environment organized over time to 
stifle self-criticism.Whistleblowing, in this larger view, signals the need to 
reconstitute the organization, and aims to marshal constitutive resources 
to do so. Hence, in this view, whistleblowing is not just an indictment of 
the organization, but also, ultimately, and more importantly, an appeal 
for a different way to organize it. As such, whistleblowing will be under-
stood as situated between whatever interactions preceded it and what it 
now invites.
To our mind, viewing whistleblowing as constitutive, or reconstitu-
tive, provides us two clear benefits. First, it recognizes what seems a self-
evident truth, namely, a deep understanding of whistleblowing requires 
our examining interactions and discourses among a whole network of 
actors over time. And second, it promotes our investigating a different 
way for an organization to organize itself. In other words, it’s not merely 
an objection to, or exposure of, the status quo. It’s a call for a re-do.
The present whistleblowing case involving Peer Jacob Svenkerud
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communication-constitutes-organizing (CCO) lens ( Barbour & Gill, 2017 ; 
Barbour, Gill, & Barge, 2018 ;  Cooren, 2010 ;  Cooren & Fairhurst, 2009 ; 
Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004 ;  Taylor, 1999 ;  Taylor & Van Every, 2000 ).
CCO scholars contend that communication is central to the emergence,
enactment, and evolution of organizations. It is not only the simple 
expression of ideas or messages, but also in fact it actively produces,
generates, and transforms organizations. Put another way, organizations 
aren’t merely contexts in which communication occurs, or entities that 
produce communicative products, but are themselves literally enacted 
through actions and interactions. CCO views organizations as always 
becoming. They are an ongoing accomplishment of a network of actors.
In this chapter, we show how a CCO lens interprets key aspects of
PJS’s story. In doing so, we show the value of construing whistleblowing 
as literally constructive, indeed as  reconstitutive. 
The scholarly movement of communicative constitution of organi-
zations (CCO) proposes that communication is critical in constituting
an organization—that is, very organization itself. CCO approaches can 
encompass both inductive ( Taylor & Van Every, 2000 ) and deductive 
( McPhee & Zaug, 2009 ) explanations for collective activity. In either 
case, the focus is not on communication as a variable of study within 
an already formed organization. Instead, the seemingly mundane, day-
to-day communicative actions of strategizing, branding, hiring, firing,
promoting, requesting, ordering—all of these things ultimately serve to 
constitute the object of an organization. Taylor (2011 ) described the con-
stitutive stance succinctly as “Not communication in organization, but 
rather organization in communication” (p. 4).
Generally, CCO helps us understand how the meaning of an organiza-
tion emerges through communication: who gets to participate in creating 
that meaning, and ongoing communicative efforts to somehow reconsti-
tute (i.e., improve) the organization.
We situate the present analysis primarily within the Montréal School 
of CCO scholarship ( Cooren, 2006 ;  Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004 ;  Taylor,
1999 ;  Taylor & Van Every, 2000 ). We like how it emphasizes the ways 
that legitimacy, authority, and voice are contested among actors through 
their ongoing interactions.
CCO 
A central concern of CCO is how the voices of myriad organization
members come to constitute a single organizational chorus ( Barbour et al.,
2018 ;  Kuhn, 2012 ). To bridge the gap between observing micro-level 
communicative events and explaining larger collective structures, Mon-
tréal School scholars suggest that a recursive interplay between what they 
call conversations and texts scale up to constitute a collective actor (the 
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interactions, and practices. These conversations in turn generate a  text, 
or shared interpretation of the conversation. This interplay between text 
and conversation forms a self-organizing loop, or “coorientation” sys-
tem ( Taylor, Cooren, Giroux, & Robichaud, 1996 ;  Taylor & Van Every,
2000 ), wherein texts are “the inputs to, and outcomes of, conversation”
( Kuhn, 2008 , p. 1233).
In other words, voices eventually become a chorus as individuals draw 
upon this shared interpretation, this “text,” to guide their conversations 
and collectively pursue goals. Texts are usually treated as an invisible 
resource, or an “understanding,” that guides conversation rather than an 
explicit “thing” that individuals reference. But not always. “Texts” can 
also be periodically inscribed into concrete forms. Think, for example,
of vision statements, policy documents, and procedural manuals, as well 
as organizational messaging to external audiences ( Kuhn, 2008 ). During 
the conversation phase, which is ongoing, the resulting text is further 
altered. The organization itself emerges through communication in that it 
is described in text and enacted through conversation. Individuals collec-
tively coorient by focusing on a shared object (the text, or organization).
For example, three individuals starting a new environmental conservancy 
nonprofit may talk over the goals, purpose, activities, and practices of 
their emerging organization. Although not necessarily codified as a mis-
sion statement, this initial conversation creates a shared text that might 
be summarized as oceanic stewardship. As time passes and the nonprofit 
grows, the newly hired accountants, marketers, and fundraisers coorient.
They draw upon and alter the shared idea of what oceanic stewardship
actually means. As this text gains distance, the meaning and purpose of 
the organization, the text, might shift and expand to encompass sea life 
conservation, reducing reliance on plastic packaging, lobbying, educat-
ing, and social media activism. As individuals within the nonprofit carry 
out their daily work, the shared text of  oceanic stewardship, whatever 
the text may have evolved to mean, guides their actions. That is, com-
munication is both the site of emergence and the surface upon which the 
organization continues to exist ( Taylor, 1999 ).
Instead of focusing, like other approaches, on organizational structures
as influencing actions, which risks construing organizational life as largely 
static and predictable, CCO wisely views all organizational communica-
tion as the exercise of agency by a network of human and non-human 
actors, and human and non-human voices ( Cooren, 2004 ;  Cooren & 
Fairhurst, 2009 ;  Cooren, Kuhn, Cornelissen, & Clark, 2011 ). In such
a view, structure can be seen as whatever the actors do to materialize 
and “author” the organization to its own members, customers, or other 
stakeholders ( Cooren, 2010 ). So, as an alternative to documenting the 
presence of organizational structures, we can examine what  Kuhn (2008 ) 
terms authoritative texts that provide meaning and identity for firms. An 
authoritative text is the abstract representation of the entire organization 
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reflected in the emerging and shared meaning around “oceanic steward-
ship” in the foregoing example.Authoritative texts provide a “trajectory”
for organizational action and “portrays the relations of authority and cri-
teria of appropriateness that become present in ongoing practice” ( Kuhn,
2012 , p. 553). These texts are often revealed through networks of mean-
ing that favor certain characteristics of organizing ( Kuhn, 2008 ) rather 
than official codified policy. In other words, an authoritative text may 
be as simple as “how things are done around here” and not a solidified 
document. Despite their slippery character, authoritative texts help define 
organizations by providing members with a focus for coorientation that 
can guide actions.
Authoritative texts occur in the continuous flow of discourse that is 
found in everyday communication practices.Voices coalesce as fragments 
that can nonetheless be seen as a whole in the gestalt. Understanding 
the organizing of organizations requires examining talk and text not as 
isolated communication, but as the basis of action that provides mean-
ing ( Alvesson & Karreman, 2000 ;  Engestrom, 1999 ). Authoritative texts 
should be understood as “intertextually” influenced in the sense that they 
are shaped by, interact with, and encounter other texts and related dis-
courses ( Schoeneborn, Kuhn, & Kärreman, 2019 ). Individuals make sense 
of the actions they take and establish and assert power through ongoing 
communication ( Mumby,1987 ;  Mumby & Stohl, 1991 ;  Weick,1979 ). As 
actors reproduce and disseminate texts in organizing, they create narra-
tives around the meaning of work and the formation of ongoing practices 
( Clair, 1993 ;  Deetz, 2003 ).
Authoritative texts emerge through the ongoing interplay of grand ide-
ologies about how firms should be organized and operate (the Discourse),
and everyday conversations that occur within the activity of work (the 
discourse) ( Alvesson & Karreman, 2000 ). The recognition of D/discourse 
at both the micro-level of interaction and the macro-level of institutions 
suggests that its role in organization should be understood as a recursive 
process in which each helps form the other. Organizations may emerge 
through conversation, but they don’t emerge for the sake of conversation.
No, they emerge and continue to exist in order to accomplish situated 
goals ( Engestrom, 1999 , p. 170). Recognizing the action-oriented nature 
of D/discourse in organizations prompts researchers to examine the pro-
duction and implications of interactions.
The Enactment of an Authoritative Text at Norsk Tipping 
PJS’s fascinating retrospective account of his tenure at Norsk Tipping 
(NT) in Chapter 1 lets us access the constitution and reconstitution of the 
organization’s authoritative text. That is, we can see a lone voice attempt-
ing to shift the whole that has coalesced. The interviews with PJS, the 
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record of his correspondence with his attorney—all indicate how events 
over time shifted the constitution of NT and the communication choices 
made by actors in conversation with others.
A helpful starting point for making sense of the communicative con-
stitution of NT is to trace the D/discourses present. We can examine the 
constitution of NT at two levels: (1) the broader perception of what the 
organization was as a whole, and (2) the internal, situated discourses that 
signified to members what the organization was.
Macro-Level Discourse of NT 
The fraud at NT was so startling in part because the organization was 
widely viewed as both upright and a desirable place to work. That, in 
short, was the prevailing external reading of the authoritative text of NT.
Over decades, through its prominent public engagement and generous 
disbursement of winnings, NT acted in a manner consistent with what 
was expected from a reliable, state-owned company. Moreover, because 
of its monopolistic position and government support, the discourse 
regarding the organization became self-fulfilling. People came to trust 
that NT acted in the way a lottery organization should because it was the 
only organization of that type that they regularly experienced. Activities 
such as sponsoring athletic organizations and events allowed NT to have 
a prominent voice in the country and established the organization as a 
productive contributor to Norwegian life.
Indeed, at several points in PJS’s interviews, his musings over the pre-
cise role of a state-owned organization are triggered by his awareness of 
the disjunction between the prevailing reading of NT’s authoritative text 
and his own reading of it. For instance, in his first interview he reflects 
on his decision to join NT: “I thought this company, which was nation-
ally based, 100% owned by the Norwegian government would be very 
conscientious about how they handled their financial matters.” But after 
discovering NT allotted an exceptionally large budget for marketing,
advertising, and research (several hundred million Norwegian crowns 
combined), he found himself wondering, “Is this right in terms of being a 
non-profit organization and in accordance with what non-profit means?”
A key element in the communicative constitution of NT is the way 
leadership came to shield decisions from the public, and even to members 
of the organization itself, to preserve the positive prevailing reading. PJS 
notes that given the funding and mission of the organization, he “had 
an understanding that we [NT] had to be visible.” Yet over time, as the 
CEO altered patterns of spending, including making deals with friends,
authorizing lavish business expenditures, and appropriating funds for his 
personal benefit, the company’s activities and strategy were shared with 
ever fewer individuals. The CEO developed a small, close-knit group of 
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would freeze you out.” Changing what he communicated about and with 
whom, the CEO effectively obscured NT’s inner workings—and also pre-
served its image as a highly respected organization with a decades-old 
sterling reputation.
Meanwhile, PJS also encountered concrete texts from the Norwegian 
Ministry of Cultural Affairs that challenged his assumptions about NT’s 
transparency. Although he had expected that the monopoly—in fact, a 
national monopoly—would practice perfect transparency both inside 
and outside its walls, he learned that “[NT] was, for some strange reason,
under a law that did not require them to be as open as other state-owned 
companies.” He later also learned that the Ministry of Culture had ruled 
that NT should receive cover under a law that obscured its operations in 
order to insulate it from increasing competition from online and interna-
tional gaming companies. Establishing the appropriate level of transpar-
ency for NT involved a complex mixture of concrete and figurative texts.
The very laws enacted to regulate addictive gambling behavior, ensure 
the financial viability of the state-owned monopoly, and safeguard the 
continued financial support for prosocial causes ultimately allowed NT 
greater leeway to perpetuate and cover up financial wrongdoing. NT’s 
embracing of a mission to help curb destructive gambling gave the orga-
nization greater legitimacy and authority as an entity supporting the pub-
lic good. In sum, the public Discourse indicated that NT existed and 
acted to support the betterment of Norway and the lives of Norwegians.
NT’s annual reports also operated as a communicative device that sup-
ported this image of it as a well-managed, thoroughly responsible orga-
nization. PJS notes that he himself drew on these annual reports as texts 
with internal and external audiences to portray the organization as one 
forever challenged to balance the monopolistic regulation of a market 
with the need for sponsoring public benefits. Surely that alone deserved 
applause! 
During the pre-whistleblowing time frame, multiple flows of seemingly 
inconsequential communication sustained NT. Much of the communi-
cative “stuff” that constituted NT was procedural and mundane. For 
example, the day-to-day actions of NT’s departments—filing invoices,
researching new products, hiring, sending emails, updating websites,
interacting with sponsors, etc.—kept the assemblage of NT going. But 
these same seemingly mundane communicative actions helped perpetu-
ate the wrongdoing. In one example, PJS experienced discomfort that the 
CEO had awarded a high-value contract to a close personal friend.When 
PJS asked the CEO about the outward appearance of this controversial 
practice, the man airily proclaimed, “I’m not worried about it. Just write 
a press release. We have everything covered. We have done our internal 
evaluations.” Here the CEO references a separate flow of conversation-
producing texts legitimizing his conduct. This story provides a notewor-
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can actually have larger implications for the constitution of the organi-
zation. The texts—a press release and “internal evaluations”—conjured 
an image of an aboveboard organization. Through these practices, these 
texts reinforced NT’s “business as usual” ethos.
It’s not luck or happenstance that the wrongdoing at NT persisted for 
so long without more scrutiny or outcry. Rather, NT benefitted from a 
long-held, well-established, and carefully crafted Discourse establish-
ing NT as above reproach. Indeed, the stellar reputation of NT and its 
stature in the community were principal reasons why PJS had excitedly 
joined the organization. Purposeful, strategic communicative actions 
taken by NT in the form of annual reports, sponsorships, press releases,
public events, and management appearances reinforced this Discourse 
and made it material. As a result, a powerful authoritative text emerged 
that shielded the organization from criticism from employees and exter-
nal stakeholders alike.
PJS notes that as the extravagant and irresponsible spending at NT 
increased, and its members’ actions became further misaligned with pop-
ular expectations for public organizations, questions from the press and 
other government officials increased. A CCO perspective would read this 
dynamic as the authoritative text and associated communication of NT 
now diverging from the historical construction of expectations regard-
ing how the organization ought to act. But despite the growing uneasi-
ness over NT’s management, these sentiments did not coalesce into a text 
that could have shifted the broader Discourse about NT, and it therefore 
didn’t initiate substantive change. The broader external discourse wasn’t 
powerful enough to influence change because a persistent positive dis-
course within NT always countered it.
Micro-Level Discourse at NT 
The extent to which the actions of leadership, and the CEO’s in particu-
lar, went unchallenged by workers within the organization is a consistent 
facet of PJS’s story of his time at NT. Here, for example, he recalls the 
atmosphere at NT that surrounded and shielded the CEO: “it soon became 
clear to me that the CEO was very much an institution at the company”
(int 18, p. 2).When the great man entered the building, employees “raced 
up and shook his hand . . . you went into the restroom and made sure that 
your tie was straight.” And “when he came into the reception, it almost 
seemed like people were standing up, saluting him,” suggesting that the 
CEO, like a generalissimo, encouraged reverence, mixed with fear, in his 
lower-level employees. PJS explained that “all these things around him 
and his personality built up over time.” Other stories emphasized the 
CEO’s need for a larger-than-life personality. The stories gained distance 
and traveled from their original occurrence to represent the type of lead-
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The self-serving actions of the CEO were widely known throughout the
organization, and they came to constitute how the organization operated.
The stories were among its givens, and workers just accepted them. It 
was the culture. But PJS, up closer to the executive suite, found it hard to 
adjust. As he noted about his own socialization, “I tried to learn the cul-
ture. But immediately, these [countervailing] stories came along”—stories 
of excess spending and extravagance. In one such tale, the company 
footed the bill to construct a replica Viking ship, rent Viking costumes,
and have the CEO ride the ship into an event intended to welcome World 
Lottery Association delegates to Norway. The company spent, on aver-
age, in the neighborhood of 100,000 crowns per person (more than
$11,000 USD) for this 50-person event. Other stories of extravagant gifts 
from suppliers (such as a holiday trolley full of gifted liquor), expensive 
travel, private chauffeurs, and a Mercedes limousine with a well-stocked 
bar, were prevalent. The stories provided a model for NT employees and 
a basis of what was normal at NT. These stories could have been fodder 
for criticism or accusations of malfeasance, but against the backdrop of 
the charismatic reputation of the CEO and the positive reputation of NT,
they were either ignored, excused, or explained away as how he chose to 
conduct business.
Two distinct communication strategies designed to show its ongoing 
success sustained the discourse that everything was just fine at NT. First,
the CEO stifled dissent and criticism from associates. Here is PJS reflect-
ing on the general understanding of the company’s culture: “it was a 
very subdued culture .  .  . not very many asked questions. And if you 
asked questions, there was an internal understanding that if you asked 
too many questions, that will have a consequence.” Leadership afforded 
workers few opportunities to question the decisions or the direction of the 
organization. Second, through his position leading external communica-
tion, PJS himself felt pressure to portray the organization as responsible 
and productive. The annual reports, press releases, and press interviews 
were texts constructed to reinforce a glowing view of NT. Those working 
within NT had little opportunity to alter the nature of communication 
around the direction of the company, and management and the com-
munication professionals at NT obscured or obfuscated any reasons to 
question it.
Authority in the Construction and Attempted 
Reconstruction of NT 
Modern organizations have formal hierarchies of institutional author-
ity, with individuals near the top afforded greater authority (Weber,
1946; Fayol, 1949). Descriptions of his CEO as possessing magisterial 
authority, simply by virtue of his lofty position, dominate PJS’s early sto-
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prevalent, a CCO lens argues for viewing authority as a distributed and 
negotiated phenomenon. The performative aspects of the CEO’s role and 
his charisma matter. Rather than authority being equated with hierarchi-
cal position, CCO theory prompts us to consider how authority emerges 
through communicative interaction, distributed among actors.
Taking this view, an analysis of the present case can reveal how com-
munication constituted and shifted authority over time. In particular,
PJS’s comments regarding the non-transparency of the actions and
decision-making at NT, and how leadership resisted transparency,
reveal the functioning of authority in communication, not just through
the communication of those in positions of power. In this case, author-
ity over who could have input into organizing offers a different view
of transparency that centers on understanding the exercise of control
over how NT was made more or less visible to actors by communi-
cation. Discourses are a product of what actors may see, know, and
perceive. So when managements prevent individuals from seeing an
organization, they are unlikely to communicate in ways that shift exist-
ing discourses.
From a coorientation perspective, the NT case shows how the con-
versations that lead to a shared authoritative text, one distanced from
the local, were often restricted to a privileged few. As early as PJS’s first 
interview, he references “off-record meetings” between the Ministry of 
Culture and top executives at NT. Worker protections through Norwe-
gian unions might have given them the resources and cover needed to 
challenge the malfeasance at NT, but the CEO so tightly controlled access 
to the flow of conversation constituting the coorientation process at NT 
that union representatives on the board were ineffectual. PJS recalled that
the CEO and vice president would hold pre-board meetings with the union 
representatives to ensure that those representatives didn’t challenge any-
thing later, during the actual meetings. He explained: “that was just to 
keep them in place, to show authority . . . they called them into a meeting 
before the board meeting and then told them that, ‘This is how we want 
it,’ and that’s how it went.”Thus, leadership co-opted the representatives’ 
authority to preserve its own legitimacy.
Their communication choices also limited the effectiveness of commu-
nication meant to challenge the malfeasance and shift the conversation 
at NT. When PJS confronted the board of directors with allegations of 
wrongdoing, he had to face a meeting at which the board anatomized 
each allegation point by point. Earlier, PJS had asked the advice of a highly 
respected lawyer, judge, and mediator with experience investigating cor-
porate corruption for how to approach this meeting. The man cautioned,
“Everything you say will—they will attempt to downplay or dismiss . . .
everything you do, they will attempt to diminish or make less significant 
or dismiss.” Indeed, the board attempted to explain away issues of wrong-
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aside as “strategic meetings” for which they had no receipts. After mini-
mizing each allegation, the board asked PJS if he was “satisfied” with the 
response rather than working to actually change the corrupt practices.
Instead of addressing the underlying concerns, they shifted the purpose 
of the communication to satisfying PJS, at least nominally. This meeting 
represents another example of competing efforts to control the conversa-
tion and resulting textual outcomes. As this case illustrates, the exercise 
of authority relied less on formal hierarchical position, though bolstered 
by it, than on strategic communicative actions. Whereas board meetings 
appeared, superficially, as a site of acceptance and upholding question-
able practices, PJS noted that certain conversations beyond the control 
of the CEO generated a different textual outcome. He explained: “There 
was a consensus among the top leadership group [that] to go against the 
CEO and to criticize the CEO openly, entailed a risk to them . .  . still,
though, the corridor talk communicated differently.” He went on to say 
that individuals would privately chat with him after leadership meetings 
and voice concerns about particular questionable business practices but 
would not do so in visible ways. As the CEO attempted to control the 
coorientation process and create a shared interpretation that everything 
was normal and aboveboard through his strategic communication, other 
texts began to form and gain distance that countered the CEO’s desired 
text.
Voice as a Means of Legitimate Resistance to Authority 
To shift the discourse regarding the appropriateness of actions by NT’s 
leadership, PJS needed to communicate an alternative discourse. He
needed, that is, to  voice a different way of being; he needed to intervene in 
the flow of conversation. The concept of “organizational member voice”
owes much to the work of Hirschman (1970 ), who discussed three poten-
tial clusters of choices for action and communication that individuals 
have in confronting the sort of rupture that occurred at NT (see Chap-
ter 2). First, they can decide to exit the organization and avoid, condemn,
or distance themselves from the issue. Put another way, they can choose 
invisibility, silence, or speaking up from the outside. Second, they might 
conspicuously display loyalty and remain aboard but keep silent, at least 
for the time being, regarding any existing issues, probably just hoping 
that the organization would eventually turn things around. Third, they 
can actively use their voice: they can communicate concerns, undertake 
efforts to improve conditions, or call attention to problems. Some schol-
ars have since presented a fourth path for members, termed “neglect.” It 
involves individuals recognizing the problem yet taking no action—just 
waiting, resignedly, for the inevitable collapse ( Farrell & Rusbult, 1992 ).
In PJS’s case, he opted for a fifth response: voicing his concerns, while still 
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Whistleblowing is a particular form of voice for dissent and resis-
tance ( Near & Jensen, 1983 ;  Stewart, 1980 ). Viewed through a CCO 
lens, whistleblowing attempts to constitute dissent as legitimate—and to 
undermine the legitimacy of existing authoritative texts. With the crisis 
at NT, this lens looks past individual acts of misconduct to acknowledge 
the virtual cascade of communication by actors over time that created 
the conditions that then supported wrongdoing and shielded perpetra-
tors. The actions of PJS were his attempt to resist and redirect the domi-
nant authoritative text, to constitute different organizing. As  Gossett and 
Kilker (2006 ) noted, “By openly articulating their concerns, dissenting 
members provide an oppositional discourse that can challenge the domi-
nant narrative and provide an alternative for making sense of the orga-
nization” (p. 66).
But the same organizational structures that empower wrongdoing to 
occur over time also make whistleblowing extremely risky, as those same 
structures are the matrix against which communicating dissent must often 
occur ( Gabriel, 1999 ). In PJS’s case, whistleblowing meant having to go 
outside the company leadership and communicate his concerns directly 
to the board of directors. His initial efforts to do so were either ignored 
or actively discouraged with name-calling and ridicule. This aspect of 
the case accords with some research documenting that whistleblowing 
occurs after active efforts to voice concerns within an organization fall 
short ( Stewart, 1980 ). It was only when PJS found that his communica-
tion efforts weren’t spurring an alternative path of action within NT that 
he communicated with other actors who might have greater authority to 
alter the dominant NT discourse.
What a CCO Lens Can Tell Us About Whistleblowing 
and Organizations 
Whistleblowing Shaped by Time and Place 
As a communicative act, whistleblowing typically does not occur at the 
time of the wrongdoing. Instead, it emerges based on contextual factors 
that eventually lead a person to deem it as necessary, appropriate, or 
feasible. Also typically, before the whistleblower (or, more often, their 
complaint) becomes public, that person remains an active organization 
member. The eventual meaning and effectiveness of the whistleblowing 
are influenced by the timing of the complaint and the series of activities 
that have preceded it, as well as by the distinct roles occupied by the 
whistleblower and others implicated. When the whistleblowing occurs,
the organizational role of the whistleblower will affect his or her author-
ity by shaping others’ perceptions of their motivations. Yet, member 
voice can also lose authority when whistleblowers leave their organiza-
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insider. They are now outliers, whether they remain or exit altogether.
They may be labeled as disgruntled, vindictive, or opportunistic. More-
over, the shift from in-group member to out-group member makes them 
more susceptible to attacks from remaining co-workers who can portray 
them as actually never fitting in or as ineffectual.
In the wake of major fraud, outsiders may wonder how it could have 
been sustained for so long, and seemingly involved so many different 
people, without anyone protesting. What’s overlooked is that the fraud 
rarely operates as a broad, coordinated conspiracy within the entire orga-
nization. More often, it functions exactly as it did at NT, where people 
in authority make decisions that they then shield from others or that few 
have the insight or the ability to change.
The whistleblowing authority of PJS derived in part from the sheer 
length and breadth of his insider knowledge. He could speak to a series 
of misdeeds committed over years and could even present them yet more 
concretely in list form to the board. Given the inertia of organizational 
discourse over time, and the authority generated by texts produced over 
years and across contexts, isolated claims, unlike PJS’s, aren’t nearly so 
likely to be seen as authoritative or powerful in shifting communication 
about ways of working. Therefore, we must view whistleblowing efforts 
as situated within, and a product of, a specific history of macro- and 
micro-level discourses regarding appropriate ways of organizing specific 
organizations. The case of PJS at NT exhibits the contingent nature of 
authority and associated discourses.
Whistleblowing as Precarious Authority 
Scholarship consistently recognizes the huge risk assumed by a whistle-
blower. It includes not only the potential for retribution, but also the 
possibility that the complaint itself will be distrusted or ignored. The 
whistleblower’s claim to authority is inherently paradoxical. In demon-
strating that others have transgressed, the whistleblower may reveal their 
own complicity in transgressions. This paradox is reflected in the per-
sistent moral dilemma faced by PJS regarding his appropriate course of 
action. He sounded the alarm only when he was ready to acknowledge,
painfully, his own role in perpetuating the misconduct and genuinely 
believed the organization would not change without his intervention. He 
knew that his role as a leading communicator for NT provided him with 
inside information that could be critical in exposing wrongdoing—but 
that also made him complicit in perpetuating the charade.
His eventual success in convincing others of wrongdoing demonstrates 
how texts, as non-human actors, can exercise authority and undermine 
extant discourses.Though stories of extravagance regarding the CEO were 
widely known, the man’s behavior could often be rationalized as support-
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entertaining, and the like. It wasn’t until PJS produced receipts exhibiting 
the CEO’s personal lawn-care expenditures that the board got concrete,
unimpeachable evidence of impropriety. Its specificity and concreteness 
provided him with authority, but the fact that the text was decoupled 
from PJS himself explains its effects in organizing.
Conclusion 
PJS’s case reveals how the entirety of the events were, in the final analy-
sis, communicative attempts to reconstitute the organization. They under-
score in CCO the need to conceptualize not just the flow of conversation 
and emergence of text, but also the strategic communication that actors 
employ to intervene in construction processes. NT had been constituted 
as having an organization dominated by a culture of deference to leader-
ship, plus an acceptance of employee subordination and submission to 
established ways of working. As details of the whistleblowing became 
more widely known, both internally and externally, the elements demon-
strated the communication involved in responding to the whistleblowing.
Attempts to reframe the organization—to put a new face on it—were stra-
tegic communicative actions aimed to reconstitute it. NT’s essence was,
and will always be, instantiated through communicative acts codified and 
reflected in, but not reducible to, organizational structures. Like every big 
organization, NT finds itself continually made and remade, and those pro-
cesses will shape how well it handles any future cases of wrongdoing.
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 16 Epilogue 
God and Devil, Hero and Villain,
and the Long Journey Ahead 
Rita L. Rahoi-Gilchrest 
This collection of essays, showcasing the expertise of nearly two dozen 
organizational communication scholars, is a daring anomaly. All of its 
richly varied chapters explore just a single case study. More unusual still,
they all focus on one man’s intensely personal story of corporate whistle-
blowing in a country, Norway, otherwise renowned for its ethics and 
transparency.
How do our three co-editors defend such an approach? In Chapter 2 , 
it is argued that the full complexity of any major socio-organizational 
event is best captured by triangulation—that is, by using multiple frames 
for analysis. So, at the outset, they offered each potential contributor 
two theoretical viewing lenses to consider: Hirschman’s social-economic 
perspective on exiting organizations (a dialectic of self vs. organizational 
preservation) and Campbell’s social-psychological model of the heroic 
monomyth (in a twist on that myth, the case study possibly reflects not 
heroic valuation but the dialectic tension of “saving” the self vs. a greater 
other).
In addition, they wisely made available to these contributors a rich
array of primary and secondary source materials, any of which might 
prove especially pertinent to a scholar’s preferred theoretical perspective.
Given the variety of perspectives here, and given that all of them focus on 
a single story, we can expect that the book will prove fascinating, not to 
mention unusually accessible, to a wide range of readers.
Because this project was several years in gestation, the editors will seem 
prescient in their anticipation of the debates on whistleblowing that began 
dominating American politics in the fall of 2019. These latter events, far 
more public in scope and impact than the Norsk Tipping (NT) scandal,
can prove difficult for many of us to interpret amid the cacophony of 
opinions being expressed.We might find this nuanced guide helpful, then,
when revisiting our own sensemaking in interpreting the meaning of any 
single whistleblowing event, especially one of such national scope and 
impact. Here, we are able to explore whistleblowing more broadly—as 
a public, organizational, mediated, corporate, even “paracorporate” act 
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practice, and perceptions of calling public attention to wrongdoing.These 
analyses also take our understanding of what whistleblowing is, and can 
be, far beyond typical “classifications” that merely identify top types of 
reported corporate wrongdoing (e.g., health care, defense contractor, tax/ 
IRS, securities, or procurement fraud; see Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro,
2016).
Instead, these chapters bring to life the kind of deep understanding of 
whistleblowing that Sarah Amira de la Garza describes: “Whistleblowing 
experiences are vivid displays of conflict between forces of power and 
largely unspoken values.” Reading this collection will be valuable to any-
one seeking a more well-rounded appreciation of this very particular and 
dramatic form of organizational/rhetorical narrative. But the interdisci-
plinary and intercultural nature of this collection deserves to be noted as 
well. We hear from not only corporate and legal practitioners but also 
scholars from across the United States, England, and Norway, writing 
from departments of communication, economics, and business. This 
makes for an impressive wealth (or array) of interdisciplinary expertise.
Of the many intriguing questions and themes arising from the 15 chap-
ters in this collection, I want to explore these four: 
• How, rhetorically, do publics define and manage the concept of
whistleblowing? 
• How does this process shift over time as cultural norms and expecta-
tions change? 
• How can the whistleblowing process be understood as a multidimen-
sional, shifting matrix of dialectic tensions? 
• How does whistleblowing hold potential for engaged research and 
practice in organizational and “paracorporate communication” (a term 
I’ll define at the end of this epilogue)? 
How Whistleblowing Is Rhetorically Defined and Managed 
Let’s begin with a classical rhetorical perspective on these contempo-
rary events. Ronald Walter Greene, Daniel Horvath, and Larry Brown-
ing walk us through the applicability of the ancient Greek concept of 
parrhesia, denoting frank free speech that, like whistleblowing, involves 
both criticizing and truth-telling in the face of considerable personal risk.
Their discussion establishes a foundation for our thinking about whistle-
blowing as a rhetorical act, not just a moral one. From the perspective of 
organizational communication scholarship, these authors also show how 
whistleblowing can lead to improving an organization’s infrastructure 
and enhancing its democracy.
This discussion can be extended further, however, if we consider
whistleblowing as not only a rhetorical/organizational act but also as a 













   









by various publics as a “god term”—rhetorician Kenneth Burke’s evoca-
tive name for what he called “the ultimates of motivation.” Scholar 
Richard Weaver extended that idea by proposing a dichotomy between 
“god” and “devil” terms. “God” terms—words such as “liberty,” “jus-
tice,” “freedom,” and “allies”—are sanctified by rhetorical communities 
or cultures and become guiding terms for collective inspiration and posi-
tive action, whereas “devil” terms—words such as “Nazi,” “abortion,”
and “rapist”—are used because “there seems to be indeed some obscure 
psychic law which compels every nation to have in its national imagina-
tion an enemy .  .  . for something which will personify ‘the adversary’”
(Weaver, 2009/1953, p. 222, see also Kperogi, 2016). These latter words,
while negatively nuanced, can have the same rhetorical force as their dia-
lectic opposites. What makes this dialectic—and therefore a challenging 
target when it comes to the rhetoric surrounding whistleblowing—is that 
both “god” and “devil” terms can, and do, shift over time.
How Cultural Meaning-Making of Whistleblowing 
Shifts Over Time 
Given the history of whistleblowing legislation in America dating all 
the way back to 1778 (Stanger, cited in Naylor, 2019 ), we might expect 
whistleblowing to enjoy the cultural gravitas of a “god term.” But can we 
truly say that whistleblowing is always so considered? Or is it instead an 
example of a principle caught in the dialectic of “god” vs. “devil” terms? 
While the whistleblower’s legal rights and protections have usually 
been defended during the past few decades, and while whistleblowers 
certainly have been romanticized if not glamorized in movies such as On 
the Waterfront, All the President’s Men, and Erin Brockovich, consider 
its definition as it appears online and in the public domain in the second 
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary. There, “whistleblower” is defined as 
“an employee who turns against their superiors to bring a problem out 
in the open” (italics mine). This is very different from Miceli and Near’s 
(1985) summary quoted in several of these essays. And while Greene,
Horvath, and Browning are justified in presenting a definition grounded 
in organizational scholarship, its wording—“disclosure . . . to persons or 
organizations able to effect action”—does not quite convey the potential 
for backlash against whistleblowers in the way that Black’s early legal 
definition can (and, I suggest, does). In the court of public opinion, this 
legal definition as it appears in the public domain might well carry more 
weight in shaping reactions to whistleblowing than definitions from a 
more limited field of study.
No less influential are the power and presence of those “superiors”
in the Black’s Law definition. When those superiors include the actual 
government or leadership of a country, our task of deciding whether 
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act—becomes far muddier. Consider the discourse surrounding whistle-
blowing in the daily headlines of the past decade. There, we can see a 
linguistic tug-of-war between “god” and “devil” terms as a split develops 
between those who view whistleblowing as an unpatriotic act (attacking,
for instance, the motives of Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning) and 
those who staunchly defend the right of whistleblowers to be protected 
for their patriotic or moral acts (most recently, in 2019, the CIA offi-
cial whose White House whistleblower complaint triggered presidential 
impeachment hearings).
Perhaps another key to deeper understanding of the social meaning-
making in whistleblowing lies in Greene, Horvath, and Browning’s pre-
sentation of Charles Redding’s differentiation between “boat rockers”
and “whistleblowers”—implying that their motivation, as we perceive 
it, might lead to a wider definition of a whistleblowing act as being on 
one side or the other of the “god/devil” dialectic. We also can take into 
consideration Corey Bruno and Charles Conrad’s observation that once 
people have been “de-humanized through existing rhetoric” (perhaps 
through the application of “devil terms”), they are less likely to be dis-
senters at all.
Whistleblowing as Dialectic Tensions 
The dialectic tensions in our very talking about whistleblowing lead us 
back to the opening chapter of this volume. There, in his own account of 
his whistleblowing experience, we find Peer Jacob Svenkerud (PJS) reflect-
ing on his personal and professional struggles to navigate the competing 
forces of self-preservation and self-sacrifice. PJS poignantly describes 
feeling, for much of his life, a “stranger in a strange land,” moving from 
company to company in search of a professional home that truly aligned 
with his values, his training as a scholar of social structures and diffusion 
theory, and his day-to-day work as a corporate leader.
Organizational assimilation is a powerful force, especially for some-
one who has long sought the ideal fit for his skills, temperament, and 
experience. PJS, as just such a person, likely felt especially susceptible 
to its influence; Bruno and Conrad agree that “self-knowledge and self-
perception at a given point in time/space guides and constrains actors’ 
symbolic action and their identity narratives,” which implies that the 
forces of organizational assimilation can strongly affect an individual’s 
decision to delay whistleblowing.
Further, as PJS describes, NT had an authoritarian corporate culture in 
which anyone daring to speak out about unethical practices had repeat-
edly and quickly been sanctioned. Such a repressive culture, Bruno and 
Conrad point out, often leads to co-workers perceiving the dissenter as 
a threat to their own well-being. In one particular meeting, only one of 

















the growing attention they were getting in the media, PJS was christened 
“The Prince of Darkness”—a “devil term” in all senses of the phrase.
And just a few short months later, when he had expressed his concerns to 
another top leader, the vice CEO introduced another “devil term,” telling 
the group, “We have an unfaithful servant . . . do any of you know who 
this individual is?”As PJS then reveals, his identity was outed nearly three 
years later, and despite a new CEO’s promises to “clean up” after the 
scandal, PJS was essentially removed from an active role as director for 
communications and external affairs. He then hired an attorney, settled 
with the company, and began a new career just days after terminating 
his relationship with NT. What began as informed self-sacrifice for the 
public good then became nearly a life-and-death (or life-and-health) issue 
of self-preservation. What PJS does not discuss in depth but is also rel-
evant, is his identity as the son and grandson of a socially and politically 
prominent family in Norway. Knowing this helps us understand even 
better the deeper dimensions of the personal and professional risks he 
took in this case.
Along these same lines, Karl E. Weick’s chapter addresses such dialec-
tic tensions as “surfaces of apprehension” (citing Taylor & Van Every,
2000)—“opposed ideas that become increasingly difficult to manage”— 
and delves more deeply into the sensemaking that PJS needed to do in his 
particular circumstances.Weick says that “whistleblowing can be treated 
as a deepening struggle to make sense under conditions where a growing 
set of implications, tied to a generative cognition, become increasingly 
incompatible” and adds that while some people are able (or acculturated) 
to adapt to modest dissonance, others have a “fixation with stronger dis-
sonance that edits sensemaking more severely.” Returning to PJS’s story 
and viewing it from this sensemaking perspective, it appears his personal 
vulnerability in feeling a lack of belongingness or satisfaction despite his 
successful career might well have been a hidden strength—not only to 
call out the dissonances between organizational messaging and practice,
but also to brave the risks of the whistleblowing act.
At this point, then, we have a sense of how rhetorical, multidisciplinary,
intercultural/international, and historical views inform a keener under-
standing of whistleblowing. For me personally, however, as a passionate 
lifelong student of organizational/corporate communication and rheto-
ric, the finest value of this collection is how it inspires future directions 
for research in these fields—with whistleblowing as the centerpiece of a 
vital discursive community.
Whistleblowing as Research and Practice in Organizational 
Communication 
The idea of personal and organizational risk-taking that I discussed in 
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idea that whistleblowing might be a more inclusive, and more promising,
topic for research and practice in organizational communication than 
previously realized. Authors Greene, Horvath, and Browning discuss the 
unique nature of whistleblowing as organizational communication. They 
suggest we move beyond established definitions of whistleblowing (i.e.,
as a public act or an act against one’s superiors) and instead view it as 
a way to “negotiate asymmetrical relationships of power.” They contend 
that both organizations and individuals might benefit from organizations 
actively encouraging collective action and upward communication on 
whistleblowing, keeping discussions internal and therefore resulting in 
positive correction that remains under organizational control.
I discussed earlier the dialectic tension resulting in the use of “legal”
vs. “scholarly” definitions of whistleblowing. Another reason to exam-
ine whistleblowing as a unique form of organizational communication 
comes from law professor Anne Oline Haugen, who says: “In this story,
the whistleblower blew the whistle about the use of public funds that he 
considered illegitimate. No one disputed the justness of his charges, but 
he still received no protection from recrimination. How could this hap-
pen?” Indeed. It’s especially puzzling given Bjørn T. Bakken and Thor-
vald Hærem’s observation that whistleblowing cases are “high on the 
public agenda in Norway.” Essentially, Haugen goes on to explain, there 
are differences in Norway’s legal statutes and practice. Norwegian law,
for instance, determines that some immoral practices are not punishable 
within the scope of whistleblowing statutes. But regardless of context or 
culture, the law can be flawed.
Norwegian scholars Einar Øverenget and Åse Storhaug Hole, in their 
discussions of ethical blindness and the lack of reporting organizational 
wrongdoing, offer another intriguing possibility for future research.
What can we investigate further to improve risk assessment for ethical 
blindness in the organizational cultures we study? These authors identify 
several likely subjects: fear of retaliation, beliefs of inaction, difficulty in 
assessing the wrongdoing, and lacking trusted confidants.
But the case of NT reveals other factors that might influence non-
reportage, such as the prestige and value structures of the organization— 
factors building a strong sense of organizational identification and pride.
Joseph McGlynn reminds us in his chapter on whistleblowing and risk 
that from the perspective of prospect theory, people “place a greater 
emphasis on potential losses than they do gains.” Thus, where they
occupy a comfortable place in a successful organization, people are more 
apt to be risk-averse. And any organization that enjoys a positive reputa-
tion, as Audra Diers-Larson points out, suffers from the “vulnerability 
of complacency.” The stronger and more accomplished the organiza-
tion, then, the greater the risk might be of failure to address unethical 
actions unless the kind of “mindful management” discussed by Bakken 



















are not needed to amplify weaker signals of wrongdoing to management,
which of course is what PJS eventually decided he had to do. As William 
Rothel Smith III, Jeffrey W. Treem, and Joshua B. Barbour remind us in 
their chapter on reconstituting organizations, whistleblowing is a signal 
of the “need to reconstitute the organization . . . and . . . marshal consti-
tutive resources to do so,” as PJS experienced in the NT case.
Contributors Åse Storhaug Hole and Therese E. Sverdrup offer another
valuable perspective from the field of organizational behavior regarding 
decision-making, sensemaking, and whether or not dialectic tensions are 
addressed and resolved. Their discussion of psychological contracts reso-
nates with PJS’s discussion of the many pressures weighing on him at NT.
He certainly had long-standing relational contracts based on trust and 
loyalty (reinforced by considerable organizational messaging that loyalty 
was a priority), as well as ideological contracts based on the stated values 
of the organization. In fact, it was only when these ideological contracts 
were so repeatedly and egregiously violated that he could break the rela-
tional contract keeping him from whistleblowing.
If whistleblowers cannot be guaranteed legal protection, and if individ-
uals struggle with organizational identification, perceived loss vs. gain,
and their own unwritten psychological contracts, does this mean that 
whistleblowing will most likely occur only when it raises the lowest risks 
for all and can be managed internally within organizations? Consider the 
point made by Bruno and Conrad that not only PJS’s story, but also his 
status, allowed him to engage in whistleblowing. (He was, we recall, an 
insider in upper management, tasked with looking after his company’s 
image and strategy, and someone who maintained secrecy and anonymity 
for nearly three years.) This view is echoed in writer Amira de la Garza’s 
observation that PJS was able to “elegantly navigate events due largely in 
part to the power that accompanied his experience and position, as well 
as the power of having governmental agencies collaborating to inves-
tigate.” So, do we infer from this narrative and these discussions that 
whistleblowing is most likely to be carried out by those who are already 
well connected and/or protected? 
Several of the scholars invited to this colloquy addressed the issue of 
voice and how it’s expressed or suppressed in the meaning-making that 
accompanies the act of whistleblowing. In terms of its implications for 
organizational research, Diers-Lawson makes a poignant point in her
chapter on the “loneliest stakeholder.” She notes a lack of attention to 
“narrative about transgressions in organizations—the emotional journey 
that employees take through the crisis, no matter whether they are whistle-
blowers or trying to make sense of the events as they unfold.” Contributors 
Storhaug Hole and Sverdrup agree, noting,“We think it no less important 
to focus on non-reporting behavior because most employees stand by in 
silence.” This might well be worth consideration in future research on 
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Additionally, where does the sensemaking of stakeholders fit into the 
dynamic of risk, decision-making, and dialectic tensions involved in 
whistleblowing? After all, the perceived opinion of the board of directors 
came into play in the NT case when PJS was told that his voice would 
carry more weight than that of someone less highly ranked in the com-
pany. Yet, he recalls, when he met with the chair and vice chair of the 
board in Oslo, “case after case was dismissed with the explanation that 
it was impossible to prove, that they lacked written evidence, that, yes, it 
was serious and warranted a ‘warning’ and change of practice, but that 
no further action was required.”Although this was not the final decision 
by the board, it was certainly a stunning first reaction to PJS’s attempt to 
share his concerns.
The significance of this action, contributor Brian K. Richardson explains,
is that whistleblowers rarely win their case if stakeholders don’t, or 
won’t, get involved in the issue. And, applying attribution theory, they 
are generally apt to have “more negative perceptions about whistleblow-
ers who were engaged in the wrongdoing they are now reporting.”Yet, at 
the other end of the spectrum, the “saint whistleblower will face greater 
retaliation . . . in an attempt to reduce their credibility and legitimacy.”
Diers-Lawson affirms that in the NT situation, “blame attribution [was] 
less of a question of the facts of a situation and more of a question of 
perception and competing interests.” This takes us back to our earlier 
discussion of the “god”/“devil” dialectic. Richardson poses the question 
of whether stakeholders would consider PJS to have been a hero or a 
prince of darkness.
This discussion fully acknowledges the difficulties inherent in chang-
ing any organization’s culture, particularly when its potential losses 
may exceed any gains. Nord University Professor June Borge Doornich 
reminds us of companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco that were 
forced to implement change after their white-collar scandals made the 
news but wonders whether such forced change as a result of publicized 
crises is actually effective in the long term. She concedes that the judi-
cial frameworks in certain countries “force companies to implement a 
management control system that both eases the threshold for blowing 
the whistle and protects the whistleblower afterwards.” But as we have 
already discussed, a legal paradigm isn’t always the most effective one for 
understanding and managing whistleblowing.
At the start of this epilogue, you’ll recall my coining the phrase “para-
corporate communication,” with the prefix “para” denoting “beside,
alongside of, beyond, aside from” (Merriam-Webster, 2019 ). I meant 
“paracorporate” to reference the broader, multidisciplinary field of study 
that surrounds and supplements our studies of corporate communica-
tion. In this very volume, perspectives ranging from organizational to 
interpersonal to rhetorical theory offer varied perceptual lenses trained 
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wrongdoing. To help navigate the difficult cultural, social, and organiza-
tional changes such an act carries with it, we might well have to draw on 
many different tools as scholars.
Ultimately, the narrative offered by PJS in the NT case—indeed, this 
entire volume—challenges us to examine our own values as scholars and 
practitioners. As we pursue these lines of paracorporate research, do we 
believe the need for self-identity, the need to tell a story until it is heard,
and the innate drive for sensemaking will be enough for aggrieved indi-
viduals to overcome the pressures of organizational culture, identifica-
tion, and assimilation and find the courage to report wrongdoing? Can 
we take our skills at risk assessment and employ them to make organi-
zations stronger and safer for (and perhaps through) whistleblowing? 
Do we believe organizations can evolve cultures actually welcoming the 
whistleblowing act as a means of rewriting the organization’s story on 
the way to fulfilling its own manifest destiny? 
As in the act of whistleblowing itself, our future goals as scholars and 
practitioners might well be to come together into the kind of community 
of practice represented in this collection, studying the “communicative 
constitution of organizations” suggested by Rothel Smith III, Treem, and 
Barbour, and using our shared wisdom and insights to draw belief and 
action together.
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